



VESTED RIGHTS, “FRANCHISES,” AND THE SEPARATION 
OF POWERS 
CALEB NELSON† 
Modern courts and commentators have had trouble distinguishing the kinds of 
decisions that require “judicial” power from the adjudicative tasks that Congress can 
authorize administrative agencies to perform in the course of “executing” federal law. 
In a prior article (Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
559 (2007)), I sought to explain traditional doctrines on that topic. For much of 
American history, Congress could authorize executive-branch agencies to administer 
and dispose of “public rights” belonging to the federal government or the people 
collectively, and Congress also could give agencies conclusive authority with respect to 
the administration of “privileges” that federal law gave private individuals or entities. 
But the political branches did not have similar sway over vested private “rights.” Only 
true courts could conclusively determine either that a private person had forfeited such 
rights or that the claimed rights had never vested in the person to begin with. 
In my earlier article, I referred to the category of “franchises”—special powers or 
perquisites that the government gave private people who, in turn, did something of 
value for the public. Because no one had a vested right to be granted a franchise in 
the first place, I lumped franchises together with privileges. That taxonomy may have 
influenced the Supreme Court’s analysis of patents in Oil States Energy Services 
v. Greene’s Energy Group (2018). But the story is actually more complex. In the 
nineteenth century, once the government granted a franchise, private rights normally 
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were thought to vest in the franchisee. That idea affected constitutional doctrine with 
respect to a wide array of legal interests, including not only patents but also corporate 
charters, the power to operate ferries and toll roads, and more. 
This Article explores the concept of franchises and their interaction with 
American-style separation of powers. In the process, it illuminates historical 
understandings of the public/private distinction, unearths new evidence about the 
constitutional status of patents, and sheds light on the traditional roles of each branch 
of government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Article III of the Constitution vests what it calls “[t]he judicial Power of 
the United States” in courts that enjoy structural protections against political 
influence—courts staffed by judges who “shall hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour” and whose compensation “shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office.”1 But Article III does not spell out the types of 
governmental decrees that require judicial power, as opposed to the decrees 
that Congress can authorize administrative agencies to make in the course of 
helping to execute federal law. That line is important to American-style 
separation of powers, but it has proved difficult to draw. 
In 2007, I published an article explaining the framework that lawyers and 
judges used for this purpose throughout much of American history.2 That 
framework relied on the traditional distinction between “public rights” and 
“private rights”—a distinction that Ann Woolhandler and I had already 
explored in related contexts.3 Of course, I was not the first to note that the 
various branches of government play different roles when different types of 
legal interests are at stake, or that the distinction between public rights and 
private rights is an important aspect of those differences. Justice William 
Brennan had emphasized that distinction in cases about Congress’s power to 
authorize adjudication outside the Article III courts,4 and modern scholars 
had also examined the distinction’s history.5 Still, I took the distinction more 
 
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
2 Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (2007). 
3 See generally Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 689 (2004) (discussing the distinction’s relevance to traditional ideas about the proper parties to 
lawsuits); Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015 
(2006) (discussing the distinction’s relevance to constitutional limits on “retroactive” legislation). 
4 See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-56 (1989); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-72 (1982) (plurality opinion). Earlier, Justice White’s 
majority opinion in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 
442 (1977), had likewise invoked the concept of “public rights,” but in my view it botched the 
analysis. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 602-05. 
5 The seminal article is Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From 
Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765 (1986). 
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seriously than most law professors did,6 and I suggested that it is more 
embedded in separation-of-powers doctrines than people realized. 
In the ensuing years, what I called the traditional framework has become 
more prominent. Various scholars with an interest in originalism have 
embraced it to distinguish the kinds of legal claims that Congress can commit 
to administrative agencies from the kinds of legal claims that trigger the need 
for “judicial” power.7 On the Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas has 
also deployed the framework repeatedly in this context.8 Most recently, his 
majority opinion in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, 
LLC9 used the framework to uphold the administrative cancellation of a 
patent pursuant to procedures authorized by Congress. The Court reasoned 
that a patent is a “public franchise” granted by the government, and the 
Constitution does not prevent Congress from qualifying such grants by 
reserving a power of administrative reconsideration.10 
I am honored and gratified by the reception of my earlier article. Precisely 
because people have paid attention to it, though, I feel a responsibility to correct 
something that I got wrong—or at least did not adequately qualify—and that 
risks affecting the future course of doctrine. Contrary to a passing suggestion in 
the article, what nineteenth-century lawyers called “franchises” were capable of 
vesting in private individuals or entities in such a way as to become full-fledged 
private rights. When granting franchises, though, legislatures could indeed 
structure them in such a way as to avoid this result. As we shall see, the story of 
“franchises” thus relates to what scholars have correctly identified as two of the 
most important open questions about the framework discussed in my earlier 
article: (1) how to classify the kinds of legal interests that modern statutes 
 
6 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern 
Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 204 (“By invoking a dichotomy between so-called ‘public’ and 
‘private’ rights, [Justice Brennan’s opinion in Northern Pipeline] has introduced (or, perhaps more 
accurately, reintroduced) a standard wholly unwarranted by constitutional language, history, policy 
or theory.”); see also James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of 
the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 665 (2004) (“Scholars have been especially unkind to the 
public rights category . . . .”). 
7 See, e.g., William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1540-47 (2020); 
Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 417-23 (2017). For a nonoriginalist’s 
wise comments (and measured assessment of doctrinal evolution), see Henry P. Monaghan, Jurisdiction 
Stripping Circa 2020: What The Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69 DUKE L.J. 1, 36-47, 55 (2019). 
8 See Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2185 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); Sessions v. 
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1246 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 
135 S. Ct. 1932, 1964-66 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 
Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 171-72 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 
U.S. 318, 344 n.2 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
9 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
10 See id. at 1373. 
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create11 and (2) the extent to which Congress can use its other powers to extract 
waivers of the right to judicial adjudication of vested private rights.12 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly summarizes the historical 
framework. Part II examines where “franchises” fit in that framework. Part 
III focuses specifically on patents for inventions. 
I. A SUMMARY OF THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRAMEWORK 
My earlier article relied on two key distinctions. First, it contrasted legal 
interests belonging to the government (or to the people in their collective 
capacity) with legal interests belonging to private individuals or entities.13 
Second, within the latter category, it contrasted private “rights” (of the sort 
that even the legislature could not abrogate once they had vested in a private 
person) with mere “privileges” (which belonged to private people only so 
long as the legislature allowed them to exist).14 
Those distinctions were centrally important to the doctrine of “vested 
rights,” which Edward Corwin once described as “the underlying doctrine of 
American Constitutional Law” before the Civil War—a doctrine so 
foundational that, without it, “there would [not] have been any Constitutional 
Law” at all.15 Under general principles of constitutional law (common to both 
the Federal Constitution and the constitutions of the various states),16 only 
certain kinds of legal interests were thought to be capable of “vesting” in 
private individuals or entities in such a way as to trigger this doctrine. Those 
legal interests could be described under the categories of life, liberty, and 
property—categories corresponding to the kinds of individual rights that 
Lockeans believed would exist even in the state of nature and that allegedly 
supplied the basic rationale for creating government in the first place.17 Rights 
to life and physical liberty were said to be vested in individuals from birth, 
 
11 See Baude, supra note 7, at 1578-79; see also Adam Mossoff, Statutes, Common Law Rights, and 
the Mistaken Classification of Patents as Public Rights, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2591, 2598-99, 2602-15 (2019) 
(noting that interests should not automatically be classified as privileges simply because they are 
created or secured by statutes, and applying this point to patents). 
12 See Baude, supra note 7, at 1579; John Harrison, Public Rights, Private Privileges, and Article 
III, 54 GA. L. REV. 143, 179-216 (2020). 
13 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 566. 
14 See id. at 566-72. 
15 Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247, 
255 (1914). 
16 Cf. Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General 
Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1283 (2000) (noting that except where the constitution of a 
particular state specifically established an idiosyncratic rule, federal courts often applied “a presumptive 
set of one-size-fits-all principles of state constitutional interpretation based on a variety of sources, 
including the consensus of other state courts resolving similar questions, prior interpretations of 
analogous federal constitutional provisions, as well as various domestic and foreign treatise writers”). 
17 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 567. 
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and to remain vested unless a particular individual was duly adjudged to have 
forfeited them.18 Property moved around more, but the capacity to acquire 
property was thought of as a natural right19—and when a private individual 
or entity did indeed acquire legal interests that counted as real or personal 
property (including various rights acquired by contract), those interests too 
triggered the doctrine of vested rights.20 
As applied in the nineteenth century, the doctrine of vested rights limited 
governmental power in various ways. Of course, the doctrine did not prevent 
statutes from regulating how people used their property or identifying 
circumstances in which property would be deemed to be abandoned, 
transferred from one person to another, or forfeited to the government.21 
Likewise, statutes could define crimes and authorize sentences that could 
include loss of property (monetary fines), loss of liberty (imprisonment), or 
loss of life (capital punishment). But whatever the scope of various 
legislatures’ powers to establish rules according to which people could lose 
their rights to life, liberty, or property, the doctrine of vested rights restricted 
the temporal effect of those rules. Throughout the nineteenth century, the 
doctrine operated as a limit on retroactive legislation, and it also helped to 
define what counted as retroactivity.22 
That aspect of the doctrine reflected broader principles about the 
separation of powers. In general, neither “legislative” nor “executive” power 
was capable of acting directly upon vested rights and legally divesting them 
(or authoritatively declaring that they had been divested in the past).23 Thus, 
only a court—a body with “judicial” power—could validly adjudge someone 
guilty of a crime and sentence him to pay a fine, to serve a term in prison, or 
to be executed. Likewise, if someone claimed to be the owner of the type of 
legal interests that counted as vested rights to property, only a court could 
declare authoritatively (in a way that would have preclusive effects in later 
litigation) that the property actually belonged to someone else. 
 
18 See, e.g., EDWIN E. BRYANT, THE OUTLINES OF LAW 218, 220 (Madison, Democrat 
Printing Co. 1895); 1 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 203, 205 (Boston, Charles 
C. Little & James Brown 1838). 
19 See, e.g., MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 4 (“[A]ll persons have a natural right to life, liberty 
and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry	.	.	.	.”). 
20 See generally WILLIAM G. MYER, VESTED RIGHTS: SELECTED CASES AND NOTES ON 
RETROSPECTIVE AND ARBITRARY LEGISLATION AFFECTING VESTED RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 
(St. Louis, Gilbert Book Co. 1891). 
21 Cf. Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2464-67 (2016) 
(discussing early state and federal forfeiture statutes); id. at 2512-13 (discussing recording statutes, 
laws about the abandonment of property, and adverse possession). 
22 See James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property 
and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 103-11 (1993); Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1023-27. 
23 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 568-70. 
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Some state constitutions said relatively little about the characteristics of the 
state’s courts. But the Federal Constitution restricted the kinds of entities that 
could exercise what Article III calls “[t]he judicial Power of the United States.”24 
Given those restrictions, Congress could not confer “judicial” power upon the 
typical administrative agency.25 As a result, Congress could not authorize such 
agencies to make binding determinations that a private individual or entity had 
acted in such a way as to forfeit vested private rights (or that such rights had 
never vested in the individual or entity in the first place). 
By contrast, within the limits of its enumerated powers, Congress could 
and did authorize executive officials or administrative agencies to dispose of 
legal interests that did not fit the template of vested private rights. For 
instance, Congress could authorize “land offices” in the executive branch to 
surrender the public’s rights in land owned by the federal government, and to 
determine which private claimants met the statutory criteria for purchasing 
or being given this land. To the extent that no private person’s vested rights 
were yet at stake, Congress could give the land office conclusive authority to 
determine which rival claimants met the statutory criteria and to distribute 
the land accordingly.26 Likewise, Congress could revise the statutory criteria 
at any time before private rights actually vested.27 
To apply this framework, people had to draw distinctions that were not 
dictated by formal logic. For instance, the framework depended crucially on 
the difference between a mere expectancy and a vested right, but doctrines 
about the moment at which a legal interest vested were inevitably somewhat 
arbitrary.28 Likewise, it was not always obvious whether a license should be 
regarded as a vested property right or a revocable “privilege”29—and as 
Professor Charles Reich famously suggested, the same might be said of an 
anticipated stream of income.30 
Still, modern ways of talking have made the traditional framework seem 
less coherent than it actually was. Take the Supreme Court’s opinion in Atlas 
 
24 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
25 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 575-77. 
26 See id. at 577-78; see also Lewis v. Lewis, 9 Mo. 183, 188 (1845) (explaining this point on the 
ground that “[t]he United States is the owner of the public lands, and can dispose of it on such 
terms, and in such manner, as seem fit”); Harrison, supra note 12, at 172-73 (linking “the nineteenth 
century system of executive adjudication” to the idea that “public rights were ownership interests of 
or controlled by the government” and “[a] core function of the executive is to exercise the proprietary 
rights of the government itself according to law”). 
27 See, e.g., Frisbie v. Whitney, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 187, 192-93 (1870). 
28 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 579 (illustrating this problem with doctrines about purchase options). 
29 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 740 (1964) (noting the important 
consequences that flowed from this distinction). 
30 See id. at 787 (“It is time to see that the ‘privilege’ or ‘gratuity’ concept, as applied to wealth 
dispensed by government, is not much different from the absolute right of ownership that private 
capital once invoked to justify arbitrary power over employees and the public.”). 
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Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission.31 The 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 had established a mechanism for 
imposing civil penalties on employers who violated the Act or its 
implementing regulations. If an inspector representing the Secretary of 
Labor found violations in a workplace, the inspector would issue a citation to 
the responsible employer and could propose a monetary penalty for each 
violation.32 An employer who contested either the citation or the proposed 
penalties could trigger an adjudicative process before an administrative 
tribunal, but the tribunal’s final order would be subject only to appellate-style 
review in a federal circuit court.33 As the Administrative Conference of the 
United States (ACUS) noted, this arrangement was unusual at the time: 
“Under most money penalty statutes, the penalty cannot be imposed until the 
agency has succeeded in a de novo adjudication in federal district court, 
whether or not an administrative proceeding has been held previously.”34 
Nonetheless, ACUS urged other agencies to “consider asking Congress to 
grant them such authority,”35 and the Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in 
Atlas Roofing held that employers facing civil penalties did not have a 
constitutional right to have the relevant factual disputes be resolved by a jury. 
In Justice White’s words, 
At least in cases in which “public rights” are being litigated—e.g., cases in 
which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights 
created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact—the Seventh 
Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the factfinding 
function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the 
jury would be incompatible.36 
As shorthand for the category of “cases in which ‘public rights’ are being 
litigated,”37 people soon started referring to “‘public rights’ cases.”38 To this 
 
31 430 U.S. 442 (1977). 
32 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, §§ 8–10(a), 84 Stat. 1590, 1598-
1601; see also id. § 17(a)–(d), 84 Stat. at 1606 (establishing a maximum penalty of $1,000 per violation against 
employers whose violations are not willful or repeated and who correct the violation in a timely fashion). 
33 See id. §§ 10–11, 84 Stat. at 1601-03. 
34 Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 72-6: Civil Monetary Penalties as a Sanction 
(Dec. 14, 1972), as reprinted in 38 Fed. Reg. 19,792, 19,793 (July 23, 1973). 
35 Id. 
36 Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450. 
37 Id. 
38 See Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s Assault on 
the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1978). This locution arguably traces back to the 
following dictum in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856): 
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that 
the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial 
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day, the Supreme Court continues to refer to “the ‘public rights’ category of 
cases” when discussing doctrines about administrative adjudication.39 
The problem with this way of talking is that the distinction between 
public and private rights is a way of classifying legal interests, not entire cases. 
In Atlas Roofing, for instance, public rights were indeed at stake on one side—
but because the government was imposing monetary sanctions, private 
property rights were at stake on the other side. A case that pits public rights 
against private rights is no more a “public rights case” than it is a “private 
rights case,” and the idea that it must be classified as one or the other is bound 
to make the traditional doctrine seem hopeless.40 
To see the clunkiness of the modern vocabulary, consider the standard 
criminal case. As leading commentators observe, “[c]riminal cases have always 
been treated as ‘private rights’ cases, . . . and there seems to be no doubt that 
an administrative agency may not directly impose criminal punishments.”41 But 
criminal cases have the same structure as the dispute in Atlas Roofing: again, 
public rights (represented by the prosecutor) are pitted against the defendant’s 
rights to life, liberty, or property.42 It is arbitrary to call this structure a “private 
rights case” in one context and a “public rights case” in the other. 
The way out of this puzzle is to think more granularly about the legal 
interests at stake in these cases, and about who is in charge of those interests. 
If someone violates a federal criminal statute, Congress can surrender the 
relevant public rights without going to court; Congress can simply repeal the 
statute retroactively. By the same token, Congress can put prosecutors in the 
executive branch in charge of whether to bring charges and whether to accept 
 
determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the 
courts of the United States, as it may deem proper. 
Id. at 284; see also id. (referring to “this class of cases”); cf. Nelson, supra note 2, at 586-90 (discussing 
Murray’s Lessee). Still, references to “public rights cases” did not become popular among either judges 
or commentators until modern times. In Westlaw’s database, the earliest judicial opinion to use that 
phrase is Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 740 F.2d 1262, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 
473 U.S. 922 (1985), reinstated on remand, 770 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev’d, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
As a category for use in analyzing administrative adjudication, the phrase “cases involving ‘public 
rights’” also made its debut after Atlas Roofing. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) (plurality opinion); Peick v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 539 F. 
Supp. 1025, 1061 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff ’d, 724 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1983); Marshall v. Parking Place, Inc., 
No. 76-73, 1978 WL 1610, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 31, 1978). 
39 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489 (2011); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. 
MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 353-58 (7th ed. 2015) (likewise describing differences between 
the doctrines applicable to “public rights cases” and the doctrines applicable to “private rights cases”). 
40 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts 
Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 246-51 (1990) (concluding that the category of “public rights cases” 
is “so manipulable” as to be “meaningless”). 
41 FALLON ET AL., supra note 39, at 358. 
42 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 605. 
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a plea bargain on behalf of the public. Indeed, the Constitution itself 
empowers the President to grant a pardon even after a defendant has been 
convicted. But while the political branches are in charge of the public rights at 
stake in a criminal prosecution, they cannot unilaterally dispose of the 
defendant’s private rights. Just as Congress cannot itself make a binding 
determination of guilt and authoritatively sentence a defendant to prison,43 
neither can Congress authorize an agency in the executive branch to do so. 
Under the framework that prevailed in the nineteenth century, the same would 
have been true in cases like Atlas Roofing. While Congress could have denied 
certain “privileges” to a defendant based on an administrative determination 
of wrongdoing, the monetary penalties in Atlas Roofing operated against the 
employer’s property rights and therefore would have required an opportunity 
for proceedings in a true court—and the appellate-style review authorized by 
Congress probably would not have been good enough.44 
II. WHERE DO “FRANCHISES” FIT? 
In my initial article describing the nineteenth-century framework, I 
lumped so-called “franchises” together with “privileges.”45 Others have now 
done the same.46 But while I stand by the rest of my taxonomy, my reference 
to “franchises” was too casual. It is true that what nineteenth-century lawyers 
called “franchises” were granted by the government, and legislatures had 
broad discretion over whether to grant them and to whom; generally 
speaking, no one had a vested right to obtain a franchise in the first place. It 
is also true that states and the federal government issued franchises to serve 
public ends, and that franchises were subject to correspondingly more public 
regulation than other enterprises. Once granted, though, many legal interests 
that were called “franchises” could amount to vested rights under the 
nineteenth-century framework. 
 
43 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting bills of attainder). 
44 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 604 n.189 (arguing that Atlas Roofing misused precedents such as 
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909)); id. at 602-05 (concluding that Atlas 
Roofing “made significant inroads upon the traditional framework,” though noting that those inroads 
are limited in two ways: (1) Atlas Roofing does not apply to the standard criminal case in which life 
or liberty is at stake and (2) even when public rights are pitted against vested property rights, Atlas 
Roofing probably applies only where Congress has authorized appellate-style review in a true court). 
45 Id. at 567. 
46 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373-78 (2018); 
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1246 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis 
Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 171 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 
U.S. 318, 344 n.2 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Harrison, supra note 12, at 184 (citing my article for 
the proposition that “[i]n the nineteenth century system, franchises remained subject to modification by 
the government that granted them, absent a genuine contract to the contrary”). 
2021] Vested Rights, “Franchises,” and the Separation of Powers 1439 
A. “Franchises” in the English Legal Tradition and in Nineteenth-Century 
America 
In the English legal tradition, the term “franchise” was tied up with the 
royal prerogative—a concept that defies easy summary but that embraced 
various powers, immunities, and other perquisites belonging to the king.47 
Some aspects of the prerogative were nondelegable (meaning that the king 
could not confer them upon anyone else),48 but the king could give or sell others 
to people of his choosing. The interests created by such royal grants were called 
“franchises.” Thus, Blackstone defined a “franchise” as “a royal privilege, or 
branch of the king’s prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject.”49 
Elaborating on this definition in the 1790s, Stewart Kyd explained that “the 
word ‘franchise’ means a royal privilege in the hands of a subject, by which he 
either receives some profit, or has the exclusive exercise of some right.”50 
Because the king’s prerogative covered myriad topics, Blackstone 
observed that “[t]he kinds of [franchises] are various, and almost infinite.”51 
The word “franchise” derived from a French term for “liberty,”52 and it had 
long been used to refer to diverse exemptions that the king could confer upon 
a subject—such as exemptions from taxation, or from obligations of personal 
 
47 The prerogative has been understood in different ways at different times. See W.S. Holdsworth, 
The Prerogative in the Sixteenth Century, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 554-62 (1921) (observing that “[d]uring 
the Tudor period . . . there was . . . a great development of legal doctrine as to the position of the king and 
as to the nature and extent of his prerogative,” and summarizing some of the key ideas); see also Edward 
Gerald Gingold, The Seventeenth Century Constitutional Crises: Causes and Consequences, 25 CHITTY’S L.J. 
191, 191 (1977) (describing “the nature and limits of the royal prerogative” as “the central issue” in the crises 
of the seventeenth century). For discussion of the prerogative as of the mid-eighteenth century, see 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *240 (subdividing the king’s prerogatives into “such as regard, 
first, the king’s royal character; secondly, his royal authority; and, lastly, his royal income”); id. at *240-80 
(covering the first two categories); id. at *281-337 (covering the third category); see also Julian Davis 
Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1223-28 
(2019) (summarizing Blackstone’s list of the varied powers and privileges that the king enjoyed under the 
rubric of the prerogative). For discussion of the prerogative today, see generally GAIL BARTLETT & 
MICHAEL EVERETT, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 03861: THE ROYAL 
PREROGATIVE (2017), https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03861/SN03861.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GZQ-LDWF]. 
48 See Holdsworth, supra note 47, at 558-59. 
49 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37. Henry Finch had provided essentially the 
same definition a century and a half earlier. See HENRIE FINCH, NOMOTEXNIA 38b (London, 
Society of Stationers 1613); see also JOSEPH ASBURY JOYCE, A TREATISE ON FRANCHISES 1-2 
(1909) (noting that Finch’s definition was “adopted and followed substantially by Blackstone, Chitty, 
and Cruise” (footnotes omitted)). 
50 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 14 (London, J. Butterworth 
1793); see also id. (noting that the word “franchise” was sometimes used in a broader sense to encompass 
“every political right which can be enjoyed or exercised by a freeman,” including “the right of voting 
at elections” and “the right of being tried by a jury,” but endorsing the narrower definition). 
51 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37; accord FINCH, supra note 49, at 39a. 
52 Franchise, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2009); cf. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *37 (“Franchise and liberty are used as synonymous terms . . . .”). 
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service, or from restrictions on hunting in the king’s forests.53 But the word 
was also used to refer to more affirmative rights and powers that the king 
could grant, including the power to levy and collect certain types of taxes or 
tolls54 and rights in property that otherwise would go to the king.55 Likewise, 
Blackstone observed that “[i]t is . . . a franchise for a number of persons to 
be incorporated, and subsist as a body politic, with a power to maintain 
perpetual succession and do other corporate acts.”56 
After the United States became independent, American lawyers continued 
to use the word “franchise,” but they recast it to avoid references to the king’s 
prerogative or to royal grants. Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court in 
1839, for instance, Chief Justice Roger Taney defined franchises as “special 
privileges conferred by government upon individuals, and which do not belong 
to the citizens of the country, generally, of common right.”57 He added: “It is 
essential to the character of a franchise that it should be a grant from the 
sovereign authority, and in this country no franchise can be held which is not 
derived from a law of the state.”58 James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law 
provided both a similar definition (“certain privileges conferred by grant from 
government, and vested in individuals”) and a similar account of how 
franchises were created (in the United States, “whoever claims an exclusive 
privilege . . . must show a grant from the legislature”).59 
Kent emphasized that many of the categories of franchises granted in 
England had no relevance in the United States. In his words, “Corporations, or 
bodies politic, are the most usual franchises known in our law.”60 But apart from 
granting the franchise of corporate status, legislatures also conferred various 
other special privileges upon individuals or entities that proposed to serve the 
public in some respect. For instance, although private people normally were 
 
53 See 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 561-62 (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press 1895) 
(discussing different types of franchises that existed in the thirteenth century). 
54 See id. at 562-63 (listing “[f]iscal powers” as another category of thirteenth-century 
franchises). Early on, even the power to hold courts that would administer justice (and enable the 
franchisee to collect fees and fines) was a type of “franchise” that the king might grant. See id. at 
563-72; cf. Naomi D. Hurnard, The Anglo-Norman Franchises (pts. 1 & 2), 64 ENG. HIST. REV. 289, 
433 (1949) (arguing that Maitland exaggerated the extent to which franchise courts were authorized 
to hear serious criminal cases). 
55 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37 (listing the rights to “waifs, wrecks, 
estrays, treasure-trove, royal fish, forfeitures, and deodands” as “franchises” that the king might grant). 
56 Id. But see 1 KYD, supra note 50, at 15 (arguing that under Kyd’s preferred definition, “a 
corporation cannot be called a franchise” because the status of incorporation was not an estate or 
inheritance that “may be granted and conveyed from one to another”). 
57 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 595 (1839); see also JOYCE, supra note 49, at 5 (“This 
definition has been extensively quoted or adopted and relied upon as an authority by the courts . . . .”). 
58 Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 595. 
59 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 366 (New York, O. Halsted 1828). 
60 Id. 
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not allowed to obstruct the public right of navigation along a river, a private 
company might be granted the franchise of building and maintaining a bridge 
over the river (and collecting a charge from users).61 On similar principles, the 
government might grant private individuals or entities the franchise of 
operating a ferry to transport members of the public across the river for a fee.62 
Likewise, an early twentieth-century treatise about franchises observed that 
utility companies might be authorized “to dig up the streets of a city or town” 
and to lay water or gas lines for the purpose of supplying residents, and transit 
companies might be authorized “to construct and operate a street railway.”63 In 
Kent’s locution, all these grants were “franchises.”64 
Admittedly, nineteenth-century courts and commentators used the word 
“franchise” in various ways, and they did not always give it a clear definition.65 
Still, the definitions offered by Chief Justice Taney and Chancellor Kent 
persisted throughout the century. Both judicial opinions and treatises defined 
a “franchise” as “a privilege or authority vested in certain persons by grant of 
the sovereign . . . to exercise powers, or to do and perform acts which without 
such grant they could not do or perform.”66 
In contrast to powers that people could exercise simply as a matter of private 
right, the privileges or authorities conferred by franchises were said to be “of a 
public nature” in the sense that they “cannot be legally exercised without 
legislative grant.”67 As a condition of receiving the grant, moreover, franchisees 
often promised to perform “important duties of a public character.”68 As we shall 
see, though, franchisees who were living up to their end of the bargain were 
thought to enjoy private rights in their franchises. In the words of one court, 
 
61 See, e.g., Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 
Pet.) 420, 451 (1837) (argument of counsel); JOYCE, supra note 49, at 43-44. 
62 See JOYCE, supra note 49, at 45-46. 
63 Id. at 41-43, 48-50. 
64 See KENT, supra note 59, at 367 (“Special privileges conferred upon towns and individuals in a 
variety of ways, and for numerous purposes, having a connexion with the public interest, are franchises.”). 
65 See, e.g., Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U.S. 217, 223 (1876) (“Much confusion of thought has arisen 
in this case and in similar cases from attaching a vague and undefined meaning to the term 
‘franchises.’”); City of Bridgeport v. N.Y. & New Haven R.R. Co., 36 Conn. 255, 266 (1869) (“The 
term ‘franchise’ has several significations and there is some confusion in its use.”); City of Potwin 
Place v. Topeka Ry. Co., 33 P. 309, 310 (Kan. 1893) (“The term ‘franchise’ seems to be used by the 
courts with much laxity.”); see also JOYCE, supra note 49, at 1-14 (canvassing definitions). 
66 Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe & James River R.R. Co., 38 Va. 42, 75-76 (1840); accord, 
e.g., JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 181 
(Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888). 
67 State ex rel. Clapp v. Minn. Thresher Mfg. Co., 41 N.W. 1020, 1025 (Minn. 1889); accord, e.g., 
State v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 595, 599 (1844); People v. Trs. of Geneva Coll., 5 Wend. 211, 217 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); People ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 387 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818). 
68 Calif. State Tel. Co. v. Alta Tel. Co., 22 Cal. 398, 422 (1863), overruled in part on other grounds 
by City of S.F. v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 493 (1874). 
1442 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 1429 
The grant of a franchise is in the nature of a vested right of property	.	.	.	. So 
long as the grantee fulfills the conditions and performs the duties imposed upon 
him by the terms of the grant, he has a vested right which cannot be taken away, 
or otherwise impaired by the Government, any more than other property.69 
B. Corporate Franchises 
1. The Distinction Between Public and Private Corporations 
As we consider where franchises fit in doctrines about vested rights, we 
can start with what Kent identified as the most common franchise known to 
American law—the grant of corporate status. By the 1810s, the Supreme 
Court had begun to articulate doctrines that shaped discussion of this topic 
for the rest of the nineteenth century and beyond. 
The process started in Terrett v. Taylor, where the Court (through Justice 
Story) drew a sharp distinction between “public corporations” and “private 
corporations.”70 Although both types of corporations owed their existence to 
the legislature, Justice Story indicated that the doctrine of vested rights 
treated them differently once they had been created. In Justice Story’s telling, 
“public corporations which exist only for public purposes, such as counties, 
towns, cities, &c.,” did not have vested rights in their charters; even after a 
state legislature had created a public corporation, the legislature normally 
could resume some or all of the political powers that the legislature had 
initially granted.71 By contrast, “the principles of natural justice, . . . the 
fundamental laws of every free government, . . . the spirit and the letter of 
the constitution of the United States, and . . . the decisions of most 
respectable judicial tribunals” all cut against the idea that the legislature could 
unilaterally repeal the charter of a private corporation and direct the 
disposition of the corporation’s property.72 Of course, the common law 
recognized some grounds for the forfeiture of corporate charters; a private 
 
69 Id. 
70 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 51-52 (1815). 
71 See id. at 52. Although Story asserted that “the legislature may, under proper limitations, 
have a right to change, modify, enlarge or restrain” public corporations, he suggested that the 
legislature needed to “secur[e] . . . the property” held in the name of these corporations “for the 
uses of those for whom and at whose expense it was originally purchased.” Id.; cf. HENDRIK 
HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW 
YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870, at 17-18 (1983) (noting that although nineteenth-century 
authors distinguished between the “political power” and the “property rights” that had been granted 
to New York City, the city’s charter did not itself draw this distinction, and even the regulatory 
powers granted by the charter arguably “came to the corporation as private property”). 
72 See Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 52. 
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corporation could act in such a way as to lose its right to exist.73 But Justice 
Story implied that legislatures could not authoritatively declare, by statute, 
that such a forfeiture had occurred. Consistent with the idea that vested rights 
were at stake, “a judicial judgment” was necessary.74 
A few years later, the same concepts played central roles in the famous 
Dartmouth College case.75 In 1769, the governor of the province of New 
Hampshire (acting in the king’s name) had issued a charter establishing the 
Trustees of Dartmouth College as a “body corporate and politic.”76 The charter 
gave the Trustees various corporate powers, including the authority to select 
successor trustees.77 In 1816, however, the New Hampshire state legislature 
enacted statutes increasing the number of trustees by nine (who would be 
appointed by the state’s governor and executive council) and requiring various 
important decisions to be approved by a new board of overseers (filled mostly 
with appointees of the governor and executive council).78 The old trustees 
went to court to challenge the validity of these statutes. 
The New Hampshire Superior Court, which upheld the statutes, began 
its analysis by observing that “corporations may be divided into public and 
private.”79 In the state court’s telling, for-profit corporations that were 
operated at least partly for the benefit of private shareholders were private 
corporations, and the franchises and property of such corporations could 
amount to vested private rights.80 But the Trustees of Dartmouth College did 
not fit this template; its franchises were to be exercised for the purpose of 
education (a “matter[] of public concern”), and the individual trustees who 
were resisting the legislature’s changes lacked “any private interest in the 
property of this institution.”81 For these and other reasons, the court 
 
73 See id. at 51 (“A private corporation created by the legislature may loose its franchises by a 
misuser or a nonuser of them . . . .”). 
74 Id. (observing that a private corporation’s franchises “may be resumed by the government 
under a judicial judgment upon a quo warranto to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture”). 
75 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
76 See id. at 524 (statement of the case) (quoting the charter); JOHN M. SHIRLEY, THE 
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 52-53 
(Chicago, G.I. Jones 1895) (“The charter, in theory, was granted by George III., . . . but in fact it was 
granted by John Wentworth, governor of the province, without the knowledge of the king or the 
Home Office.”); cf. 1 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 7-29 (1917) (noting that during the colonial period, it was common for 
corporations to be established “by grants from colonial proprietors, governors, or assemblies” rather 
than “by letters patent issuing from the English crown,” and discussing the legal status of such grants). 
77 Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 532 (statement of the case). 
78 See id. at 626 (opinion of the Court); see also id. at 539-49 (statement of the case) (quoting the 
statutes); Richard W. Morin, Will to Resist: The Dartmouth College Case, DARTMOUTH ALUMNI MAG., April 
1969, at 17, 19-26 (describing events leading up to the state’s attempt to reconstitute the board of trustees). 
79 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 115 (1817). 
80 See id. at 115-16. 
81 Id. at 119. 
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concluded that the Trustees of Dartmouth College should be regarded as a 
public corporation.82 According to the court, moreover, nothing in either the 
State or the Federal Constitution prevented the legislature from revising the 
charter of such an entity. In the court’s words, “All public interests are proper 
objects of legislation; and it is peculiarly the province of the legislature, to 
determine by what laws those interests shall be regulated.”83 
When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Daniel Webster 
(representing the old trustees) acknowledged that “[s]ome corporations are 
for government and political arrangement,” and “[t]hese may be changed and 
modified as public convenience may require” (assuming that property rights 
were respected).84 According to Webster, though, the state court had defined 
this category of corporations too broadly. Rather than being a public 
corporation that remained subject to legislative interference, Dartmouth 
College was properly regarded as a private eleemosynary corporation—a 
charity rather than a for-profit entity, but one that had been established “for 
the management of private property, according to the will of the donors,” and 
one whose corporate franchises “are as inviolable as any vested rights of 
property whatever.”85 In Webster’s words, “Whether the State will grant these 
franchises, and under what conditions it will grant them, it decides for itself. 
But when once granted, the constitution holds them to be sacred, till forfeited 
for just cause.”86 In keeping with the general doctrine of vested rights, 
moreover, Webster added that the legislature could not conclusively declare 
such a forfeiture: “Corporate franchises can only be forfeited by trial and 
judgment,” and a legislature that sought to rescind a franchise by statute 
would be “assum[ing] to exercise a judicial power.”87 
Of course, the Federal Constitution says little about separation of powers 
at the state level—and while the Fifth Amendment forbids the federal 
government to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without “due 
process of law,”88 the Federal Constitution did not impose a similar restriction 
on the states until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. At the 
time of Dartmouth College, the primary restrictions on a state legislature’s 
ability to abrogate vested private rights were found in state constitutions. 
Webster argued at length that the statutes in question violated New 
 
82 Id. at 119-20. 
83 Id. at 120-21. 
84 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 562 (1819) (argument of 
counsel) (giving as examples “cities, counties, and the towns in New England”). 
85 See id. at 562-76. 
86 Id. at 573. 
87 Id. at 560, 579. 
88 U.S. CONST. amend. V. On the longstanding connection between the idea of “due process of law” 
and the separation of powers, see Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation 
of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012); see also Nelson, supra note 2, at 569 n.42 (citing additional sources). 
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Hampshire’s constitution,89 but he conceded that the U.S. Supreme Court 
did not have jurisdiction to reverse the state court’s judgment on that basis; 
the “single question” was “whether these acts are repugnant to the 
constitution of the United States.”90 
On that topic, Webster pointed to the Contract Clause of the Federal 
Constitution (which says that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts”91). In Fletcher v. Peck, the Supreme Court had 
already held that this clause prevents states from impairing a private person’s 
rights not only under contracts with another private person, but also under 
contracts with the state itself.92 Fletcher had also established that a grant 
conferred by statute could sometimes give rise to such a contract—and if it 
did, the Contract Clause would limit the state legislature’s power to repeal or 
amend that statute.93 Admittedly, the contract at issue in Fletcher was the sort 
of contract that could be made between purely private parties—a sales contract 
about the transfer of land upon payment of the purchase price. But in the 
 
89 See Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 577-88 (argument of counsel). 
90 Id. at 557 (acknowledging “the limits which bound the jurisdiction of the Court in this case”); 
see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (describing the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction over cases from the state courts). 
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
92 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-39 (1810). 
93 In 1795, the legislature of the state of Georgia had enacted a statute selling four huge tracts 
of public land to four private companies for a total of half a million dollars. See C. PETER 
MAGRATH, YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 7 (1966); Act of Jan. 7, 1795, 
1794–1795 Ga. Laws 1. Technically speaking, the statute did not itself grant the land, but it directed 
the governor to do so upon proof that the first installment of the purchase price had been paid. See 
id. at 3-6. The purchasers did indeed pay the money and the governor granted the land. Soon, 
though, it emerged that the four companies had allowed legislators who supported the statute to buy 
shares in the companies on favorable terms, and the state was engulfed in accusations of corruption. 
See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT YAZOO LANDS SALE: THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK 
38-40 (2016). In 1796, after elections had “largely purged [the legislature] of those who had 
succumbed to the bribes,” MAGRATH, supra, at 12, the new legislature enacted a statute purporting 
to declare that the earlier statute was “null and void,” that all grants derived from it were also void, 
and that the land described in the earlier statute belonged to the state. See Act of Feb. 13, 1796, 1796 
Ga. Laws 1, 5; see also id. (providing for good measure that the enrolled version of the earlier statute 
“shall . . . be publicly burnt, in order that no trace of so unconstitutional, vile and fraudulent a 
transaction, other than the infamy attached to it by this law, shall remain in the public offices 
thereof ”); HOBSON, supra, at 53-54 (reporting that this ceremony occurred two days later). But in 
Fletcher v. Peck, the Supreme Court held that this new statute violated the Contract Clause. 10 U.S. 
(6 Cranch) at 136-39 (reasoning that the earlier statute amounted to a contract that was performed 
when the governor granted the land, and the state legislature could not validly unwind the legal 
effect of that transaction). To be sure, a party to a conveyance sometimes could obtain rescission by 
proving fraud in court (subject to the need to protect the rights of innocent third parties). See id. at 
133. But the legislature could not simply enact a statute making its own findings of fraud and 
authoritatively declaring that the land still belonged to the state. 
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Dartmouth College case, Webster argued that a charter granting corporate 
powers, when accepted, “is as much a contract as a grant of land.”94 
Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall agreed that “[i]t can 
require no argument to prove[] that the circumstances of this case constitute a 
contract.”95 Marshall rattled off the circumstances that he had in mind: 
An application is made to the crown for a charter to incorporate a religious 
and literary institution. In the application, it is stated that large contributions 
have been made for the object, which will be conferred on the corporation, as 
soon as it shall be created. The charter is granted, and on its faith the property 
is conveyed. Surely in this transaction every ingredient of a complete and 
legitimate contract is to be found.96 
Like Webster and Story, Marshall emphasized that the Contract Clause did 
not prevent states from reorganizing “their [own] civil institutions, adopted 
for internal government”97—the entities that Story had called “public 
corporations.”98 In Marshall’s words, 
If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it create a civil 
institution to be employed in the administration of the government, or if the 
funds of the college be public property, or if the State of New-Hampshire, as 
a government, be alone interested in the transactions, the subject is one in 
which the legislature of the State may act according to its own judgment, 
unrestrained by any limitation of its power imposed by the constitution of 
the United States.99 
According to Marshall, however, matters were different “if this be a private 
eleemosynary institution.”100 Ultimately, the Supreme Court did indeed classify 
the Trustees of Dartmouth College as private rather than public—with the result 
that the Contract Clause prevented the state legislature from either repealing its 
charter or making a “violent alteration in [the charter’s] essential terms.”101 
Marshall’s opinion for the Court confined itself to “the circumstances of 
this case” and did not explicitly assert that the charters of all private 
corporations amounted to contracts with the state. In an influential 
 
94 Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 592 (argument of counsel) (emphasis omitted). 
95 Id. at 627 (Marshall, C.J.). 
96 Id.; see also id. at 643-44 (“This is plainly a contract to which the donors, the trustees, and 
the crown, (to whose rights and obligations New-Hampshire succeeds,) were the original parties.”). 
97 Id. at 629. 
98 Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815) (emphasis omitted); accord Dartmouth Coll., 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 668-69 (Story, J., concurring). 
99 Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629-30; see also id. at 638 (referring to the legislature’s 
“right to change” these civil institutions, which were but “the instruments of government”). 
100 Id. at 630. 
101 Id. at 630-41, 651-54. 
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concurring opinion, though, Justice Story appeared to take that position. To 
be sure, Story thought that the government enjoyed ongoing control over 
whatever public corporations it created.102 For purposes of this doctrine, 
though, Story defined the category of “public” corporations narrowly, to 
include only those corporations whose “whole interests and franchises” 
belonged exclusively to the government.103 Once the government had issued 
a charter to a private corporation, moreover, Story thought it “perfectly clear” 
that the legislature could not unilaterally abrogate the franchises that the 
charter had granted. In Story’s words, 
[A]ny act of a legislature which takes away any powers or franchises vested by 
its charter in a private corporation or its corporate officers, or which restrains 
or controls the legitimate exercise of them, or transfers them to other persons, 
without its assent, is a violation of the obligations of that charter. If the 
legislature mean to claim such an authority, it must be reserved in the grant.104 
2. Was Justice Story Making Things Up? 
Historians agree that at the time of these opinions, neither the distinction 
between public and private corporations nor its constitutional significance 
was as well settled as Justice Story suggested.105 Indeed, Professor Morton 
Horwitz has spoken of “the entirely novel separation between public and 
private corporations in the Dartmouth College Case,” which Justice Story 
allegedly promoted in order “to free the newly emerging business corporation 
from the regulatory public law premises that had dominated the prior law of 
corporations.”106 Other scholars, however, see the matter less starkly.107 I am 
 
102 See id. at 671-72 (Story, J., concurring). 
103 Id.; see also id. at 668-69 (“[S]trictly speaking, public corporations are such only as are founded 
by the government for public purposes, where the whole interests belong also to the government.”). 
104 Id. at 712; see also id. at 700 (“In respect to corporate franchises, they are, properly speaking, 
legal estates vested in the corporation itself as soon as it is in esse.”). 
105 See, e.g., R. Kent Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story’s Doctrine of “Public and Private Corporations” 
and the Rise of the American Business Corporation, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 833-35 (1976). For some of 
the initial work in this vein, see WARREN B. HUNTING, THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS 
CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 72-75 (1919); The Dartmouth College Case, 8 AM. 
L. REV. 189, 215-32 (1874). 
106 Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 
1425 (1982). But cf. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860, at 112-13 (1977) (tracing the distinction to the first decade of the nineteenth century). 
107 See Newmyer, supra note 105, at 833 (“The distinction between public and private 
corporations was not new with the Dartmouth College case; nor, contrary to the impression given by 
Story’s concurring opinion, was it an established doctrine in American law.”); Joan Williams, The 
Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225, 240 (1985) 
(reviewing HARTOG, supra note 71) (noting that “the basic structure of Story’s categories derived 
from New England traditions,” but arguing that “Story exaggerated both the immunity of private 
corporations from sovereign power and the vulnerability of public corporations to that power”); cf. 
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inclined to think that Story’s position was neither inevitable nor illegitimate: 
it was not the only possible way of understanding the constitutional status of 
corporate franchises, but it also did not conflict with a determinate original 
meaning or a prior consensus. 
a. The Concept of “Public” Corporations 
As many commentators have observed, the taxonomies of corporations 
found in leading English works of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries did not classify corporations according to whether they were public 
or private.108 English authors contrasted corporations that consisted of just 
one person at a time (“corporations sole”) with those that consisted of many 
people (“corporations aggregate”), and they contrasted “ecclesiastical” 
corporations with “lay” corporations.109 Within the category of lay 
corporations, they distinguished “eleemosynary” corporations from other 
corporations (which they called “civil” corporations).110 But their system of 
classification did not draw Story’s public/private distinction. 
Some English cases did draw such a distinction for certain purposes.111 
Story himself emphasized Philips v. Bury, where Lord Chief Justice Holt had 
contrasted corporations “[f]or publick government” with those “[f]or private 
charity.”112 As commentators have observed, though, Lord Holt’s opinion was 
simply about judicial review of decisions made by the “visitor” of a college,113 
 
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1082, 1100 (1980) (observing 
that “before the nineteenth century, there was no distinction in England or in America between 
public and private corporations,” but adding that this distinction “was not purely a legal invention” 
and “had been generally emerging since the American Revolution”). 
108 See The Dartmouth College Case, supra note 105, at 216; accord, e.g., EDWIN MERRICK DODD, 
AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
MASSACHUSETTS 17-19 (1954); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business 
Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 19-20 (1945); James J. Robbins, The Private Corporation: Its 
Constitutional Genesis, 28 GEO. L.J. 165, 169 (1939). 
109 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *469-70; see also The Dartmouth 
College Case, supra note 105, at 216-17 (citing numerous English authors). 
110 See The Dartmouth College Case, supra note 105, at 216-17 (noting this taxonomy in the works 
of Blackstone, Kyd, Wooddeson, and Chitty, among others). 
111 See, e.g., Cudden v. Estwick (1704) 90 Eng. Rep. 1138, 1139 (K.B.) (contrasting by-laws made 
by “a private corporation or company,” which bind only “their own members,” with those made by 
“a great city or borough,” which can also bind “strangers”). 
112 (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 469, 470 (K.B.). 
113 The Bishop of Exeter had removed the rector of a college over which the bishop was the 
visitor. In Philips, Lord Holt opined that the courts could not second-guess the bishop’s decision; 
because the college was a corporation for private charity rather than for public government, the 
decision that there were grounds for removal lay within the visitor’s jurisdiction and could not be 
collaterally attacked in the royal courts. See id. at 470-71; accord, e.g., Parkinson’s Case (1689) 90 Eng. 
Rep. 393, 394 (K.B.) (Holt, C.J.). 
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and the fact that a public/private distinction mattered to that topic did not 
necessarily support Story’s broader conclusions.114 
Of course, even if Story exaggerated the distinction between public and 
private corporations, it need not follow that he was wrong about the 
inviolability of corporate charters. According to Lieutenant Warren Hunting, 
English authorities from the second half of the eighteenth century and the 
first half of the nineteenth century indicated that “as between the Crown and 
the recipients of its grants of corporate powers, the charter became a private, 
vested right.”115 As a historical matter, Lieutenant Hunting suggested, Story’s 
position might simply have been too narrow: “[T]he very precedents [Story] 
cited to prove that the charters of private corporations were regarded as 
private property applied equally to public corporations.”116 
Hunting focused specifically on the charters of England’s “boroughs”—
incorporated entities that wielded powers of local government. In Hunting’s 
words, “the doctrines that the Crown could not interfere with a charter once 
granted, and that charters were franchises, applied to borough charters as well 
as to the charters of other kinds of corporations.”117 As various scholars have 
explained, however, England’s boroughs were not easy to characterize as 
public or private.118 They originated in feudal times, when control over land 
went along with governmental powers,119 and they blended what Frederic 
Maitland called “ownership” and “rulership.”120 
 
114 See The Dartmouth College Case, supra note 105, at 220 (arguing that Lord Holt’s discussion 
was “limited to the subject of visitation then under consideration”); see also HUNTING, supra note 
105, at 74 (“We agree . . . with Mr. Hill that Phillips v. Bury does not warrant the conclusion which 
Story drew from it . . . .”). 
115 HUNTING, supra note 105, at 65. The idea that corporate charters were vested as against the 
Crown did not protect them against abrogation by Parliament; given theories of parliamentary 
supremacy, a statute abrogating a corporate charter presumably would have had legal effect. Still, 
such a statute might have been regarded as a breach of faith—and hence something that America’s 
written constitutions might prevent legislatures from doing. See id. at 71 (acknowledging that “Kyd 
and Blackstone did seem to consider it necessary to assert that corporations could be dissolved by 
an act of Parliament,” but expressing uncertainty about whether they reached this conclusion simply 
“by virtue of [Parliament’s] omnipotence”); cf. Frug, supra note 107, at 1094 (“At the time of the 
American Revolution, . . . corporate liberty was protected against royal attack, but the extent of its 
vulnerability if Parliament became hostile remained unresolved.”). 
116 HUNTING, supra note 105, at 75. 
117 Id.; cf. Frug, supra note 107, at 1092-94 (recounting Charles II’s successful attack on London’s 
charter in the 1680s, but noting that “the immunity of corporate charters from royal abrogation was 
reestablished” after the Glorious Revolution). 
118 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal 
Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 380 (1985) (“In the late middle ages . . . when the traditional set of 
borough powers was defined, no sharp distinction between public and private as yet existed. 
Boroughs, therefore, exhibited a characteristically feudal mixture of public and private roles.”). 
119 See id. at 374-80. 
120 FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH 11-12, 30-31 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1898), quoted in Frug, supra note 107, at 1087 n.106; see also HUNTING, supra 
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In colonial America, New York City had a written charter along the lines 
of an English borough,121 and so did a few other municipalities.122 Professor 
Hendrik Hartog (author of the leading modern work on this topic) notes that 
New York City’s corporate charter gave the city a diverse array of legal 
interests, including an exclusive ferry franchise, title to a great deal of land, 
and “what might be seen as a hodgepodge of public governmental powers.”123 
At first, Professor Hartog reports, people would not have sought to classify 
these interests as either public or private.124 Indeed, such classification might 
have been difficult, because the corporation used its property rights as part of 
a strategy of governance.125 By the early nineteenth century, though, that 
technique was fading, and people had begun to contrast the city’s proprietary 
rights with its governmental powers.126 Consistent with hints in Justice 
Story’s concurring opinion in Dartmouth College,127 the 1840 edition of Kent’s 
Commentaries indicated that while municipal corporations did not have vested 
rights in their political powers, their property was different: “Grants of 
property and of franchises coupled with an interest, to public or political 
corporations, are beyond legislative control, equally as in the case of the 
property of private corporations.”128 In 1865, however, New York’s highest 
 
note 105, at 83 (“[A]t the time of which we are speaking, society was based upon the feudal system. 
The land was full of franchises. Political and proprietary rights were everywhere commingled, but 
commingled in such a way that the proprietary side was by far the more conspicuous.”). 
121 See HARTOG, supra note 71, at 14-19, 25-30 (tracing New York’s various charters, which 
culminated in the Montgomerie Charter of 1730). 
122 See 1 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 50-60 (concluding that roughly two dozen corporations of this 
sort were created, of which “sixteen or seventeen survived until the Revolution”); cf. HARTOG, supra 
note 71, at 22-23 (cautioning against treating these corporations as identical, and emphasizing that 
charters contained distinctive grants and created different entities). More municipal charters were 
issued after independence. See Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 
WM. & MARY Q. 51, 63 (1993). Still, the entities that they created did not necessarily have the same 
status as England’s ancient boroughs. Cf. Alabama v. Mayor of Mobile, 5 Port. 279, 285-86 (Ala. 1837) 
(argument of counsel) (arguing that the city of Mobile is a “public corporation” that is “under the 
control and power of the State government,” and contrasting it with “some of the municipal authorities” 
in Europe, which “have rights of great antiquity, and of a different nature from any in this State”). 
123 HARTOG, supra note 71, at 15-17. 
124 See id. at 18-20. 
125 See id. at 50-54 (discussing the city’s practice of granting waterfront property to individuals 
on condition that they build streets and the like). 
126 See id. at 17-18; see also id. at 113-14 (inferring from property grants made by the city in the 
early 1790s that “city leaders were learning to distinguish the public from the private self of the 
corporation”); id. at 119 (“The legal significance of the distinction discovered between the property 
rights and the governmental powers of the corporation was first explored in the case of Mayor v. 
Scott, decided in 1804.”); cf. id. at 225-29 (discussing the evolution of that distinction in Bailey v. 
Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842)). 
127 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
128 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *306 n.b (4th ed. 1840); see also 
MURRAY HOFFMAN, A TREATISE UPON THE ESTATE AND RIGHTS OF THE CORPORATION OF 
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court rethought that idea and suggested that neither New York City nor other 
municipal corporations had any vested rights against the state. In the words 
of Chief Judge Hiram Denio, “[c]ity corporations are emanations of the 
supreme law making power of the state,” and property held in their name “is 
not thereby shielded from the control of the legislature.”129 
While New York City was regarded as a hybrid well into the nineteenth 
century, New England towns apparently were considered more purely public. 
In Dartmouth College, when Daniel Webster argued that “the legislature has 
more power over some [sorts of corporations] than over others,” he 
specifically used “the towns in New England” as an example of the sort that 
“may be changed and modified as public convenience may require.”130 
Consistent with this argument, Professor Joan Williams has concluded that 
“the bifurcation of corporations into public and private began in 
Massachusetts substantially before the Supreme Court decided Dartmouth 
College in 1819.”131 As early as 1792, the attorney general of Massachusetts 
indicated that the legislature could not unilaterally repeal “an incorporation 
to build a bridge, or to cut a canal,” but that “legislative acts . . . incorporating 
towns and proprietors . . . may be repealed at pleasure.”132 Thus, history does 
 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, AS PROPRIETORS 45 (New York, McSpedon & Baker 1853) (asserting 
that this proposition “admits of no dispute”); Frug, supra note 107, at 1104-05 (discussing this idea). 
129 Darlington v. Mayor of New York, 31 N.Y. 164, 193 (1865) (concluding that property held in 
the name of incorporated cities “is as essentially public property as that confided to the administration 
of similar official agencies in counties and towns”); id. at 198-201 (repudiating the contrary intimations 
in Bailey); cf. id. at 205 (reserving judgment about whether the state legislature could “divert[] the city 
property to other public use than such as concerns the city, or its inhabitants”). But see Webb v. Mayor 
of New York, 64 How. Pr. 10, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1882) (“I perceive no difference between the tenure 
of property thus held by the city and the proprietary rights of natural persons or private corporations. 
This privilege, however, is peculiar in this state to the city of New York.”); cf. Comment, Municipal 
Water Systems—Are They Public or Private Property of the City?, 13 YALE L.J. 196, 196-97 (1904) (noting 
a split of authority across the United States on the question posed by the Comment’s title). 
130  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 562 (1819) (argument of 
counsel); cf. Frug, supra note 107, at 1096 (noting that in pre-revolutionary New England, “no city 
[or town] possessed a corporate franchise”); Williams, supra note 118, at 417-31 (discussing the sense 
in which Massachusetts towns were corporations). 
131 Williams, supra note 118, at 429 n.375. 
132 THE PATH TO RICHES 57 (Boston, P. Edes 1792). Attorney General James Sullivan wrote 
this pamphlet to advocate repealing the charter of the Massachusetts Bank, which Sullivan grouped 
with towns rather than bridge companies. See id.; cf. OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, 
COMMONWEALTH 100-01 (rev. ed. 1969) (describing the Massachusetts Bank, which had private 
investors but was authorized to issue banknotes with the state’s name and seal). But see Art. 9, 
7 MONTHLY ANTHOLOGY & BOSTON REV. 187, 191-92 (1809) (“[T]he Massachusetts bank [is] 
beyond the control of the legislature . . . .”), cited in HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra, at 153 n.74. 
In 1802, Sullivan expressed more uncertainty about the legislature’s power over the bank. Without 
trying to predict what courts would say, he observed that “the public opinion is, and so far as I 
understand it, always has been, (that is for eighteen years past) that the legislature cannot, at pleasure 
dissolve corporations, possessing the priviledges indicated by the emblem of a common seal”—and 
“[w]hether there has been an existing distinction in this opinion, between banks, and other corporations 
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not necessarily defeat Justice Story’s suggestion that neither the Contract 
Clause nor the broader doctrine of vested rights protected what he called 
“public” corporations against control by the state legislature. 
b. Vested Rights and “Private” Corporations 
For many modern critics, the problem with Justice Story’s position is not that 
he gave public corporations too little protection, but rather that he gave private 
corporations too much. According to one standard account, the reason 
eighteenth-century English authors did not distinguish public corporations from 
private corporations is that all corporations were regarded as public entities.133 
That is true in some respects. Incorporation was not something that 
private people could do entirely on their own; corporate status required a 
“public grant.”134 What is more, “such a grant was regarded as a special 
privilege to be extended only upon condition that the public interest would 
thereby be promoted”; to receive the benefit of incorporation, an entity 
needed to serve some public purpose.135 In eighteenth-century England, 
though, the Crown could not freely retract corporate charters after issuing 
them, and the extent to which Parliament could legitimately abrogate such 
charters was not clear.136 Thus, the public-regarding features of incorporation 
were not necessarily inconsistent with the idea that corporate charters could 
create vested private rights. 
 
I do not know.” James Sullivan, Opinion of the Attorney General of Massachusetts, on the Life of the 
Corporation, 1802, in HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra, app. D at 254, 258. Still, Sullivan continued to 
suggest that the legislature could freely dissolve towns. See id. at 257 (“Towns in England, as well as 
here, are corporations for certain purposes; but they have no common seal. In this State, towns and 
parishes have been created, altered[,] changed, and dissolved, at the pleasure of the legislature.”). 
In the 1820s, a dictum in an opinion by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appeared 
to deny the legislature’s power to dissolve a town without its consent. See Waldron v. Lee, 22 Mass. 
(5 Pick.) 323, 335 (1827). Later in the nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Judicial Court 
regarded this power as completely settled. See Weymouth & Braintree Fire Dist. v. Cnty. Comm’rs 
of Norfolk, 108 Mass. 142, 144-45 (1871); see also Town of E. Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. 
(10 How.) 511, 534 (1851) (holding that even after a ferry franchise had been granted to a town, the 
Contract Clause did not prevent the state legislature from modifying or abrogating it, because “the 
towns[,] being mere organizations for public purposes, were liable to have their public powers, rights, 
and duties modified or abolished at any moment by the legislature”). 
133 For a full-throated articulation of this view, see Robbins, supra note 108; cf. Hendrik Hartog, 
Because All the World Was Not New York City: Governance, Property Rights, and the State in the Changing 
Definition of a Corporation, 1730–1860, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 91, 91-92 (1979) (referring to the “standard” 
view that “[u]ntil the early years of the 19th century, . . . all corporations were public institutions,” 
though suggesting that this view is too simplistic and warning that “we do not know what it meant 
to be defined as a ‘public’ corporation in 18th century America”). 
134 Robbins, supra note 108, at 170. 
135 Id. 
136 See Frug, supra note 107, at 1094. 
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In any event, using English conceptions of the corporation to draw 
conclusions about American conceptions is potentially hazardous. What 
modern lawyers think of as the paradigmatic private corporation—the profit-
seeking business corporation—was not common in eighteenth-century 
England. In Professor Pauline Maier’s words, “The British . . . virtually ceased 
to develop the corporation for business or profit-seeking purposes between 
the passage of the Bubble Act in 1720 and its repeal 105 years later . . . .”137 
That was true in colonial America too,138 but it ceased to be true soon after 
independence.139 In the 1780s, states issued twenty-eight charters to business 
corporations,140 and the pace accelerated dramatically in the 1790s141 and 
 
137 Maier, supra note 122, at 51. To be sure, business corporations had existed in England for 
centuries. See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720–1844, at 39 (2000) (“In the second half of the sixteenth century 
and during the seventeenth century, the corporation . . . increasingly began to be used . . . for profit-
oriented organization of business.”); id. at 45 (“The first two decades of the seventeenth century can 
probably be characterized as the heyday of the initial age of the history of the business 
corporation.”). Even before the era of the Bubble Act, though, “the corporation went through a long 
decline.” Id. at 290; see also id. at 81 (“The Bubble Act was not as well defined a turning point as 
many have argued . . . .”). While some very well-known companies—including the East India 
Company and the Bank of England—operated in the corporate form throughout the eighteenth 
century, and while new corporations were also created, the corporation did not become the leading 
form of business organization in England until the mid-nineteenth century. See Handlin & Handlin, 
supra note 108, at 3 (“Throughout the whole of the eighteenth century England chartered some half-
dozen corporations for manufacturing purposes, and hardly more in any other business sphere. Until 
well into the nineteenth century the corporation was used extensively only in the organization of 
canal companies.”); see also HARRIS, supra, at 33 n.27 (“Business corporations were mentioned only 
briefly in the major eighteenth-century treatise on corporations, written [by Stewart Kyd] in 1793–
1794 . . . .”); cf. id. at 53 (noting the early rise of the East India Company and the Bank of England); 
id. at 95-100 (discussing the canal corporations of the 1760s and beyond). Ron Harris summarizes 
the situation in England this way: “The business corporation originated in the sixteenth century, 
acquired most of its features during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and gained gradual 
legal recognition in the first half of the nineteenth century to become a major phenomenon in the 
economy by the late nineteenth century . . . .” Id. at 289-90. 
138 See 1 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 48 (noting that “more than a dozen corporations” with charters 
granted in England had conducted operations in colonial America, and “[t]he large majority were 
dominated by business motives,” but “none of th[ose] business corporations had a continuous active 
existence of more than a score of years”); id. at 87 (“Business corporations which were colonial both 
in origin and in activity were few, and on the whole of no great importance.”). 
139 See Maier, supra note 122, at 51-52. 
140 See 2 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 22 (presenting a state-by-state, year-by-year tabulation). In 
addition to the charters issued by states, Congress also issued one charter (to the Bank of North 
America). See id. at 30. As Davis notes, some entities (including the Bank of North America) 
received charters from multiple states. See id. at 22, 30 (indicating that 22 distinct business 
corporations were created during the 1780s). 
141 See id. at 22-23 (indicating that states issued 259 charters to business corporations in the 
1790s, and Congress issued one more); cf. id. at 17-18 (noting that Massachusetts enacted a general 
incorporation statute for aqueduct companies in 1799, and Davis’s tables do not reflect whatever 
companies organized themselves under this statute). 
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beyond.142 With only slight exaggeration, Professor Kent Newmyer asserts 
that “[t]he business corporation was the unique creation of American 
lawmakers during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries . . . .”143 
In the 1780s, the two states that issued the most charters to business 
corporations were Virginia and Massachusetts.144 In the 1790s, Massachusetts 
surged into the undisputed lead, and other New England states also issued 
many such charters.145 Perhaps because of growing familiarity with business 
corporations,146 lawyers alluded to a distinction between public corporations 
and private corporations in two cases involving Virginia in 1801 and 1802,147 
and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is said to have acted upon 
that distinction later in the same decade.148 
Admittedly, even business corporations were connected to public needs; 
state legislatures incorporated entities to serve specific public purposes, not 
to conduct business in general.149 But the idea that incorporation was granted 
 
142 See DODD, supra note 108, at 11 (“The chartering process went on even more rapidly after 
the turn of the century[.] . . . [B]y 1830 the New England states alone had created nearly 1900 
business corporations . . . .”). 
143 R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
246 (2001); see also JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 35 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1832) (“In no country 
have corporations been multiplied to so great an extent, as in our own . . .	.”); JAMES WILLARD 
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1780–1970, at 8 (1970) (“[W]hen we began making important use of the corporation for 
business in the United States from about 1780, there was little relevant legal experience on which to 
draw. For 100 years, we proceeded to use the corporate instrument on a scale unmatched in England.”). 
144 See 2 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 22. 
145 See id. at 22-23 (indicating that the states that issued the most charters to business 
corporations in the 1790s were Massachusetts [47], Connecticut [33], and New Hampshire [29]); see 
also Maier, supra note 122, at 53 (“Although the immediate post-Revolutionary surge in 
incorporations was not confined to any one region—Virginia, for example, chartered several 
important corporations for the development of inland navigation in the 1780s—New England, and 
above all Massachusetts, soon led the nation in creating corporations.”). 
146 Cf. HORWITZ, supra note 106, at 112 (“The distinction between public and private corporations, 
so prominent in Justice Story’s concurring opinion [in Dartmouth College], was above all a response to the 
dramatic growth in the number of business corporations during the previous generation.”). 
147 See Virginia v. Howard, 28 F. Cas. 1224, 1225 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 16,963) (argument of 
counsel) (contending, unsuccessfully, that a defendant could be criminally prosecuted for keeping a 
slaughterhouse in violation of a by-law of the corporation of Alexandria, and observing in this 
context that “[t]here is a difference between private and public corporations”); United States v. Bank 
of Alexandria, 24 F. Cas. 982, 983 (C.C.D.C. 1801) (No. 14,514) (argument of counsel) (noting that 
“[t]here are public corporations and private corporations,” and arguing unsuccessfully that 
mandamus should not lie against the officers and directors of a private corporation). 
148 See Dale A. Oesterle, Formative Contributions to American Corporate Law by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court from 1806 to 1810, in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE 
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, 1692–1992, at 136-40 (Russell K. Osgood ed., 1992); Williams, supra 
note 107, at 233. As Professor Williams notes, other New England courts also drew this distinction 
before the federal Supreme Court did so in Dartmouth College. See id. at 233-34. 
149 Professor Hurst reports: 
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in consideration of benefits to the public coexisted with the idea that 
corporate charters could create vested private rights. Thus, in an 1806 case 
involving a company that had been incorporated to build a turnpike (with a 
right to collect tolls), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts famously 
observed that “the rights legally vested in this, or in any corporation, cannot 
be controuled or destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a power for that 
purpose be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation.”150 If 
anything, the fact that states granted corporate status as part of an 
arrangement to benefit the public may have contributed to the view that 
corporate charters amounted to contractual bargains between the public and 
the incorporators—an essential premise of the idea that such charters could 
trigger the protections of the Contract Clause.151 
Indeed, a prominent eighteenth-century lawyer (and future Supreme 
Court Justice) made statements along these lines about the very first business 
corporation created in the United States after independence—the Bank of 
North America, chartered by Congress in 1781 and by three states in 1782.152 In 
1785, when the Pennsylvania legislature was considering a bill to repeal the 
charter that it had issued to the bank three years earlier, James Wilson 
protested that the legislature “surely” did not have “the same discretionary 
 
Of the 317 separate-enterprise special charters enacted from 1780 to 1801 in the states, 
nearly two-thirds were for enterprises concerned with transport (inland navigation, 
turnpikes, toll bridges); another 20 per cent were for banks or insurance companies; 
10 per cent were for the provision of local public services (mostly water supply); less 
than 4 per cent were for general business corporations. 
HURST, supra note 143, at 17; see also Maier, supra note 122, at 80 (observing that well into the 
nineteenth century, it was assumed that “even ‘private’ corporations had to serve a public function”). 
150 Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 143, 146 (1806). 
151 See Bruce A. Campbell, John Marshall, the Virginia Political Economy, and the Dartmouth 
College Decision, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 40, 43, 61-63 (1975) (using language in Virginia’s 
constitution and in charters issued by the Virginia legislature to argue that “in Virginia the charter 
represented a bargain between the public and the corporation’s sponsors,” and suggesting that this 
view informed Chief Justice Marshall’s position in Dartmouth College). 
A leading book asserts that in Massachusetts, “[t]he application of the contract conception to 
the relations between state and corporation seemed, as late as 1812, ‘too fanciful to need any 
observation.’” HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 132, at 155 (quoting Brown v. Penobscot Bank, 8 
Mass. (7 Tyng) 445, 448 (1812) (argument of counsel)). In context, though, the lawyer quoted in this 
passage may simply have been denying that the state had made the particular contractual agreement 
that the Penobscot Bank claimed, to the effect that the bank would never face special legal penalties 
for failing to pay its note-holders on time. 
152 For detailed discussion of the bank and the controversies that enveloped it, see Joseph H. 
Sommer, The Birth of the American Business Corporation: Of Banks, Corporate Governance, and Social 
Responsibility, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1011, 1019-21, 1046-76 (2001). For good summaries, see 2 DAVIS, 
supra note 76, at 30, 36-44, and Ian Speir, Corporations, the Original Understanding, and the Problem of 
Power, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 136-41 (2012). 
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power of repeal” with respect to every type of statute.153 Wilson acknowledged 
that as “the Representatives of the community,” legislators could be trusted 
with the power to repeal “a law respecting the rights and properties of all the 
citizens of the state.”154 But that was not true of some other kinds of laws, 
including “[a] law to vest or confirm an estate in an individual” and “a law to 
incorporate a congregation or other society.”155 Wilson explained that the act 
chartering the bank had created a new party with interests distinct from those 
of the community, and “[r]ules of justice, of faith, and of honor” needed to be 
observed between them.156 Foreshadowing the Supreme Court’s conclusion in 
Dartmouth College, Wilson suggested that the statute incorporating the bank 
should “be considered as a compact” that the legislature either could not or at 
least should not abrogate.157 
Thomas Paine was even more explicit. In a pamphlet published in 1786, 
he observed that “[t]he charter of the Bank, or what is the same thing, the Act 
for incorporating it, is to all intents and purposes an Act of Negociation and 
Contract, entered into, and confirmed, between the State on one part, and 
certain persons mentioned therein on the other part.”158 According to Paine, 
such “a Contract, or a joint Act,” was “an Act of a different kind” than “a law 
or Act of legislation,” because the legislature could not unilaterally repeal it.159 
Likewise, while “[t]he Bank may forfeit the charter by delinquency,” the 
legislature could not simply decree or declare such a forfeiture; instead, “the 
delinquency must be proved and established by a legal process in a court of 
justice and trial by jury . . . .”160 
At least at first, the arguments advanced by Wilson and Paine did not 
carry the day; the Pennsylvania legislature repealed the bank’s charter in 
 
153 CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BANK OF NORTH-AMERICA 16 (Philadelphia, Hall & Sellers 
1785); see JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 9 (2016) 
(noting Wilson’s authorship of this “widely circulated pamphlet”). 
154 CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BANK OF NORTH-AMERICA, supra note 153, at 16. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 17. 
158 THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON GOVERNMENT, THE AFFAIRS OF THE BANK, AND 
PAPER-MONEY 16 (Philadelphia, Charles Cist 1786). 
159 See id. Thirty years later, Rep. John Sergeant of Pennsylvania took a similar point for granted 
during debates about the bill to charter the second Bank of the United States. Rep. Sergeant urged his 
colleagues to think carefully, because the bill “was not . . . an ordinary act of legislation which Congress 
might at their pleasure repeal.” 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1075 (1816). By its terms, the charter would last 
for twenty years, and “there would be no power within that period to repeal it.” Id.; see also Aditya 
Bamzai, Tenure of Office and the Treasury: The Constitution and Control over National Financial Policy, 1787 
to 1867, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1299, 1355 (2019) (noting these statements as evidence that the bank 
was considered a private entity). In a subsequent speech, Rep. Sergeant indicated that “[t]his is a 
settled, established principle . . . and almost universally conceded.” 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 1385 (1819). 
160 PAINE, supra note 158, at 16. 
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1785.161 But the legislature reissued a charter to the bank in 1787,162 and 
Professor William Ewald portrays that decision as a vindication of Wilson’s 
position.163 In a forthcoming article, moreover, Dean William Treanor links 
this episode to the wording of the Federal Constitution’s Contract Clause.164 
The Clause’s precursor in the Northwest Ordinance had protected only 
“private contracts or engagements” (which might not include contracts with 
the government), but the Committee of Style omitted this qualification when 
it inserted the Contract Clause into the draft Constitution.165 Dean Treanor 
is inclined to attribute this choice to the Committee’s draftsman, Gouverneur 
Morris, who had addressed the Pennsylvania legislature on behalf of the bank 
in 1785 and (like Wilson and Paine) had suggested that the bank enjoyed 
vested rights in its charter.166 
To their credit, some of the leading twentieth-century commentators who 
questioned the legal basis for Justice Story’s opinion in Dartmouth College 
acknowledged that Wilson and Paine took a similar position in the 1780s.167 
But another episode from the Founding era has attracted less attention.168 In 
the 1750s, the proprietors of the Province of Pennsylvania had issued a charter 
to the Trustees of the College, Academy and Charitable School of 
Philadelphia.169 In 1779, the state legislature enacted a statute modifying the 
 
161 Act of Sept. 13, 1785, ch. 1178, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 57 (1906). 
162 Act of Mar. 17, 1787, ch. 1278, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
supra note 161, at 412. 
163 See William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
901, 909 (2008) (describing Wilson’s arguments as “ultimately successful”). 
164 William M. Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener: Gouverneur Morris and the Creation 
of the Federalist Constitution, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 69-74), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3383183 (draft of Dec. 1, 2020). 
165 See id. (manuscript at 69, 71). 
166 See id. (manuscript at 12-16) (discussing Morris’s drafting role); id. (manuscript at 70-71) 
(suggesting that Morris intentionally adopted wording that could be interpreted to cover corporate 
charters, even though other delegates to the Philadelphia Convention may not have recognized this 
choice); id. (manuscript at 36) (noting Morris’s prior address defending the bank); see also Ewald, supra 
note 163, at 909-10 (emphasizing James Wilson rather than Gouverneur Morris, but likewise concluding 
that “[t]he Contracts Clause in the Constitution was an outgrowth of the arguments about Pennsylvania’s 
authority to breach its own charter”); cf. ELY, supra note 153, at 10 (reporting Professor Ewald’s conclusion, 
though not necessarily endorsing it). 
167 See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
17-18 (1938); Handlin & Handlin, supra note 108, at 19. 
168 Of course, I am not the only person to describe it. See, e.g., Speir, supra note 152, at 130-33. A 
detailed account appears in Edward Potts Cheyney, A History of the University of Pennsylvania, in 1 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA: ITS HISTORY, INFLUENCE, EQUIPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS 
44, 80-97 (Joshua L. Chamberlain ed., 1901). 
169 ADDITIONAL CHARTER OF THE COLLEGE, ACADEMY, AND CHARITY-SCHOOL OF 
PHILADELPHIA, IN PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, B. Franklin & D. Hall 1755). 
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charter and converting the school into a university.170 For the next few years, 
William Smith—the ousted provost of the school—filed repeated petitions 
with the state legislature protesting this statute.171 In 1783–1784, Smith and 
others also lodged memorials with the state’s Council of Censors,172 which 
was charged with “enquir[ing] whether the [state] constitution ha[d] been 
preserved inviolate” during the previous seven years.173 Although a 
committee of the Council agreed that the 1779 statute had been 
unconstitutional, a majority of the full Council voted to strike this portion of 
the committee’s report.174 Later in 1784, however, Smith filed another petition 
with the state legislature, which was poised to repudiate the prior statute until 
the minority party fled and deprived the legislature of a quorum.175 
Smith renewed his petition in 1788 and also published it as a pamphlet.176 
As part of his argument, Smith observed that “[c]olleges and other like 
corporations are . . . of two sorts.”177 Some were “constituted for public 
government, and endowed by the public.”178 But others, “which . . . are called 
private corporations,” were “constituted by private persons and for charities 
specified in the act of foundation.”179 Smith maintained that once such a 
private corporation was established, “the state cannot change, alter or abridge 
any of the laws, rules, orders or privileges of the FOUNDERS,” let alone 
“disseize the founders of the whole franchises and estates . . . and, dissolving the 
former body, create a new one upon its ruins!”180 This time, the legislature 
 
170 Act of Nov. 27, 1779, ch. 871, reprinted in 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
supra note 161, at 23. 
171 See Cheyney, supra note 168, at 92-93 (chronicling Smith’s petitions). 
172 See JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS 15, 95-96, 129 (Philadelphia, Hall & Sellers 1784). 
173 PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 47. 
174 See Cheyney, supra note 168, at 93 (noting that the vote was 13 to 9). Some of the majority’s 
reasons were specific to the old school and its conduct. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL OF 
CENSORS, supra note 172, at 130 (arguing that the old corporation had lost a quorum and had become 
incapable of exercising its essential functions “long before this act of Assembly was made”); id. at 131 
(arguing that a by-law adopted in 1764 was contrary to the existing charters and “amount[ed] to a 
forfeiture of the said charters”). More broadly, though, the majority suggested that because “corporations 
. . . are the creatures of society,” they could not “plead any exemption from legislature regulation.” Id. at 
131-32 (rejecting the “absurdity” that one session of the General Assembly “can enact a law that no 
succeeding General Assembly can alter, amend or repeal, without the consent of the corporators”). 
175 See Cheyney, supra note 168, at 94-95. 
176 WILLIAM SMITH, AN ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN 
THE CASE OF THE VIOLATED CHARTER, OF THE COLLEGE, ACADEMY AND CHARITABLE 
SCHOOL OF PHILADELPHIA (Philadelphia, R. Aitken & Son 1788). 
177 Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 5-6. In describing the 1779 statute as an “open violation of the constitution of this 
commonwealth,” Smith invoked a specific provision preserving “the privileges, immunities and 
estates” of “all religious societies[] or bodies of men heretofore united or incorporated for the 
advancement of religion and learning, [or for] other pious and charitable purposes.” Id. at 3-4 
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agreed. In March 1789, the legislature declared that the 1779 statute had been 
“repugnant to justice, a violation of the constitution of this commonwealth 
and dangerous in its precedent to all incorporated bodies and to the rights 
and franchises thereof.”181 Without abolishing the university that had been 
created in 1779, the legislature reanimated the old school and restored its 
charter.182 Two years later, the two entities were merged (with their consent) 
to form the University of Pennsylvania.183 
The back-and-forth in Pennsylvania over the Bank of North America and 
the Philadelphia academy suggests that at the time of the Founding, there was 
not a consensus about the constitutional status of corporate charters. Still, 
both the distinction between public and private corporations and the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Contract Clause in Dartmouth College 
have more historical support than is often suggested. In keeping with that 
fact, Professor Stephen Siegel reports that the Dartmouth College decision was 
not particularly controversial in its day.184 
In any event, to the extent that the significance of the public/private 
distinction in this context had not been settled before 1819, Dartmouth College 
helped to settle it. In ensuing decades, courts repeatedly held that the charters 
of public corporations did not amount to contracts and could be revoked or 
altered by statute,185 but that the charters of private corporations were 
different. Writing in 1838, indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court declared that 
“[n]o proposition is more thoroughly established, than that the franchises of 
a corporation can not be forfeited without a judgment either on scire facias or 
 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 45). But Smith argued that the 1779 
statute was “equally repugnant to common justice.” Id. at 31. 
181 Act of Mar. 6, 1789, ch. 1393, reprinted in 13 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
supra note 161, at 187, 188-89 (explaining that the 1779 statute, “without trial by jury, legal process or 
proof of misuser or forfeiture,” had deprived the trustees, the corporation, the teachers, and others 
of their “charters, franchises and estates”). 
182 Id. at 189-92. 
183 Cheyney, supra note 168, at 100. 
184 Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the 
Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1986). But 
cf. THOMAS EARLE, THE RIGHT OF STATES TO ALTER AND ANNUL CHARTERS, CONSIDERED, 
AND THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES THEREON, EXAMINED 
11-18 (Philadelphia, Carey & Lea et al. 1823) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions on this 
topic “have been erroneous” and that “[w]e, who assert this erroneousness, . . . are supported by the 
judges of several state courts”). 
185 See, e.g., Coyle v. Gray, 30 A. 728, 731 (Del. 1884) (“The corporation of the city of 
Wilmington . . . is merely an agency instituted by the state for the purpose of carrying out in detail 
the objects of government. . . . It has no vested powers or franchises. Its charter . . . is in no sense a 
contract with the state.”); Town of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio 427, 432 (1831) (“In this respect there 
seems to be a well settled distinction between private and public corporations. . . . [A] public 
corporation, created for the purposes of government, cannot be considered as a contract.”). 
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quo warranto” (that is, judicial proceedings to determine whether a recognized 
ground for forfeiture had occurred).186 
That proposition survived even after methods of incorporation changed 
dramatically. Early on, legislatures had almost always created business 
corporations on a case-by-case basis: a state legislature (or occasionally 
Congress) would enact a “special act” naming the entity, establishing it as a 
corporate body, and either listing its powers and obligations or referring to a 
standard list found in another statute.187 The fact that the state was issuing a 
charter to one particular corporation, and that the state was trying to 
encourage that corporation to perform functions that would benefit the 
public, may have made it easier to think of the arrangement as contractual.188 
But that way of thinking persisted even after states started enacting “general” 
incorporation acts that allowed entrepreneurs to organize business 
corporations without special permission from the legislature.189 As the 
Supreme Court subsequently confirmed, the incorporators’ acceptance of the 
terms offered by the state could still create a contract (and the franchises 
granted thereby could still be vested rights) even if the state made the same 
terms available to other would-be incorporators.190 
 
186 Webb v. Moler, 8 Ohio 548, 552 (1838); see also, e.g., Del. R.R. Tax, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 206, 
225 (1874) (“That the charter of a private corporation is a contract between the State and the 
corporators, and within the provision of the Constitution prohibiting legislation impairing the 
obligation of contracts, has been the settled law of this court since the decision in the Dartmouth 
College case.”); Mayor of Mobile v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 570, 578 (1875) (observing that this 
doctrine is “settled beyond controversy, by judicial decision,” though criticizing its consequences); 
Stephens v. Marshall, 3 Pin. 203, 207-08 (Wis. 1851) (“The power of the legislature to abrogate grants 
or franchises, after private rights have become established under them, has not been asserted since 
the Dartmouth College Case. The general principle is settled by authority.”). 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s acceptance of this doctrine did not last. See infra notes 255–85 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Ohio Supreme Court’s resistance in the 1850s). 
187 See 2 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 16-17; DODD, supra note 108, at 417 n.28. 
188 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
189 On the spread of general incorporation acts, see Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to 
General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 101-04 
(1999) (noting that the trend began in the late 1830s and that such acts became common in the ensuing 
decades). There are isolated examples of general incorporation acts for certain types of business 
corporations before the 1830s, but not many. See DODD, supra note 108, at 417 n.28 (observing that 
“the earliest American general incorporation act for business enterprises would seem to be the 
Massachusetts general Aqueduct Act of 1799,” and “[t]he earliest general act of real importance is the 
New York Manufacturing Corporations Act of 1811”); cf. 2 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 16-17 (noting earlier 
examples of general incorporation acts for religious or eleemosynary purposes). 
The spread of general incorporation laws caused some commentators to doubt that 
incorporation should still be called a “franchise.” See, e.g., 2 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 884 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1886) (noting 
that what once had required “a gift of a special privilege” was now available to all). 
190 See, e.g., Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 161 (1877); Miller v. 
State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478, 488, 492 (1873); see also Capital City Gaslight Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 72 F. 829, 831-32 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1896) (“Whether a charter is given directly, by act of the 
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3. Some Early Qualifications 
Of course, even if the charters that state legislatures granted to private 
corporations amounted to contracts, the legislatures could determine the 
wording of the charters that they granted, and hence the terms of the deal. In 
the late eighteenth century, some acts of incorporation passed by the 
Connecticut legislature included a clause specifying that the legislature could 
repeal or amend the act at will.191 In 1806, when the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts observed that acts of incorporation could give rise to vested 
rights, the court acknowledged the potential effectiveness of such clauses; as 
the court put it, “the rights legally vested . . . in any corporation[] cannot be 
controuled or destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a power for that 
purpose be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation.”192 Justice Story’s 
concurring opinion in Dartmouth College both praised this statement as a 
matter of general law and recognized the same exception under the Contract 
Clause. If Dartmouth’s charter had included a reservation clause, Justice 
Story indicated, the Contract Clause would not have prevented the state from 
exercising the powers that had been reserved, because that possibility would 
have been built into the contract all along.193 
After Dartmouth College, state legislatures often preserved their flexibility 
by including broad reservation clauses in the acts of incorporation that they 
passed.194 Indeed, the Delaware Constitution of 1831 required every new act of 
 
legislative body, or whether articles of incorporation or association are adopted under general 
statutes theretofore enacted by such legislative body, is not material on this point.”). 
191 See, e.g., An Act to Incorporate the Norwich Bank § 7 (1796), reprinted in 1 RESOLVES AND 
PRIVATE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO THE YEAR 1836, at 
131, 133 (Hartford 1837) (“[T]his act or any part thereof may be altered or repealed at the pleasure of 
the general assembly.”); 2 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 316 & n.2 (citing this and other examples); id. at 
315-16 (noting that a similar reservation appeared in a 1789 statute incorporating the Director, 
Inspectors, and Company of Connecticut Silk Manufacturers); see also Bruce A. Campbell, 
Dartmouth College as a Civil Liberties Case: The Formation of Constitutional Policy, 70 KY. L.J. 643, 
701 (1982) (noting that “[i]n England, the Crown regularly inserted reservation clauses in corporate 
charters,” and early American legislatures may have been “following England’s lead” in this respect). 
192 Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 143, 146 (1806) (emphasis added). 
193 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 708 (1819) (Story, J., 
concurring) (citing the relevant passage from Wales); id. at 712 (“If the legislature mean to claim 
such an authority, it must be reserved in the grant. The charter of Dartmouth College contains no 
such reservation; and . . . therefore . . . the acts of the legislature of New-Hampshire, now in 
question, do impair the obligations of that charter, and are, consequently, unconstitutional . . . .”); 
see also Siegel, supra note 184, at 33 (“So clearly was [the significance of reservations] a corollary of 
contract notions, that the reserve clause doctrine made its appearance in the very same opinions . . . 
that first declared that state-granted franchises were protected by the contract clause.”). 
194 See Siegel, supra note 184, at 33 n.153 (noting that Chancellor Kent described such clauses as 
having become common in “all the recent acts of incorporations” (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 246 (New York, O. Halsted 1827))); see also ELY, supra note 153, 
at 39 (reporting that within weeks after the Supreme Court decided Dartmouth College, a newspaper in 
Kentucky urged the state legislature to include a reservation clause in all subsequent charters). 
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incorporation to include “a reserved power of revocation by the legislature.”195 
Once states started enacting general incorporation acts, moreover, those acts 
often included global reservation clauses, applicable to all corporations created 
under the acts.196 A number of state constitutions similarly reserved the power 
to alter acts of incorporation,197 and the Supreme Court ultimately held that 
such constitutional reservations were as effective as reservations in individual 
acts of incorporation.198 Going forward, the widespread use of reservation 
provisions limited the practical effect of the Dartmouth College doctrine.199 
So did the rule of construction that the Supreme Court announced in the 
famous Charles River Bridge case.200 There, the Court held that a statute 
incorporating a company to build and maintain a bridge, and authorizing the 
company to collect tolls at specified rates for the purpose of defraying its 
expenses, did not impliedly promise that the state would never cause a free 
bridge to be constructed in the same vicinity. More generally, the Court 
agreed with a recent English opinion that although an act of incorporation 
could amount to a contract between the state and the incorporators, “any 
ambiguity in the terms of the contract, must operate against the adventurers, 
and in favour of the public, and the [incorporators] can claim nothing that is 
not clearly given them by the act.”201 Even with respect to old charters that 
did not include reservation clauses, this rule of construction cut back on the 
scope of the private rights that charters were understood to confer and that 
the Contract Clause protected against abrogation.202 
 
195 DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. II, § 17. 
196 See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 167, at 60 (“[I]t became the rule rather than the exception to 
avoid the restrictions imposed by [Dartmouth College and related decisions] through the adoption of 
reservation clauses in general incorporation statutes and constitutional provisions.”); see also, e.g., 
Act of June 10, 1837, ch. 63, § 23, 1837 Conn. Laws 49, 53 (“[T]he General Assembly may at any time, 
for just cause, rescind the powers of any corporation, created pursuant to the provisions of this 
act . . . .”); cf. N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 1, ch. 18, tit. 3, § 8, 1827 N.Y. Laws 449 (“The charter of every 
corporation, that shall hereafter be granted by the legislature, shall be subject to alteration, 
suspension and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature.”). 
197 See WRIGHT, supra note 167, at 85 (citing N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VIII, § 1, which “was 
evidently the model” for similar clauses in some other state constitutions). 
198 See, e.g., Miller v. State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478, 497 (1873). 
199 Cf. Speir, supra note 152, at 155 n.297 (“At present, 49 states and the District of Columbia 
have enacted a reservation clause as part of their corporation codes, their constitutions, or both.”). 
200 Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 
Pet.) 420 (1837); see also HORWITZ, supra note 106, at 130-39 (discussing the case’s significance). 
201 Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 544 (quoting Proprietors of the Stourbridge Canal 
v. Wheeley (1831) 109 Eng. Rep. 1336, 1337 (K.B.)); see also id. at 549 (“In charters of this description, 
no rights are taken from the public, or given to the corporation, beyond those which the words of 
the charter, by their natural and proper construction, purport to convey.”). 
202 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 184, at 40 (“The strict construction principle was a major 
undermining of the contract clause’s protection of state-granted franchises.”). 
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Still, neither reservation provisions nor the Charles River Bridge principle 
changed the theoretical status of corporate franchises. The state did not have to 
grant such franchises, and the state could build appropriate qualifications into the 
franchises that it chose to grant. But when granted in unambiguous terms and 
without reservations, corporate franchises amounted to vested private rights. 
C. Ferries, Bridges, Turnpikes, and Other Public Utilities 
The preceding Section focused mostly on the franchise of incorporation. 
As noted above, however, nineteenth-century lawyers also used the word 
“franchise” to refer to various other legal interests that private people could 
not exercise without a grant from the government, and that the government 
was supposed to grant only in consideration of benefits to the public, but that 
nonetheless were regarded as a species of private property once granted. 
For instance, the authority to establish a ferry for transporting members 
of the public across a river, and to collect a toll from passengers, was said to 
be “among the most common examples of a franchise.”203 In seventeenth-
century England, Sir Matthew Hale had observed that “by an ancient right 
of prerogative,” the king enjoyed certain interests in many rivers, including 
“[a] right of franchise or privilege, that no man may set up a common ferry 
for all passengers, without a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from 
the king.”204 Likewise, nineteenth-century American courts generally agreed 
that someone who wanted to operate a ferry for members of the public needed 
a grant from the public’s authorized representatives.205 
A state’s grant of a ferry franchise to a private individual or entity amounted 
to a bargain between the state and the franchisee. Whether by statute or as a 
matter of unwritten law, the franchisee normally was regarded as a common 
carrier who owed members of the public a duty to operate the ferry, to keep it 
in good repair, and not to refuse unreasonably to transport people who tendered 
the prescribed fee.206 In return, the state allowed the franchisee to collect tolls 
 
203 Davis v. Mayor of New York, 14 N.Y. 506, 523 (1856); accord, e.g., McRoberts v. Washburne, 
10 Minn. 23, 27 (1865) (“All the books speak and treat of the right to run a ferry boat for public 
accommodation and to charge tolls, as a franchise.”). 
204 MATTHEW HALE, A TREATISE RELATIVE TO THE MARITIME LAW OF ENGLAND, IN 
THREE PARTS 6 (London, Francis Hargrave ed., 1787) (emphasis omitted). 
205 See Bird v. Smith, 8 Watts 434, 438-39 (Pa. 1839); see also, e.g., Murray v. Menefee, 20 Ark. 561, 
566 (1859) (“[A] ferry franchise being the creature of sovereign power, no one can exercise it without the 
consent of the State . . . .”); cf. 25 C.J. Ferries § 7 (1921) (“In most jurisdictions the power of establishing 
ferries has been delegated by the state to certain inferior bodies, which are authorized under general laws 
to issue licenses for this purpose, such as county or session courts, county commissioners, boards of 
county supervisors, police juries, municipalities, and other bodies.” (footnotes omitted)). 
206 See 25 C.J. Ferries §§ 50–59 (1921) (summarizing the duties and liabilities of ferrymen); Sanders 
v. Young, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 219, 220 (1858) (“A ferryman is liable as a common carrier.”); see also, e.g., 
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42 (1845) (specifying duties by statute); 2 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL 
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from passengers, and the state sometimes promised not to authorize other 
ferries over the same stretch of river.207 Unless the state reserved the power to 
rescind the arrangement at will, courts often held that the franchisee’s rights 
were protected by the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution.208 By the 
same token, the franchise was also widely regarded as private property (despite 
having been granted for the convenience of the public).209 In the Supreme 
Court’s words, “A ferry franchise is as much property as . . . chattels, or realty. 
It is clothed with the same sanctity and entitled to the same protection as other 
property.”210 Chancellor Kent agreed that “[a]n estate in such a franchise, and 
an estate in land, rest upon the same principle.”211 
Consistent with the framework described in Part I, these ideas affected 
nineteenth-century views about the need for “judicial” power. When a state 
legislature or its delegee decided to grant a ferry franchise to one applicant 
and not another, the disappointed applicant was not automatically entitled to 
judicial review; generally speaking, no one had a vested private right to be 
awarded a franchise in the first place.212 But once a ferry franchise had been 
 
ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 683-85 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1823) 
(summarizing Massachusetts statutes and unwritten law); 3 KENT, supra note 128, at *458 (noting that 
“[t]he privilege of . . . establishing a ferry, and taking tolls for the use of the same, is a franchise,” and 
adding that “the owners of the franchise are liable to answer in damages, if they should refuse to transport 
an individual without any reasonable excuse, upon being paid or tendered the usual rate of fare”). 
207 See, e.g., Costar v. Brush, 25 Wend. 628, 632 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) (discussing the exclusivity 
provision in an agreement regarding the Fulton ferry). But cf. Wright v. Nagle, 101 U.S. 791, 794-96 
(1880) (holding that although Georgia law authorized county courts to establish ferries, it did not 
authorize them to confer exclusive rights). 
208 See, e.g., Benson v. Mayor of New York, 10 Barb. 223, 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850) (“[T]he 
authorities are abundant to show, that a grant of a franchise of this description, which has been 
accepted and acted upon, partakes of the nature of a contract, so far as to be protected by [the 
Contract Clause] . . . .”); 25 C.J. Ferries § 16 (1921) (“A legislative grant of a ferry franchise without 
reservation, when duly accepted, is a contract between the grantee and the state which cannot be 
impaired by subsequent legislation, except in so far as the right to do so has been reserved.” (footnote 
omitted)). But cf. Chapin v. Crusen, 31 Wis. 209, 214-15 (1872) (finding that a statute by which the 
Wisconsin legislature had authorized a particular ferry did not amount to a contract). 
209 See Smith v. Harkins, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 613, 619 (1845) (“[A]lthough the public 
convenience is the occasion of granting franchises of this nature, and . . . the ferry established .	.	.	is 
publici juris, yet the property is private . . . .”); see also 2 DANE, supra note 206, at 683 (“[A] ferry 
becomes property, an incorporeal hereditament, the owners of which, for the public convenience, being 
obliged by law, to perform certain public services, must, as a reasonable equivalent, be protected in 
this property . . . .”); 2 EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY 21 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1862) (same); cf. State v. Real Est. Bank, 5 Ark. 595, 599 
(1844) (“In the language of the civilians, [a franchise] is private property by public use.”). 
210 Conway v. Taylor’s Ex’r, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 603, 632 (1862); accord Louisville & Jeffersonville 
Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1903); see also, e.g., Little Rock & Fort Smith Ry. v. 
McGehee, 41 Ark. 202, 212 (1883) (observing that “[a] ferry franchise is a sovereign right at common 
law” and “belongs to no citizen . . . until granted by the sovereign,” but noting that “[w]hen it has 
been granted it becomes a private vested right”). 
211 3 KENT, supra note 128, at *458-59. 
212 See, e.g., Lippencott v. Allander, 23 Iowa 536, 537-38 (1867). 
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granted, neither the legislature nor any other nonjudicial body could 
conclusively declare that the franchisee had acted in such a way as to forfeit it. 
In the words of the Supreme Court of Iowa, “the difference between deciding 
which of two or more persons applying therefor shall have a gratuitous grant 
of a ferry franchise, and the taking away or revoking that franchise after it has 
become a vested right in the grantee, is too manifest to require argument to 
demonstrate.”213 In particular, “after such franchise has been granted, the right 
of the licensee therein vested in him,” and “[w]hether he has done acts which 
forfeit his franchise is a matter for judicial determination.”214 
Courts reached similar conclusions with respect to toll bridges and 
turnpikes. Just as establishing a ferry for common use required public 
authorization, so did building a bridge over a navigable river and offering 
passage to members of the public who paid a toll.215 Public authorization was 
also necessary to collect tolls from members of the public for using a common 
highway.216 But in the nineteenth century, legislatures often granted these 
 
213 Lippencott v. Allander, 25 Iowa 445, 446 (1868). 
214 Id. at 447; accord Territory v. Reyburn, McCahon 134, 142 (Kan. Terr. 1860) (“The act 
[granting the franchise] . . . is a contract . . . which the legislature can neither change, repeal or 
impair the obligation of. [Whether] it has been forfeited . . . is a judicial question which the court 
alone can determine when a proper case is made for that purpose.”). The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts apparently suggested a similar view in the 1790s. In a case for which there is no official 
report but that a leading digest later summarized, a man named Chadwick claimed to own a ferry 
franchise, and he sued the proprietors of a new bridge for violating his allegedly exclusive rights. 
The defendants responded that the legislature had authorized them to build the bridge, and they 
also argued that the same statute established “a special mode for ascertaining the plaintiff ’s damage” 
without trial by jury in the courts. 2 DANE, supra note 206, at 686. According to the digest, though, 
“[t]he court was of opinion the act did not, and perhaps could not, deprive the plaintiff of his 
common law, and constitutional right, to try his title and damages, by a jury in a civil action.” Id.; 
see also Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344, 
483-85 (1829) (Putnam, J., dissenting) (describing the proceedings in Chadwick’s case in more detail, 
and noting that Nathan Dane—the author of the digest—chaired the panel of referees to whom the 
case was referred), aff ’d, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
215 See, e.g., McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Ga. 213, 222 (1851) (“[T]o erect a bridge and charge toll is 
. . . a right which can only be enjoyed under a grant from the Legislature.”); McPheeters v. Merimac 
Bridge Co., 28 Mo. 465, 467 (1859) (“The right to erect a bridge and to exact toll from passengers 
crossing it is a franchise that can only be granted by the state.”); see also Covington Drawbridge Co. v. 
Shepherd, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 112, 123 (1858) (noting that the navigable portion of the Wabash River was 
“not subject to be bridged by an individual assuming to exercise a mere private right,” because building 
a bridge would partially impair the public right of navigation and therefore required “public authority”). 
216 See, e.g., Va. Cañon Toll-Road Co. v. People ex rel. Vivian, 45 P. 398, 399 (Colo. 1896) (“The 
right of a corporation or of an individual to exact tolls is not of common right, and, in this country, 
does not exist in the absence of a grant from the legislature.”). Normally, building a turnpike in the 
first place also required public authorization, not least because a private company ordinarily could 
not assemble the necessary rights-of-way or parcels of land without being granted the power of 
eminent domain. See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by 
Government: The United States, 1789–1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 237 (1973) (observing that 
“[d]evolution of the eminent-domain power upon turnpike, bridge, canal, and railroad companies 
was done in every state,” and explaining that “if such companies had lacked the power to take 
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rights to private companies in order to induce them to build and operate 
infrastructure that would benefit the public.217 As with the right to operate a 
ferry across a navigable river, these rights too were denominated “franchises.”218 
Again, the government’s decisions about whether to grant such franchises in 
the first place were not necessarily subject to judicial review.219 But once the 
government had granted such franchises without reserving the power to rescind 
them at will, they were regarded as private property,220 and they triggered the 
same separation-of-powers principles as other vested private rights.221 
 
property coercively for rights-of-way, they would have been left at the mercy of any individual 
landowner disposed to be stubborn or extortionate”); see also Cnty. Comm’rs v. Chandler, 96 U.S. 
205, 208 (1878) (“[T]he right to erect [railroads, turnpikes, bridges, or ferries] is a public right.”). 
217 See, e.g., David T. Beito, From Privies to Boulevards: The Private Supply of Infrastructure in the 
United States During the Nineteenth Century, in DEVELOPMENT BY CONSENT: THE VOLUNTARY 
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES 23, 24-30 (Jerry Jenkins & David E. Sisk eds., 1993); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2015). 
218 See, e.g., Thompson v. People ex rel. Taylor, 23 Wend. 537, 562 (N.Y. 1840) (opinion of Sen. 
Edwards) (“Although the right to build the bridge in question and take toll was granted to an individual, 
it was for the accommodation of the public and was a public franchise, and so are all grants of a similar 
nature, as well as the grants for public roads and ferries.”); 2 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN 
LAW 211 (Philadelphia, Robert E. Peterson, 1851) (“The most common [franchises] are the grant of a right 
or privilege of making roads, bridges, establishing ferries, and taking toll for the use of the same.”). 
219 Cf. Truckee & Tahoe Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Campbell, 44 Cal. 89, 91-92 (1872) (“A grant of . . . a 
[turnpike] franchise by a Board of Supervisors . . . is not liable to be attacked by a private person, or in a 
collateral proceeding, for mere error in the exercise of the authority to make the grant. . . . [T]he 
determination of the Board in respect to [the relevant] questions of fact, is conclusive in this action . . . .”). 
220 See, e.g., Powell v. Sammons, 31 Ala. 552, 560 (1858) (“The right of the company to receive and 
collect toll at their gates, erected in conformity to the charter, is a franchise, and is undoubtedly private 
property.”); Cal. State Tel. Co. v. Alta Tel. Co., 22 Cal. 398, 422 (1863) (“The grant of a franchise is in 
the nature of a vested right of property . . . . So long as the grantee fulfills the conditions and performs 
the duties imposed upon him by the terms of the grant, he has a vested right which cannot be taken 
away, or otherwise impaired by the Government, any more than other property.”), overruled in part on 
other grounds by City of S.F. v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 493 (1874). In the early twentieth 
century, a treatise on franchises collected some cases that questioned the status of franchises as property. 
See JOYCE, supra note 49, at 79-80. But the treatise indicated that these cases were anomalous: 
“Notwithstanding any assertion to the contrary, franchises are property, and are almost universally 
classed as real property or incorporeal hereditaments.” Id. at 80 & n.36 (citing many cases). 
221 See, e.g., JOYCE, supra note 49, at 867 (“Although a franchise must . . . emanate from the 
sovereign power, and that power alone can grant it . . . , still when it . . . is once lawfully granted 
. . . and accepted, it becomes surrounded by constitutional guarantees of protection which no 
legislative body can set aside and ignore by declaring a forfeiture . . . .”). 
The Supreme Court qualified this doctrine in Farnsworth v. Minnesota & Pacific Railroad Co., 92 
U.S. 49 (1876). The Territory (and later State) of Minnesota had granted the company some land 
on which to build a railroad. As a result of further transactions, the company’s ownership of the land 
was subject to the condition that the company construct a portion of the track by a specified date, 
and the company agreed that it would forfeit both the land and its franchises to the state if it missed 
the deadline. See id. at 55-56. When the company nonetheless failed to build the road, the state 
legislature enacted a statute transferring those property rights to another company. Id. at 56. In 
ensuing litigation, the Supreme Court held that the state had not needed to go to court first to 
establish that a forfeiture had indeed occurred. According to Justice Field’s opinion for the Court, 
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Of course, even after the government had granted someone a franchise to 
operate a toll bridge or a turnpike, the government could use its power of 
eminent domain to take the franchise (along with other types of property) 
for public use; although “[a] franchise is property,” it is not “more sacred[] 
than other property,” so it was not exempt from the government’s power of 
eminent domain.222 When the government used that power, though, it was 
liable to pay just compensation—and because a vested private right was at 
stake, the legislature could not conclusively specify the amount of 
compensation that was just. In the Supreme Court’s words, “this is a judicial 
and not a legislative question.”223 
As technology developed, new franchises became possible. For instance, 
utility companies were granted franchises to run pipes or wires through city 
streets for the purpose of supplying residents with water, gas, or electricity.224 
Again, courts said that “[s]uch a franchise is property which cannot be 
destroyed or taken away without compensation.”225 
The very word “franchise” was often used to connote a strong type of 
vestedness. While the words “franchise” and “license” were both used in various 
ways in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was fairly common 
for courts to contrast “an irrevocable franchise” with “a mere license, revocable 
 
A forfeiture by the State of an interest in lands and connected franchises, granted for 
the construction of a public work, may be declared for non-compliance with the 
conditions annexed to their grant, or to their possession, when the forfeiture is 
provided by statute, without judicial proceedings to ascertain and determine the 
failure of the grantee to perform the conditions. 
Id. at 66. Still, the Court made clear that the original grantee was not bound by the legislature’s version 
of the facts: the forfeiture was “left open to legal contestation” in a lawsuit between the original grantee 
and the person who claimed title pursuant to the forfeiture. Id. at 67-68. Consistent with the idea that 
vested private rights were at stake, only judicial proceedings were capable of “establish[ing] as matter 
of record, importing verity against the grantee, the facts upon which the forfeiture depends.” Id. at 66. 
A later opinion explained that cases like Farnsworth merely put the government on the same 
footing as a private person who had granted land subject to a condition subsequent. See Atl. & Pac. 
R.R. v. Mingus, 165 U.S. 413, 434 (1897). If a private grantor believed that the condition had been 
breached and that the land had reverted to him, he could reenter the land. By the same token, when 
the state believed that land had reverted to it, the legislature could assert its rights by statute. See id. 
But just as reentry by a private grantor would not compel courts to accept the grantor’s version of the 
facts, neither would a statutory declaration of forfeiture. The statute was a way for the government to 
assert its position, but the statute did not itself establish that the government’s position was correct. 
222 W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 534 (1848). 
223 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893). 
224 See, e.g., 1 ALLEN RIPLEY FOOTE, THE LAW OF INCORPORATED COMPANIES 
OPERATING UNDER MUNICIPAL FRANCHISES, SUCH AS ILLUMINATING GAS COMPANIES, 
FUEL GAS COMPANIES, ELECTRIC CENTRAL STATION COMPANIES, TELEPHONE COMPANIES, 
STREET RAILWAY COMPANIES, WATER COMPANIES, ETC. 115-16 (Charles E. Everett ed., 
Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1892); JOYCE, supra note 49, at 48-51. 
225 People ex rel. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 169 N.Y.S. 139, 142 (App. 
Div.), aff ’d, 120 N.E. 192 (N.Y. 1918). 
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at pleasure of the grantor.”226 In the words of one state supreme court that drew 
this contrast, “a franchise is . . . a vested right protected by the Constitution.”227 
D. Controversies about Franchises and Calls for Reform 
As the nineteenth century wore on, each of the types of franchises 
discussed above generated controversy. Courts, commentators, and political 
reformers all expressed concerns about the power of state and local 
legislatures to grant special rights to favored individuals or corporations, 
especially if the Federal Constitution would prevent subsequent legislatures 
from undoing those grants. Eventually, the Dartmouth College doctrine itself 
came under attack from both state judges and commentators. But while the 
Supreme Court qualified that doctrine in various respects, the Court 
continued to regard franchises as vested rights. 
1. Statutory Reforms and Constitutional Restrictions on the States’ Power 
to Grant Franchises 
Early in the nineteenth century, controversy about franchises focused 
mostly on acts of incorporation. As noted above, some state legislatures had 
included reservation clauses in corporate charters even before the Dartmouth 
College decision, and this practice became widespread thereafter.228 Starting 
in the 1830s, moreover, some states adopted constitutional provisions that 
effectively prevented the state legislature from granting charters without such 
reservations.229 At the same time, Jacksonians raised pointed concerns about 
 
226 Union Inst. for Sav. v. City of Boston, 112 N.E. 637, 637-38 (Mass. 1916); see also, e.g., Levis 
v. City of Newton, 75 F. 884, 889 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1896) (asking rhetorically whether gas companies 
that had been assumed to hold “franchises” from various cities instead held “merely . . . licenses, 
which are revocable at the pleasure of the councils of these different cities”), aff ’d, 79 F. 715 (8th Cir. 
1897); Recent Important Decisions, Corporations—Franchise and License Distinguished, 6 MICH. L. 
REV. 704, 706 (1908) (noting this usage of the terms “franchise” and “license” in a different case). 
For discussion of how courts have decided whether a grant amounts to a “franchise” or a mere 
“license,” see John Greil, The Unfranchised Competitor Doctrine, 66 VILL. L. REV. 357, 388-91 (2021). 
Greil also cites old cases recognizing that the owners of ferry franchises, street-railway franchises, 
and the like could obtain injunctive relief against competitors who were operating without legal 
authorization—a further indication that these franchises were historically regarded as property. See 
id. at 379-85 (citing Walker v. Armstrong, 2 Kan. 198 (1863); Carroll v. Campbell, 17 S.W. 884 (Mo. 
1891); Patterson v. Wollmann, 67 N.W. 1040 (N.D. 1896); and Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co. 
v. Grassmeyer, 173 P. 504 (Wash. 1918)); cf. 1 JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
INJUNCTIONS 18 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 3d ed. 1890) (reciting the traditional doctrine that “in 
the absence of any injury to property rights,” equity “will not lend its aid by injunction to restrain 
the violation of public or penal statutes, or the commission of immoral and illegal acts”). 
227 Elizabeth City v. Banks, 64 S.E. 189, 192 (N.C. 1909). 
228 See supra notes 191–94 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text. 
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the very concept of special acts of incorporation,230 and states began to enact 
general incorporation acts that allowed businesses to incorporate themselves 
on standard terms without special approval from the legislature.231 To be sure, 
the legislatures in many of these states continued to grant special charters for 
much of the nineteenth century.232 But by 1889, a majority of states had 
adopted constitutional amendments that prohibited or at least restricted the 
issuance of special charters.233 
Starting in the 1870s, some state constitutions imposed similar restrictions 
on franchises more broadly. For instance, the Illinois Constitution of 1870 
forbade the state legislature to enact “local or special laws” of various 
descriptions, including those “[g]ranting to any corporation, association or 
individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise 
whatever.”234 Many other states adopted similar provisions.235 Likewise, the 
constitution with which Colorado entered the Union in 1876 forbade the state 
legislature to pass any law “making any irrevocable grant of special privileges, 
franchises, or immunities”236—and again other states adopted similar 
 
230 See, e.g., WHAT IS A MONOPOLY? 13 (New York, George P. Scott & Co. 1835) (“Every 
corporate grant is directly in the teeth of the doctrine of equal rights, for it gives to one set of men 
the exercise of privileges which the main body can never enjoy. Every such grant is equally adverse 
to the fundamental maxim of free trade . . . .”); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE 
OF JACKSON 188-89 (1953) (discussing this pamphlet by Theodore Sedgwick, which originated as 
articles in the New York Evening Post in 1834). 
231 See supra note 189; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 230, at 337 (observing that general 
incorporation statutes are “a direct legacy from Jacksonian democracy”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1634-36 (1988) (similarly noting 
the Jacksonian character of this reform). 
232 See HURST, supra note 143, at 21 (describing general incorporation acts of the mid-
nineteenth century as “optional” and noting that “legislatures . . . continued to grant special charters 
with different terms”); Hamill, supra note 189, at 123-28 (tracing state constitutional prohibitions on 
special charters and concluding that “a significant number of state legislatures permitted special 
charters through the early twentieth century”). 
233 See Hamill, supra note 189, at 127. 
234 ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. 4, § 22. 
235 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. of 1912, art. 4, § 19; COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. 5, § 25; MINN. 
CONST. of 1857, art. 4, § 33 (1881); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. 5, § 26; NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. 3, 
§ 15; N.M. CONST. of 1912, art. 4, § 24; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. 3, § 18 (1874); N. DAK. CONST. of 
1889, art. 2, § 69; S. DAK. CONST. of 1889, art. 3, § 23; WYO. CONST. of 1889, art. 3, § 27; see also Act 
of July 30, 1886, ch. 818, § 1, 24 Stat. 170, 170 (imposing this restriction on territorial legislatures). 
236 COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. 2, § 11. 
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language.237 State constitutions also explicitly restricted municipalities’ 
power to grant franchises.238 
The spread of such provisions reflects discomfort with the Dartmouth 
College doctrine, or at least with some of its consequences. Formally speaking, 
of course, the doctrine persisted: when the state had granted someone an 
irrevocable franchise that the recipient had accepted and that was supported 
by consideration, the Supreme Court continued to regard the franchise as a 
vested private right. But to the extent that state constitutions deprived 
legislatures of their power to grant irrevocable franchises in the first place, 
the Dartmouth College doctrine had less room to operate. 
2. Limitations on the Dartmouth College Doctrine 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, some state judges and 
commentators took more direct aim at the Dartmouth College doctrine. As 
described below, the Ohio Supreme Court launched a frontal attack on the 
doctrine in the 1850s. By the 1870s and 1880s, several leading authors had 
joined the fray, sharply criticizing the doctrine for preventing current 
legislators from rescinding franchises that their predecessors had granted 
unwisely or corruptly.239 Indeed, a law review article published in 1874 
referred to “the murmuring at the entire doctrine which is beginning to be 
 
237 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. 1, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. of 1912, art. 2, § 9; KY. CONST. of 
1891, Bill of Rights, § 3; S. DAK. CONST. of 1889, art. 6, § 12; UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. 1, § 23. 
Along the same lines, the Texas Constitution of 1876 provided that “no irrevocable or uncontrollable 
grant of special privileges or immunities shall be made; but all privileges and franchises granted by 
the legislature or created under its authority shall be subject to the control thereof.” TEX. CONST. of 
1876, art. 1, § 17. Ultimately, though, the Texas Supreme Court read this provision narrowly. See Mayor 
of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co., 19 S.W. 127, 130-31 (Tex. 1892) (tentatively concluding that 
this provision was simply intended to permit revocation for cause, not revocation “at the mere pleasure 
or will of the legislature,” and holding that Houston’s city council could not validly repeal an ordinance 
that had authorized the railway company to operate in the city streets for a term of thirty years). 
238 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. of 1912, art. 13, §§ 4–6; OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. 18, § 5(a). 
239 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION *279 n.2 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1871) (“Every privilege granted or right conferred . . . being 
made inviolable by the Constitution, the government is frequently found stripped of its authority in 
very important particulars, by unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation . . . .”); FRANCIS WHARTON, 
COMMENTARIES ON LAW 554, 556 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1884) (observing that “there is a 
growing tendency to doubt the correctness of the general rule laid down in [Dartmouth College], so far 
as it involves the assertion that a state cannot recall a franchise granted to a private corporation or 
modify grants made to such a corporation,” and adding that “[t]he policy of irrevocably granting away 
public franchises . . . has become far more questionable with the lapse of years than it was [then]”); 
see also VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER 
THAN CHARITABLE 417 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1882) (“The rule established by the Dartmouth 
College case was acquiesced in for a time; but it has been much criticised of late years, . . . and a 
tendency has been manifested by the courts to limit its application as far as possible.”); Hovenkamp, 
supra note 231, at 1618-24 (highlighting both Cooley’s and Wharton’s discussions). 
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heard throughout the country, the restless, fitful desire to get rid of it . . . 
which large classes of people begin to feel.”240 
Various critics suggested that the Supreme Court never should have held 
that franchises could be vested private rights. As one state judge wrote in 1892, 
The decision of the supreme court of the United States in the celebrated 
Dartmouth College Case, where it was declared that a franchise, upon being 
accepted by the grantee, became a perfect contract, which the state could 
neither recall nor in any wise impair, has never been universally admitted to 
have been based upon sound principles of government. Many eminent writers 
and courts have thought that a franchise is a mere privilege extended by the 
sovereign power of the state, which it could recall whenever it should be 
deemed advisable so to do.241 
Still, the same judge observed that “[t]he courts have generally . . . from necessity 
yielded to the supreme court of the United States”—with the result that franchises 
continued to be treated as vested rights notwithstanding these protests.242 
As we shall see, the Supreme Court eventually qualified the Dartmouth 
College doctrine in ways that reflected some of the critics’ concerns. Most 
prominently, the Court concluded that even if a state promised never to 
subject a particular corporation to particular types of regulations, the 
Contract Clause would not prevent the state from changing its mind; no one 
could acquire a vested right to be exempt from core aspects of a state’s police 
powers. But while the concept of “franchises” did not extend to everything of 
value that the government might grant, the Court never repudiated the idea 
that true franchises amounted to vested rights. 
a. Public Offices 
As background for understanding limits on the concept of “franchises,” it 
helps to start with the treatment of public offices. Traditionally, the common 
law of England had treated some offices as the property of the officeholder.243 
Thus, although Blackstone distinguished between offices and franchises, he 
categorized them both as “incorporeal hereditaments.”244 During the 
nineteenth century, though, American courts largely rejected this way of 
 
240 The Dartmouth College Case, supra note 105, at 191. 
241 Houston City St. Ry. Co., 19 S.W. at 130. 
242 Id. 
243 See STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT 
WE OWN 8 (2011). 
244 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *36-37. 
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thinking about public offices. In the United States, incumbents were said to 
hold their offices in trust for the public, not as a species of private property.245 
Admittedly, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison 
indicated that William Marbury had a “vested legal right” in the office to 
which he had been appointed.246 But Congress had not tried to eliminate that 
office,247 and Marshall’s majority opinion in Dartmouth College suggested that 
“offices held within a State for State purposes” normally remained subject to 
state control.248 Three decades later, the Supreme Court explicitly held that 
even if a state statute specified the term of an office and the fees or 
compensation that the officeholder would collect, the person who was 
appointed to this office did not thereby acquire a contractual right to serve the 
full term at the specified pay; without violating the Federal Constitution’s 
Contract Clause, the legislature could always amend the statute to shorten the 
term or to reduce the compensation for work that the officeholder had not yet 
performed.249 By and large, state courts agreed that public offices created by 
statute “are not held by grant or contract, nor has any person a private property 
or vested interest in them, and they are therefore liable to such modifications 
and changes as the law-making power may deem it advisable to enact.”250 
 
245 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1029-31 (citing cases); see also Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 
576 (1900) (“The view that public office is not property has been generally entertained in this country.”). 
246 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803). 
247 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1031 (“Statutory entitlements might be vested in the weak 
sense as against executive intrusion while not being vested .	. . against legislative termination; it is 
not clear in which sense Marshall meant the right was vested. The issue of whether Marbury’s office 
was legislatively defeasible was not presented . . . .”). 
248 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 627-29 (1819). But cf. id. 
at 699 (Story, J., concurring) (including “offices” along with “franchises” as types of “incorporeal 
hereditaments” whose owners “have a legal estate and property in them”). 
249 See Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 416-17 (1851). But cf. Hall v. Wisconsin, 
103 U.S. 5, 8-11 (1880) (limiting this doctrine to “officer[s]” and distinguishing people who performed 
services for the government as mere employees or contractors). 
250 State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Davis, 44 Mo. 129, 131 (1869); accord, e.g., Stuhr v. Curran, 44 N.J.L. 
181, 188-89 (1882), abrogated on other grounds by N.J. Dep’t of Corr. v. Int’l Fed’n of Pro. & Tech. Eng’rs, 
Local 195, 780 A.2d 525 (N.J. 2001); City of Steubenville v. Culp, 38 Ohio St. 18, 23 (1882); see also 
Conner v. Mayor of New York, 5 N.Y. 285, 295 (1851) (opinion of Ruggles, C.J.) (“Public offices in 
this state are not incorporeal hereditaments; nor have they the character or qualities of grants.”); id. 
at 296 (“The prospective salary or other emoluments of a public office[] are not . . . property . . . . 
[W]hen the plaintiff accepted the office of clerk, he must be supposed to have known that the 
legislature had the power to regulate and change his compensation as the public interests might 
require.”); Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 Serg. & Rawle 322, 323 (Pa. 1820) (rejecting a mayor’s challenge 
to a law reducing his salary after his term had begun, and observing that “[t]hese services rendered 
by public officers do not, in this particular, partake of the nature of contracts, nor have they the 
remotest affinity thereto”); FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES 
AND OFFICERS 295-96 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1890) (“Except in North Carolina, it is now well 
settled that there is no contract, either express or implied, between a public officer and the 
government whose agent he is. . . . Neither, except in North Carolina, can a public office be regarded 
as the property of the incumbent.”); MONTGOMERY H. THROOP, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
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In keeping with this view, many courts held that the legislature could 
establish administrative mechanisms to remove officeholders for cause before 
the expiration of their terms. By the end of the nineteenth century, a number 
of courts did say that the officeholder in question was entitled to notice and 
an opportunity to be heard (at least in the absence of clear statutory language 
to the contrary)251—a doctrine that presaged modern notions of procedural 
due process.252 According to the majority rule, though, the proceedings did 
not have to occur in a true court: vested private rights were not at stake in 
proceedings to remove someone from public office, and so “judicial” power in 
the constitutional sense was not required.253 
 
RELATING TO PUBLIC OFFICERS AND SURETIES IN OFFICIAL BONDS 345 (New York, J.Y. Johnston 
Co. 1892) (“[I]n this country an office is not regarded as property, nor has the officer any vested rights 
therein, which are within the protection of the United States constitution, or the general provision of 
a state constitution, forbidding legislative interference with property or vested rights.”). But see People 
ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Wells, 2 Cal. 198, 203-04 (1852) (“Under our system of government, [an office] 
may be regarded as a contract between the State on one hand and the individual on the other, whereby 
he assumes the performance of certain duties for a certain compensation. For these purposes he 
becomes seised of the office, as of any other property, in the right and enjoyment of which he cannot 
be disturbed or defeated, except by operation of law.”); see also BANNER, supra note 243, at 8-9 
(quoting early statements by Alexander Hamilton to the effect that officeholders could have vested 
rights in their offices); cf. Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1, 16-24 (1833) (acknowledging that the 
legislature can abolish or modify offices by statute, but endorsing a limited version of the idea that 
“an office is deemed the subject of property”), overruled by Mial v. Ellington, 46 S.E. 961 (N.C. 1903). 
251 See MECHEM, supra note 250, at 287 (“[W]here the appointment or election is made for a 
definite term or during good behavior, and the removal is to be for cause, it is now clearly established 
by the great weight of authority that the power of removal can not, except by clear statutory 
authority, be exercised without notice and hearing . . . .”). 
252 See, e.g., E. St. Louis Fed’n of Teachers, Local 1220 v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. No. 189 Fin. 
Oversight Panel, 687 N.E.2d 1050, 1061 (Ill. 1997) (discussing procedural-due-process protections 
for public employees and officers). On the development of procedural-due-process doctrines in 
administrative settings, see Ann Woolhandler, Delegation and Due Process: The Historical Connection, 
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 223. 
253 See, e.g., Donahue v. County of Will, 100 Ill. 94, 103-07 (1881), overruled in part by E. St. Louis 
Fed’n, 687 N.E.2d at 1061; State ex rel. Whitaker v. Adams, 15 So. 490, 491 (La. 1894); Att’y Gen. ex 
rel. Rich v. Jochim, 58 N.W. 611, 613-14 (Mich. 1894); State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Hawkins, 5 N.E. 228, 
232-33 (Ohio 1886); Cameron v. Parker, 38 P. 14, 29 (Okla. 1894); State ex rel. Starkweather v. 
Common Council, 64 N.W. 304, 305-06 (Wis. 1895); Territory v. Cox, 6 Dak. 501, 508-12 (Dak. Terr. 
Dist. Ct. 1889); see also Lynch v. Chase, 40 P. 666, 667 (Kan. 1895) (“The decided weight of authority 
is that, while the proceeding to remove from office for cause involves the examination of facts and the 
exercise of judgment and discretion by the executive officer, his action is not judicial in the sense that 
it belongs exclusively to the courts.”); Alonzo H. Tuttle, Removal of Public Officers from Office for Cause 
(pt. 2), 3 MICH. L. REV. 341, 347 (1905) (“[R]emoval for cause . . . is quasi judicial or judicial in nature 
but not judicial in the sense that it comes within the inhibition of the clause ‘all judicial power shall 
be vested in the courts.’”). But see, e.g., Christy v. City of Kingfisher, 76 P. 135, 136-37 (Okla. Terr. 
1904) (holding that removal for cause is “judicial action” that necessitates the involvement of courts 
with “judicial power”); cf. Page v. Hardin, 47 Ky. 648, 672-75 (Ky. 1848) (concluding that “every 
proceeding for the removal of an officer for cause . . . is essentially an exercise of the judicial power 
of the Commonwealth,” though adding that the legislature could nonetheless “refer the case of any 
particular officer to the action and judgment of the Governor, or to some other officer or tribunal”); 
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b. Exemptions from the Exercise of Governmental Powers 
The doctrines that I have just surveyed can be summarized as follows: 
public officers lacked vested private rights in the powers of their office. 
Instead of acquiring any sort of ownership interest in the governmental power 
that the public allowed them to exercise, individual officeholders held such 
power only as “agent[s] of the public.”254 
By contrast, there was more controversy about the status of exemptions from 
governmental power. When a legislature wanted to encourage the creation of 
a corporation, the legislature sometimes promised not to exercise certain 
powers against the corporation, and the legislature sometimes included this 
exemption in the corporation’s charter. From the mid-nineteenth century on, 
lawyers engaged in fierce debates about whether such exemptions amounted 
to vested private rights.255 Indeed, this issue caused the Ohio Supreme Court 
to repudiate the Dartmouth College doctrine in its entirety and to deny that the 
Contract Clause insulated any charter provisions against subsequent repeal.256 
As we shall see, the U.S. Supreme Court held firm against this challenge, but 
the Court subsequently articulated important limits on the kinds of 
exemptions that the Federal Constitution required legislatures to respect. 
i. Controversy About Tax Exemptions 
The flashpoint for the Ohio Supreme Court’s resistance involved 
exemptions from state and local taxes. In 1845, the Ohio legislature had 
enacted a statute allowing individuals “to associate and form companies for 
the purpose of carrying on the business of banking.”257 The statute specified 
that “[e]ach banking company, organized under this act, or accepting thereof, 
and complying with its provisions,” would pay six percent of its profits to the 
state “in lieu of all taxes to which such company, or the stockholders thereof, 
on account of stock owned therein, would otherwise be subject.”258 Six years 
later, however, the legislature enacted a statute subjecting banks to the normal 
 
Dullam v. Wilson, 19 N.W. 112, 115-16 (Mich. 1884) (agreeing that when the state constitution 
authorized the governor to remove public officers for cause, it “clothe[d] him with judicial power,” 
although perhaps only in the sense that required notice and an opportunity to be heard). 
254 Lynch, 40 P. at 667. 
255 For valuable discussion, see Siegel, supra note 184, at 41-54. 
256 See id. at 41 n.203. 
257 Act of Feb. 24, 1845, § 1, 43 Ohio Laws 24, 24. Each such company could choose to operate 
either “as an independent banking company” or as “a ‘branch of the State Bank of Ohio.’” Id. § 7, 43 
Ohio Acts at 27. Once at least seven qualifying companies had elected to operate as branches of the 
State Bank of Ohio, they were each to appoint a member of a “board of control” that would have 
various powers over the branches. Id. §§ 13–14, 43 Ohio Laws at 30-31; see also id. § 16, 43 Ohio Laws 
at 32 (providing for the board of control to operate as a corporation until at least 1866). 
258 Id. § 60, 43 Ohio Laws at 48. 
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property taxes,259 and a new state constitution subsequently prohibited special 
tax exemptions for corporations.260 Banks that already had been organized 
under the 1845 statute argued that the Federal Constitution prevented these 
new laws from applying to them: by organizing themselves under the 1845 
statute, they had acquired a contractual exemption from taxation, and the 
state could not unilaterally alter that contract. 
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed. Some of its arguments stayed within 
the rubric of the Dartmouth College doctrine. For instance, the court argued 
that even under the state constitution that had been in force in 1845, the Ohio 
legislature had lacked the authority to make contracts that would prevent 
future legislatures from exercising the state’s powers of taxation.261 (If that 
were true, this restriction would have had the same effect as a constitutional 
reservation clause.262) Likewise, Justice John Corwin argued that the State of 
Ohio used banking companies “in the exercise of one of its sovereign functions 
and duties, to regulate the currency,” and each banking company should 
therefore be regarded as “a public institution” that remained subject to public 
control.263 But the Ohio Justices also went farther. In a frontal assault on the 
doctrine that Dartmouth College had been taken to establish, they denied that 
an ordinary corporate charter amounted to a contract, and they argued that 
the legislature could repeal acts of incorporation no less than other statutes.264 
As part of this argument, Chief Justice Thomas Bartley insisted that the 
rights and powers conferred by a corporate charter were conceptually 
different than vested private rights. Casting his point in Lockean terms, 
 
259 Act of Mar. 21, 1851, 49 Ohio Laws 56. 
260 OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. XIII, § 4 (“The property of corporations, now existing, or 
hereafter created, shall forever be subject to taxation, the same as the property of individuals.”). 
261 See Debolt v. Ohio Life Ins. & Tr. Co., 1 Ohio St. 563, 577-83 (1853), aff ’d, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 
416 (1854). 
262 See, e.g., Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430, 438 (1869) (dictum). 
263 Knoup v. Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio, 1 Ohio St. 603, 608-09 (1853), rev’d, 57 
U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854). Justice Corwin clarified that when he referred to “banking,” he did not 
mean merely “the receiving of money on deposit[]” or “the purchase and sale of bullion and bills of 
exchange.” Id. at 619; see also id. (noting that those activities “require no permission from 
government, nor is the right to transact them a franchise”). Instead, he used the term to refer to 
“the business of issuing promissory notes, bills, or certificates, to circulate as money.” Id. Unlike 
simple promissory notes that an individual might issue, “[a] bank bill is designed to perform the 
office of money, and does perform that office.” Id. at 620. According to Justice Corwin, “No citizen 
can issue such a bill without permission from government . . . . The right to coin money, or, what is, 
in effect, the same, to issue bills, notes and obligations, to circulate as money, is a sovereign power.” 
Id. Justice Corwin concluded that “[a] corporation established upon such a consideration, and for 
such a purpose, must needs be a public corporation.” Id. 
264 See, e.g., Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622, 657-69 (1853); Mechanics’ & 
Traders’ Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Debolt, 1 Ohio St. 591, 597-603 (1853) (dictum); see 
also Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 1615-16 (describing these and other Ohio cases as “exhibiting 
extreme state court disregard of federal law”). 
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Chief Justice Bartley contrasted “the franchise of a corporation” (which “is an 
adventitious or derivative right, originating in the government”) with “[t]he 
rights of private property, . . . personal liberty and personal security” (which 
“are original and fundamental rights, existing anterior to and independent of 
civil government”).265 To be sure, people in the state of nature might enter 
into contracts, and those contracts might concern things that did not 
otherwise fit the template of property. But as Chief Justice Bartley 
understood the theory of American government, the type of authority 
conferred by a corporate charter could not really be disposed of by contract 
or become the subject of private property. In his view, the franchise of a 
corporation should instead be regarded in the same way that Americans 
regarded the occupancy of a public office—as “a trust of civil power granted 
or delegated in the administration of the public affairs,” but “remain[ing] 
subservient to . . . the public welfare.”266 
These statements influenced the two paragraphs in my 2007 article that 
used the word “franchise.”267 Indeed, when I referred to “franchises” 
interchangeably with “privileges” to describe a category of legal interests that 
were not vested rights, I quoted Chief Justice Bartley.268 But the U.S. 
Supreme Court did not share his view. To the contrary, when one of the Ohio 
cases reached the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of error in 1854, a majority 
of the Court rejected the Ohio judges’ arguments. In Piqua Branch of the State 
 
265 Bank of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. at 663-64. 
266 Id. at 662-64 (emphasis omitted). He explained: 
In this country, no vested right of private property can exist or be held in the civil 
power or authority of government. . . . When, in the establishment of the civil 
institutions of the State, or in the administration of the government, civil power and 
authority is vested or delegated to any person or persons, [it] is still a trust to be 
exercised pursuant to the design of its original delegation by the people, and ever 
subject to control and regulation for that purpose. 
Id. at 659-60; see also id. at 642-52 (criticizing the “arbitrary distinction” between public and private 
corporations and arguing that every corporation is “a political institution of the state”). 
Justice Corwin articulated a narrower version of this idea. He agreed that “[a] franchise is a right 
belonging to the government, as a sovereign, yet committed, in trust, to some officer, corporation or 
individual.” Knoup, 1 Ohio St. at 614. As Justice Corwin understood the Ohio Constitution, moreover, 
whatever private advantages might flow from the grant of a franchise were not properly regarded as 
vested property rights; franchises were conferred only for “the public good,” and the public remained 
in charge of them. Id. at 615-16 (emphasis omitted). Still, Justice Corwin asserted that the mere right 
to be a corporation, unaccompanied by other sovereign powers, was not a franchise in this sense. See 
id. at 613. Unlike Chief Justice Bartley, then, Justice Corwin might not have thought that the 
legislature could freely repeal simple acts of incorporation. Justice Corwin seemed more concerned 
with other delegations to corporations (such as delegations of the power “to coin money,” or “to 
appropriate private property” by exercising the state’s power of eminent domain). Id. at 614. 
267 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 567-68. 
268 Id. at 568 & n.36. 
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Bank of Ohio v. Knoop,269 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the banking 
companies in question were indeed private corporations;270 that their 
acceptance of the terms offered by the 1845 statute had created a binding 
contract with the state;271 that in the absence of special limitations in the state 
constitution, the state was just as capable of making a contract about the 
amount and objects of taxation as about other topics;272 and that having made 
such a contract, the state legislature could not abrogate it by statute.273 
Members of the Ohio Supreme Court were not persuaded. In Piqua itself, 
they apparently thought hard about whether to enter the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s mandate, and ultimately did so only over a long and radical dissent by 
Chief Justice Bartley.274 By that time, the U.S. Supreme Court had already 
issued another majority opinion reiterating what it had said in Piqua.275 In later 
cases, however, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to treat these opinions by 
 
269 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854). 
270 See id. at 380-81 (indicating that in light of the relevant precedents, “no legal fact is 
susceptible of less doubt”). 
271 See id. at 380-83. 
272 See id. at 383-88. As the Court noted, earlier cases tended to support this proposition. See 
id. at 385-87 (citing New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812), and Gordon v. Appeal Tax 
Ct., 44 U.S. (3 How.) 133 (1845)). 
273 See id. at 380, 389, 392. 
274 See Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoup, 6 Ohio St. 342, 343-448 (1857) 
(Bartley, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that notwithstanding Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 
304 (1816), the Supreme Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts); Siegel, supra 
note 184, at 50-51, 51 n.253 (describing this episode and noting that “[i]t took the Ohio Court two 
years” to enter the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate). 
275 See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 360-61 (1856). 
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the U.S. Supreme Court as binding precedents.276 The U.S. Supreme Court 
therefore continued to reverse the Ohio Supreme Court’s judgments.277 
Admittedly, the U.S. Supreme Court was divided.278 Throughout the 
relevant period, several Justices agreed with one of the Ohio judges’ principal 
arguments: as a matter of state constitutional law, the typical state legislature 
lacked the power to make contracts surrendering its successors’ powers of 
taxation with respect to a particular corporation.279 A number of state courts 
also took this position,280 as did many lawyers.281 Over time, moreover, a 
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court qualified and limited its doctrines about 
 
276 The Ohio Supreme Court set this pattern within months after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Piqua. See Order of the Ohio Supreme Court (July 26, 1854) (enforcing Ohio’s tax against 
another bank), in Transcript of Record at 8, Mechanics’ & Traders’ Bank v. Debolt, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
380 (1856) (No. 73); Order of the Ohio Supreme Court (July 26, 1854) (same), in Transcript of 
Record at 8-9, Mechanics’ & Traders’ Bank v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 384 (1856) (No. 74). In 1856, 
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed these decrees. Debolt, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 383; Thomas, 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) at 385. For a brief time thereafter, a majority of the Ohio Supreme Court accepted the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s position. See Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 1616 & n.152 (citing cases); A.W. 
Gans, Annotation, Tax Exemptions and the Contract Clause, 173 A.L.R. 15, 38 n.16 (1948) (referring to 
this “brief interlude”). In 1858, however, the Ohio Supreme Court reverted to its original position. 
See Sandusky City Bank v. Wilbor, 7 Ohio St. 481, 481-82 (1858) (indicating in the syllabus that the 
key questions were matters of Ohio law as to which the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions were not 
binding); see also Skelly v. Jefferson Branch of the State Bank of Ohio, 9 Ohio St. 607, 607 (1860) 
(stating more broadly in the syllabus that precedents established by the U.S. Supreme Court “do 
not bind and conclude the judgment of this court”), rev’d, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1862). (For the 
significance of the Ohio Supreme Court’s syllabus, see Ohio Sup. Ct. R. VI, 5 Ohio St. vii (1858) 
(indicating that the syllabus is prepared “by the Judge assigned to deliver the opinion of the Court,” 
subject to the revision of “the Judges concurring therein,” and states “the points of law, arising from 
the facts of the case, that have been determined by the Court”).) 
277 See Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 1616 & n.153 (citing Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) at 450); Ann 
Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 94 & n.91 
(1997) (also citing Franklin Branch Bank v. Ohio, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 474 (1862)); see also Siegel, supra note 
184, at 47 & n.234 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed other state courts on this issue as well). 
278 See Siegel, supra note 184, at 49-50 (noting that Justices Campbell, Catron, and Daniel 
dissented in Piqua and subsequent cases, and “when they left [the Court], Chief Justice Chase and 
Justices Field and Miller continued the dissent”). 
279 See, e.g., Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439, 443 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting) 
(“We do not believe that any legislative body, sitting under a State constitution of the usual character, 
has a right to sell, to give, or to bargain away forever the taxing power of the State.”); Piqua, 57 U.S. 
(16 How.) at 407 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Ohio legislature’s powers, and 
“especially” its power of taxation, as “trust powers” that legislators “held . . . in deposit[], to be 
returned . . . to their constituents without abuse or diminution”); id. at 404 (Catron, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that “according to the constitutions of all the States of this Union . . . the sovereign 
political power is not the subject of contract so as to be vested in an irrepealable charter of 
incorporation,” and “the taxing power is a political power of the highest class”). 
280 See, e.g., Mott v. Pa. R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 9, 27-33 (1858); W. Wis. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 
35 Wis. 257, 265-66 (1874) (dictum), aff ’d, 93 U.S. 595 (1876); see also Siegel, supra note 184, at 51-52 
(citing cases from other states too). 
281 See Ernest W. Huffcut, Legislative Tax-Exemption Contracts, 24 AM. L. REV. 399, 415-16 
(1890) (speculating that “a large majority of the profession” would agree with the dissents in Piqua). 
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tax exemptions in various ways.282 (For instance, contrary to a suggestion in 
Justice Story’s concurring opinion in Dartmouth College,283 the Court held that 
the Contract Clause normally did not prevent states from rescinding tax 
exemptions or other legal interests that the legislature had given an existing 
entity as a mere “gratuity” rather than as part of an exchange of 
consideration.284) But the Court continued to say that when a corporation 
had validly been granted an exemption from taxation as part of its charter, 
for consideration and without any applicable reservations, a subsequent 
legislature could not unilaterally eliminate the exemption by statute.285 
ii. Core Aspects of the Police Power 
While a majority of the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of 
contractual exemptions from state or local taxes, the Court was less receptive 
to the idea of contractual exemptions from certain aspects of the police power. 
In that context, the Court accepted some of the arguments that the Ohio 
Supreme Court had tried to make with respect to the power of taxation. 
 
282 See id. at 417-26; see also Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-
Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 
991-92 (1975) (noting these limitations, as well as the fact that state legislatures had various ways of 
putting pressure on corporations to renegotiate tax exemptions that the legislature wanted to end, and 
concluding that “[b]y 1890 the question was of little importance as a practical matter or a legal issue”). 
283 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 683-84 (1819) (Story, J., 
concurring). After Dartmouth College, state judges appear to have been divided about whether the 
legislature could rescind franchises that were not supported by consideration. Compare Derby Tpk. 
Co. v. Parks, 10 Conn. 522, 541 (1835) (“[N]o case has been shewn to prove, that a consideration is 
necessary.”); with Young v. Harrison, 6 Ga. 130, 145 (1849) (dictum) (indicating that the legislature 
would remain in control of a ferry franchise “unless it was founded on valuable consideration”). 
284 See Tucker v. Ferguson, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 527, 574-75 (1875) (citing Rector of Christ 
Church v. County of Philadelphia, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 300 (1861)); accord W. Wis. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 93 U.S. 595, 597-98 (1876); Grand Lodge of State of La. of Free & Accepted Masons 
v. City of New Orleans, 11 So. 148, 151-52 (La. 1891); People ex rel. Davies v. Comm’rs of Taxes & 
Assessments, 47 N.Y. 501, 503-04 (1872). In the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
There is reason and authority for holding that a supplement to a charter of 
incorporation which merely confers upon it a new right or enlarges an old one, without 
imposing any new or additional burden upon it, is a mere license or promise by the 
state and may be revoked at pleasure. It is without consideration to support it and 
cannot bind a subsequent legislature . . . . 
Phila. & Gray’s Ferry Passenger Ry. Co.’s Appeal, 102 Pa. 123, 129 (1883); see also Pa. R.R. Co. v. 
Bowers, 16 A. 836, 838 (Pa. 1889) (“[A] franchise granted without a consideration moving from the 
grantees of such franchise is not binding upon the state.”); MORAWETZ, supra note 239, at 421 (“A 
grant by a State of a continuing privilege or future right, such as an exemption from taxation, to a 
corporation already in existence may be revoked, unless it is binding upon the State as a contract. It 
is necessary, therefore, that such grant be made upon a valid consideration.”). 
285 See, e.g., Powers v. Detroit, Grand Haven, & Milwaukee Ry. Co., 201 U.S. 543, 556-59 
(1906); Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 500 (1894). 
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Consider Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1878.286 In 1828, the Massachusetts legislature had incorporated the Boston 
Beer Company “for the purpose of manufacturing malt liquors in all their 
varieties.”287 In 1869, however, the legislature enacted a law sharply restricting 
the manufacture and sale of liquor in Massachusetts.288 The Boston Beer 
Company argued that its charter gave it a contractual right (protected by the 
Federal Constitution) to make and sell beer even in the face of subsequent 
statutory prohibitions,289 but the Supreme Court disagreed. For one thing, 
the charter had been subject to a broad reservation provision, and the Court 
held that this provision defeated the company’s contractual argument.290 But 
the Court indicated that even in the absence of an explicit reservation 
provision, the company still would have lost, because “[t]he legislature had 
no power to confer any such rights” as the company was claiming.291 In the 
Court’s words, “[t]he legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the 
power” to enact laws for “the protection of the lives, health, and property of 
the citizens, and . . . the preservation of good order and the public morals.”292 
The Court expanded upon this point in Stone v. Mississippi.293 In 1867, the 
Mississippi legislature had passed a statute creating a corporation for twenty-
five years and giving it the power to conduct lotteries.294 As part of this 
arrangement, the statute required the corporation to pay the state $5000 up 
front and to post a bond to secure the payment of an additional annual tax on 
its receipts from the sale of lottery tickets.295 But after the corporation had 
been operating for a few years, a new state constitution prohibited all lotteries, 
and the legislature enacted a statute implementing this prohibition.296 As in 
Beer Co., the corporation argued that it had a contractual right to continue 
operating lotteries under the arrangement established by the 1867 statute and 
that the Contract Clause prevented the state from unilaterally abrogating this 
arrangement. Again, though, the Supreme Court disagreed. Even though the 
 
286 97 U.S. 25 (1878); see also WRIGHT, supra note 167, at 196-99 (observing that “[n]ot until 
1878 did the Court hand down a decision explicitly based upon the principle that there are certain 
police or regulatory powers which the states may not contract away,” but noting that state courts and 
legal treatises had embraced this principle earlier). 
287 Act of Feb. 1, 1828, ch. 32, § 1, reprinted in 6 PRIVATE AND SPECIAL STATUTES OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 595, 595 (Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 1837). 
288 See Act of June 19, 1869, ch. 415, 1869 Mass. Acts 706. 
289 Beer Co., 97 U.S. at 26-27 (argument of counsel). 
290 Id. at 31-32 (opinion of the Court). 
291 Id. at 33. 
292 Id.; see also McCurdy, supra note 282, at 993 (noting a suggestion to the same effect in Boyd 
v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645, 650 (1877)). 
293 101 U.S. 814 (1880). 
294 Act of Feb. 16, 1867, ch. 256, §§ 1, 6, 11, 1867 Miss. Laws 349, 349-51, 354. 
295 See id. § 8, 1867 Miss. Laws at 352-53. 
296 MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. XII, § 15; Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 58, 1870 Miss. Laws 144. 
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1867 statute seemed to promise that the corporation would be able to continue 
conducting lotteries, the legislature that was sitting in 1867 could not really 
commit its successors to this position: “No legislature can bargain away the 
public health or the public morals.”297 Rather than being a subject of vested 
private rights, “the power of governing is a trust committed by the people to 
the government, no part of which can be granted away.”298 
To reconcile this principle with the Contract Clause, the Court asserted 
that “[t]he contracts which the Constitution protects are those that relate to 
property rights, not governmental.”299 The Court conceded that “the line 
which separates governmental from property rights” is not always obvious, 
but the Court saw no uncertainty with respect to lotteries: “Certainly the 
right to suppress them is governmental . . . .”300 Thus, “[a]ny one . . . who 
accepts a lottery charter does so with the implied understanding that the 
people, in their sovereign capacity, and through their properly constituted 
agencies, may resume it at any time when the public good shall require, 
whether it be paid for or not.”301 According to the Court, a charter authorizing 
a corporation to conduct lotteries created “in legal effect nothing more than 
a license” that the state could revoke—”a permit, good as against existing laws, 
but subject to future legislative and constitutional control or withdrawal.”302 
In the ensuing years, the Supreme Court applied the same idea to a 
number of valuable privileges that legislatures had conferred in acts of 
incorporation. For instance, after the Louisiana legislature had granted a 
company the exclusive right to operate slaughterhouses in New Orleans,303 and 
after the company had made extensive investments in its facilities, the Court 
held that the Contract Clause did not prevent the state from ending the 
company’s monopoly; the authority to regulate “unwholesome trades, 
slaughter-houses, [and] operations offensive to the senses” was a core aspect 
of the police power, and a legislature could not deprive its successors of that 
authority by contract in a way that the Federal Constitution required the state 
 
297 Stone, 101 U.S. at 819. 
298 Id. at 820. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. at 820-21. 
301 Id. at 821. 
302 Id. In a later case, the Court acknowledged that the constitution of a particular state might 
restrict the state legislature’s power over lottery companies. See New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U.S. 
265, 268-69, 273-76 (1886) (discussing LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 167). But even if the people of a 
state chose to tie the legislature’s hands in this way, the authority to operate a lottery still would not 
become a contractual right of the sort that the Contract Clause protected; if the state constitution 
were later amended to expand the legislature’s power, the Federal Constitution would not prevent 
the state legislature from regulating lottery companies that had been created under the old regime. 
See id. at 275; see also Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 498-99 (1897) (clarifying this point). 
303 See Act of Mar. 8, 1869, No. 118, 1869 La. Laws 170; see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 36, 61-62, 80-81 (1873) (upholding this statute against Fourteenth Amendment challenges). 
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to respect.304 For the same reason, the Contract Clause did not prevent a state 
legislature from overriding a provision in a railroad company’s charter that had 
exempted the company from tort liability for the death of any of its 
employees.305 While the Supreme Court was “not prepared to say that the 
legislature can make valid contracts on no subject embraced in the largest 
definition of the police power,”306 certain aspects of the police power were not 
to be bargained away, and the Court declined to treat exemptions from those 
powers as vested contractual rights.307 By the early twentieth century if not 
before, the Court had said the same thing about the power of eminent domain: 
even if a corporation’s charter said that the state would never use the power of 
eminent domain against the corporation’s franchises or other property, the 
Contract Clause would not prevent the state from changing its mind later.308 
The idea that exemptions from the police power amounted to revocable 
licenses, rather than vested rights of the sort that the Contract Clause 
protects, helps to account for a basic shift in the patterns of constitutional 
litigation. Professor Wright famously calculated that for the first century of 
the Constitution’s operation (that is, between 1789 and 1889), the Contract 
Clause came up in almost forty percent of the cases in which the Supreme 
 
304 Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock 
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 750-51 (1884) (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *340). 
305 See Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1911). 
306 Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 750-51; see also New Orleans Gas Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U.S. 
650, 662 (1885) (referring to “cases in which grants of exclusive privileges respecting public highways 
and bridges over navigable streams have been sustained as contracts, the obligations of which are fully 
protected against impairment by State enactments,” and taking those cases to show that “the police 
power, according to its largest definition, is restricted in its exercise by the National Constitution”). 
307 See Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 751 (concluding that “a wise policy forbids the legislative body 
to divest itself of the power to enact laws for the preservation of health and the repression of crime,” 
and refusing to read the Contract Clause to contradict that policy); cf. New Orleans Gas Co., 115 U.S. at 
669 (emphasizing that the Court had announced this principle “with reference to particular kinds of 
private business which, in whatever manner conducted, were detrimental to the public health or the 
public morals,” and concluding that “[t]he present case involves no such considerations”). For references 
to other cases and useful discussion of the doctrine, see WRIGHT, supra note 167, at 203-13. 
308 In Contributors to the Pennsylvania Hospital v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917), the 
Court cast this point as a matter of settled doctrine: 
There can be now, in view of the many decisions of this court on the subject, no room 
for challenging the general proposition that the States cannot by virtue of the contract 
clause be held to have divested themselves by contract of the right to exert their 
governmental authority in matters which from their very nature so concern that 
authority that to restrain its exercise by contract would be a renunciation of power to 
legislate for the preservation of society or to secure the performance of essential 
governmental duties. . . . [I]t is equally true that the previous decisions of this court 
leave no doubt that the right of government to exercise its power of eminent domain 
upon just compensation for a public purpose comes within this general doctrine. 
Id. at 23-24. 
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Court heard constitutional challenges to state legislation, and it was the basis 
for decision in nearly half of the cases from that period in which the Supreme 
Court held that a state law was unconstitutional.309 During the period from 
1890 to the 1930s, however, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment supplanted the Contract Clause as a focus of constitutional 
challenges to state regulatory enactments.310 That is partly because of how the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause during the so-called 
Lochner era, but it is also because of how cases like Stone v. Mississippi 
interpreted the Contract Clause. If a particular regulatory requirement did 
not violate the Due Process Clause (because it was a legitimate exercise of the 
state’s police power), then the Contract Clause normally would not prevent 
the state from enforcing that requirement even against a corporation to which 
the state legislature had once promised an exemption. When litigants 
challenged the constitutionality of a state’s purported exercise of the police 
power, then, the key arguments normally boiled down to the Due Process 
Clause rather than the Contract Clause. 
As doctrine under the Due Process Clause developed, moreover, the 
Supreme Court held that states had more leeway to regulate businesses that 
were “affected with a public interest” than to regulate other types of 
businesses.311 The kinds of businesses that exercised franchises granted by the 
government (besides the simple franchise of incorporation) were paradigmatic 
examples of businesses that were affected with a public interest.312 But while 
legislatures could and did regulate franchise-based businesses to a greater 
 
309 See WRIGHT, supra note 167, at 95. 
310 See id. at 95-100; see also, e.g., James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the Federal 
Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 
381, 381 (1982) (“By the end of the nineteenth century, the due process clause had usurped the place 
of the contract clause as the centerpiece in litigation about individual rights.”); id. at 387-404 
(canvassing scholarly explanations for this shift). 
311 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877) (quoting HALE, supra note 204, at 77-78); see also 
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 47-65 (1998) (discussing Munn and its progeny). 
312 See Munn, 94 U.S. at 126 (using ferry franchises as an example); see also Charles Wolff 
Packing Co. v. Ct. of Indus. Rels., 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923) (noting that one category of “[b]usinesses 
said to be clothed with a public interest justifying some public regulation” consisted of “[t]hose 
which are carried on under the authority of a public grant of privileges which either expressly or 
impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of 
the public”); California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 40 (1888) (“[A] franchise is a right, 
privilege or power of public concern, which ought not to be exercised by private individuals at their 
mere will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the 
government directly, or by public agents, acting under such conditions and regulations as the 
government may impose in the public interest, and for the public security.”). But cf. Nebbia v. New 
York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-32 (1934) (noting that businesses did not have to be “dependent upon public 
grants or franchises” in order to be “subject to regulation in the public interest”). 
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extent than some other businesses, the franchises continued to be regarded as 
vested private rights that legislatures could not freely rescind.313 
III. OIL STATES AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 
Nineteenth-century conceptions of “franchises” are relevant today 
because of the revival of interest in the broader framework described in Part	I. 
In a series of separate opinions, Justice Thomas has used that framework to 
identify the kinds of claims that Congress can authorize administrative 
agencies to resolve and the kinds of claims whose authoritative adjudication 
instead requires “judicial” power.314 Like my initial article, some of those 
opinions lump “franchises” together with “privileges”315 and suggest that 
under the original understanding of the Constitution, both “could be taken 
away without judicial process.”316 
The cases in which Justice Thomas first addressed these issues did not 
themselves involve franchises. But in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. 
 
313 For a few examples, consider the following statements: 
[T]he right to operate a [cotton] gin and to collect tolls therefor, as provided by [Okla. 
Comp. Stat. §§ 3712–18 (1921)], is not a mere license, but a franchise, granted by the 
state in consideration of the performance of a public service; and as such it constitutes 
a property right within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Frost v. Corp. Comm’n, 278 U.S. 515, 519-20 (1929). 
The grant by ordinance to an incorporated telephone company, its successors and 
assigns, of the right to occupy the streets and alleys of a city with its poles and wires 
for the necessary conduct of a public telephone business, is a grant of a property right 
in perpetuity, unless limited in duration by the grant itself or as a consequence of some 
limitation imposed by the general law of the State, or by the corporate powers of the 
city making the grant. . . . If the grant be accepted and the contemplated expenditure 
made, the right cannot be destroyed by legislative enactment or city ordinance based 
upon legislative power, without violating the prohibitions placed in the Constitution 
for the protection of property rights. 
City of Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1913). 
[T]he grant of a right to supply gas or water to a municipality and its inhabitants through 
pipes and mains laid in the streets, upon condition of the performance of its service by 
the grantee, is the grant of a franchise vested in the State, in consideration of the 
performance of a public service, and after performance by the grantee, is a contract 
protected by the Constitution of the United States against state legislation to impair it. 
Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 9 (1898); see also id. at 17 (“[W]here a contract 
for a supply of water is innocuous in itself and is carried out with due regard to the good order of the 
city and the health of its inhabitants, . . . the police power cannot be invoked to abrogate or impair it.”). 
314 See supra note 8 (citing cases). 
315 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1246 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); B & B 
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 171 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 344 n.2 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
316 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1246 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a federal statute allowing the Patent and Trademark 
Office to cancel a patent for an invention.317 In upholding the statute, Justice 
Thomas’s majority opinion relied on the idea that when the government gives 
an applicant the kinds of rights that a patent confers, the government is 
“grant[ing] a public franchise,” and Congress can validly reserve the power to 
cancel this franchise in the manner that the statute described.318 This Part 
evaluates that conclusion in light of the relevant history. 
A. A Brief Summary of the English Background 
Scholars have written extensively about the early history of patents in 
England,319 and I have nothing to contribute on that topic. Because the 
English background is relevant, though, this Section summarizes it briefly. 
In England, the precursors of what modern lawyers think of as patents 
developed as a subset of a much broader category. From an early date, the Crown 
used “letters patent” to grant special privileges of various sorts to the people 
named in the letters.320 (The adjective “patent” simply indicated that the letters 
were “exposed to open view”; they were “matter[s] of public record” and were 
“usually directed or addressed by the king to all his subjects at large.”321) Starting 
in the mid-sixteenth century, some letters patent gave the people named in the 
letters a temporary monopoly in the manufacture of particular products.322 The 
exclusive rights conferred by these letters were paradigmatic “franchises,” 
granted by the Crown as a matter of royal prerogative.323 
The prerogative did not necessarily entitle the Crown to impose restraints 
that would be of no benefit to the realm.324 But in many circumstances, the 
 
317 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018). 
318 Id. at 1373. 
319 For references to leading books and articles, see Ben McEniery, Patent Eligibility and 
Physicality in the Early History of Patent Law and Practice, 38 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 175, 180 
n.34 (2016). For a helpful overview, see John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal 
Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19-33 (2007). 
320 See CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH 
PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800, at 10 (1988). 
321 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *346. 
322 See Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
615, 627-35 (1959) (discussing an isolated example of such a grant from 1449, but otherwise tracing 
this practice to the second half of the sixteenth century); see also E. Wyndham Hulme, The History 
of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common Law, 12 LAW Q. REV. 141, 145-50 (1896) 
(listing “the industrial monopoly licenses issued during the period 1561–70”). 
323 See, e.g., Klitzke, supra note 322, at 623-28; cf. 4 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 343 (1924) (“It was only very occasionally that Parliament intervened to encourage 
the founder of a new industry by the grant of statutory privileges.”). 
324 See HAROLD G. FOX, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND 
FUTURE OF THE PATENT MONOPOLY 57 (1947); see also Oren Bracha, The Commodification of 
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grant of temporary monopolies was said to be beneficial.325 For instance, 
consistent with the mercantilist ideas of the day, Queen Elizabeth often 
granted such monopolies to try to foster new industries in England.326 
Sometimes the Crown granted these monopolies to foreign artisans who 
agreed to move to England and teach their crafts to Englishmen.327 
Sometimes the recipients were native Englishmen who proposed to introduce 
to England industries that were established in other countries.328 Sometimes 
the recipients claimed to have invented genuinely new machines or processes 
that were thought to be useful, and the Crown was rewarding them.329 
In practice, the Crown did not limit its grants to situations of this sort. 
Whether to please favorites, to compensate servants, or to raise revenue for 
the Crown beyond the parliamentary subsidy, Queen Elizabeth and her 
successors sometimes granted monopolies in industries that already existed 
and needed no encouragement.330 Even when the Crown was acting for less 
 
Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 
193-94 (2004) (noting widespread agreement that “a king had to rule so to promote the public good,” 
but describing seventeenth-century debates between people who saw the monarch “as the sole arbiter 
of the public good” and people who thought that the king’s prerogative was “limited by law” in ways 
that other actors could enforce). 
325 See D. Seaborne Davies, The Early History of the Patent Specification, 50 LAW Q. REV. 86, 97-
98 (1934) (examining what patents themselves said about the benefits to the public). 
326 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents 
(pt. 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 855-57 (1994) [hereinafter Walterscheid, Antecedents 
(pt. 2)]; see also E. Wyndham Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and Present, 13 LAW 
Q. REV. 313, 313-14 (1897) (“The bringing in of new trades or manufactures . . . [was] the whole aim 
and object of the [early] monopoly system . . . .”); cf. 3 E. LIPSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND 352-56 (6th ed. 1956) (identifying four different categories of “patents of monopoly” in 
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, but linking the first category to “the principles of 
Mercantilism”). For discussion of the concepts of “mercantilism” and “monopoly,” see Thomas B. 
Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1318-27 (2005). 
327 See MACLEOD, supra note 320, at 10-12; see also E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the 
Patent System under the Prerogative and at Common Law: A Sequel, 16 LAW Q. REV. 44, 52 (1900) 
(tabulating grants from 1561 to 1603 and concluding that grants to foreigners became less common 
over time); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 
52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1261 & n.25 (2001) [hereinafter Mossoff, Intellectual History] (using Hulme’s 
numbers to infer a shift in motivations for the grants). 
328 See FOX, supra note 324, at 60-61 (discussing an early example). 
329 See Duffy, supra note 319, at 23-24. 
330 See LIPSON, supra note 326, at 354-55; see also Carolyn A. Edie, Tactics and Strategies: 
Parliament’s Attack Upon the Royal Dispensing Power 1597–1689, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 204 (1985) 
(noting that in the later years of her reign, Queen Elizabeth “found . . . that she could offer neither 
adequate payment to her servants nor rewards to her favorites,” and she granted monopolies in lieu 
of cash); Walterscheid, Antecedents (pt. 2), supra note 326, at 871 (noting that although James I 
suspended existing monopolies at the start of his reign, “he soon fell into the trap of issuing patents 
of monopoly as rewards to court favorites”). On the use of patents to generate revenue for the 
Crown, see Klitzke, supra note 322, at 640-41 (acknowledging that “Elizabeth would frequently 
reserve a small rent to herself in the patent grant,” but calling the amounts “nominal”); see also 
LIPSON, supra note 326, at 356 (reporting that patents did not produce much revenue for either 
 
2021] Vested Rights, “Franchises,” and the Separation of Powers 1487 
self-interested reasons, moreover, patents were granted “upon the faith of [the 
patentee’s] representations,”331 and the information that the patentee provided 
was not always true. Thus, when Queen Elizabeth asserted that some of her 
patents had produced results “contrary to her Majesty’s expectation at the time 
of those grants,” she was able to blame the patentees: “[I]t doth appear that 
some of the said grants were not only made upon false and untrue suggestions 
contained in her letters patents, but have been also notoriously abused . . . .”332 
In anticipation of such problems, the typical patent reserved power for 
the Crown to revoke or terminate the grant upon finding it to be harmful or 
unwarranted.333 According to Professor D. Seaborne Davies, the earliest 
known example of such a clause appears in a patent granted in 1575, and the 
clause “gradually came into general use.”334 The mature version of the clause 
contemplated proceedings in the Privy Council to find the facts that the 
clause made grounds for revocation (such as that the grant was “inconvenient 
or prejudicial to the realm” or, later, that the purported invention was not new 
or that the patentee was not the true inventor).335 In Professor Davies’s words, 
“The Privy Council did not hesitate to exercise its powers under this clause 
throughout the seventeenth century and there are records extant of 
revocations made under the clause certainly as late as 1779.”336 
Whether private litigants could challenge the validity of patents in court 
was more contested. In 1601, when a plaintiff who allegedly had imported 
goods in violation of a patent brought a trespass suit against the defendants 
who had seized those goods, Elizabeth’s Privy Council took the position that 
 
Elizabeth or James I, but contrasting Charles I); MACLEOD, supra note 320, at 20-22 (concluding 
that “the patent system was only minimally exploited as a fiscal device” after 1660). 
331 Hulme, supra note 322, at 151. 
332 Elizabeth’s Proclamation Concerning Monopolies (Nov. 28, 1601), reprinted in WILLIAM 
HYDE PRICE, THE ENGLISH PATENTS OF MONOPOLY app. J at 156 (1913). 
333 See Davies, supra note 325, at 102. 
334 Id. Professor Davies suggests that the clause was already common by 1601, when Queen 
Elizabeth sought to quell controversy about her patents by revoking some of the most objectionable. 
See id. at 103 & n.62. Except for a brief hiatus from 1625 to 1627 and another “[f]or a short time after 
the Restoration,” the clause was also familiar in the patents of Elizabeth’s successors, and it 
eventually “became a fixed feature of all patents of invention.” Id. at 103. 
Of course, monarchs with broad views of their prerogative powers might have thought that they 
could revoke royal grants even in the absence of such reservations. Still, including an explicit 
reservation in the grant made it unnecessary to take an aggressive position on that topic. 
335 See id. at 102-03 & n.61; see also, e.g., H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui & Sean Bottomley, Privy 
Council and Scire Facias 1700–1883: An Addendum to the Brief for H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui and Sean 
Bottomley as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party 3 (Nov. 6, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3054989 
(quoting a 1713 patent that authorized termination by the Crown for all these reasons). 
336 Davies, supra note 325, at 103; see also id. at 103-04 (reporting that the most common grounds 
for revocation were “non-user or . . . lack of novelty, or because the patentee was not the first inventor”). 
For a catalog of revocation cases in the Privy Council, see E. Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law and 
Practice of Letters Patent for Invention from the Restoration to 1794 (pts. 1 & 2), 33 LAW Q. REV. 63, 180 (1917). 
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“her Prerogative Royall may not be called in question for the valliditie of the 
letters patentes.”337 Soon thereafter, though, Elizabeth changed her tune 
under pressure from Parliament; she declared a number of patents void, and 
she gave permission for people aggrieved by other grants “to take their 
ordinary remedy by her Highness’s laws of this realm.”338 
Elizabeth’s concession averted potentially hostile legislation from 
Parliament,339 but the détente did not survive the reign of James I. In 1624, 
amid continued outrage over “odious monopolies” and as part of a broader 
struggle over the royal prerogative,340 Parliament enacted the Statute of 
Monopolies. That statute began with several broad declarations, including 
that (1) “all Monopolies and all Commissions, Grants, Licenses, Charters, and 
letters patent . . . for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of 
any thing within this Realm . . . are altogether contrary to the Laws of this 
Realm, and so are and shall be utterly void,” and (2) “all Monopolies and all 
such Commissions, Grants, Licenses, Charters, [and] letters patent . . . as 
aforesaid and the force and validity of them . . . shall be forever hereafter 
examined, heard, tried, and determined by and according to the Common 
Laws of this Realm and not otherwise.”341 Still, the statute made various 
exceptions,342 including one that left room for the development of modern 
 
337 Mossoff, Intellectual History, supra note 327, at 1267 (quoting Letter to the Lord Cheefe 
Justice of the Common Pleas and to the Rest of the Justices of that Courte (Oct. 7, 1601), in 32 ACTS 
OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND (2d ser.) 237, 237 (1907)). The patent in question was the 
playing-card monopoly that was also at issue in the Case of Monopolies, summarized infra note 338. 
See Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1312-
21 (1996) (describing the trespass action). 
338 Elizabeth’s Proclamation Concerning Monopolies, supra note 332, at 157. The most famous 
example of litigation in the common-law courts about the validity of an Elizabethan patent is the 
Case of Monopolies (1603), 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.). Letters patent had granted the plaintiff a 
monopoly on both the importation and the domestic manufacture of playing cards. See id. at 1260-
61. The plaintiff sued the defendant for allegedly violating these exclusive rights, but the court 
entered judgment for the defendant. Id. at 1266. A dozen years later, Coke’s report of the case 
portrayed the court as having held that the plaintiff ’s grant was “utterly void” for various reasons 
(such as that the Queen must have been deceived, for the grant would serve only “the private gain 
of the patentees” and would not benefit the public). Id. at 1262-65. Contrary to Coke’s report, 
modern scholars believe that the court did not deliver opinions to explain the judgment. See Corré, 
supra note 337, at 1325. Still, the report does show the kinds of arguments that common-law lawyers 
could advance circa 1615, when the report was published. 
339 For accounts, see FOX, supra note 324, at 75-77; Walterscheid, Antecedents (pt. 2), supra note 
326, at 865-66. 
340 See, e.g., OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1790–1909, at 19-20 (2016); Walterscheid, Antecedents (pt. 2), supra note 
326, at 872-73. 
341 Statute of Monopolies 1624, 21 Jac. I c. 3, §§ 1–2 (spelling and punctuation modernized). 
342 For instance, it took care not to repeal any pre-existing grants that had been made or 
confirmed by Act of Parliament. See id. § 7. It also exempted charters and other grants or letters 
patent to “any City, Borough, or Town Corporate within this Realm”; to “any Corporations, 
Companies, or Fellowships of any Art, Trade, Occupation, or Mistery”; and to “any Companies or 
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patent law. Specifically, section 6 said that the statute’s declarations “shall not 
extend to any letters Patent and Grants of Privilege for the term of fourteen 
years or under . . . of the sole working or making of any manner of new 
Manufactures within this Realm, to the true and first Inventor and Inventors 
of such Manufactures,” provided that these grants “be not contrary to the 
Law nor mischievous to the State, by raising of the prices of Commodities at 
home, or hurt of Trade, or generally inconvenient.”343 (The word “Inventor” 
in this provision was understood to include not only people who made 
original discoveries but also people who simply introduced practices to 
England from elsewhere in the world.344) 
Despite Parliament’s declaration that the validity of patents should be 
tried and determined “according to the Common Laws of this Realm,” 
scholars agree that the Privy Council “continued to exercise the chief control 
over matters relating to patents” until the eighteenth century.345 That did not 
necessarily violate the Statute of Monopolies; the patents that section 6 
tolerated arguably were exempt from all of the preceding declarations in the 
statute,346 and in any event almost every patent granted by the Crown 
continued to specify that the patent would have no further effect if revoked 
by the Crown upon findings made by the Privy Council.347 In practice, 
though, the Privy Council eventually stopped playing this role.348 Starting in 
the 1780s and continuing into the nineteenth century, when the Crown 
thought that a patent should be revoked, the Crown went to court; the normal 
mechanism for revocation became a scire facias action brought by the Crown 
(or someone acting in the name of the Crown) against the patentee.349 
 
Societies of Merchants within this Realm, erected for the maintenance, enlargement, or ordering of 
any Trade of Merchandise.” Id. § 9 (spelling and punctuation modernized). 
343 Id. § 6 (spelling and punctuation modernized). This exemption addressed patents or grants 
“hereafter to be made.” Id. Section 5 made a similar exception for patents and grants that already 
existed, except that they were allowed to last for up to twenty-one years. See id. § 5. 
344 See Walterscheid, Antecedents (pt. 2), supra note 326, at 877 (citing sources). 
345 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 323, at 354; see also Hulme, supra note 336, at 63 (noting that 
the period “from the Statute of Monopolies to Dollond’s case (1766)” is “almost barren of recorded 
Common Law decisions” in patent cases). 
346 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents 
(pt. 3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 771, 772-73 (1995) [hereinafter Walterscheid, 
Antecedents (pt. 3)] (noting uncertainty about the statute’s meaning on this point). 
347 See supra notes 333–36 and accompanying text. 
348 See BRACHA, supra note 340, at 22 & n.39 (noting that in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, “Privy Council patent revocation proceedings atrophied and eventually disappeared,” 
though doubting that the Privy Council’s role ended as abruptly as an earlier scholar had thought). 
349 See Christopher Beauchamp, Repealing Patents, 72 VAND. L. REV. 647, 654-60 (2019). For 
more detail about the decline of Privy Council revocation proceedings and the rise of scire facias, see 
generally Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, supra note 335. 
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By the 1780s, English practices with respect to patents had also changed in 
other ways. Scholars have highlighted two developments that had the potential 
to affect how people conceptualized the legal interests conferred by a patent. 
First, and quite early, the Crown’s process for issuing patents became 
routinized.350 Legally speaking, the issuance of a patent was always 
discretionary. But in practice, a majority of applicants who followed the 
procedures and whose petitions met the requirements received a patent, and 
the patents themselves conferred “an increasingly standard set of 
entitlements.”351 Although Professor Oren Bracha cautions against 
exaggerating this development, he notes that it sowed the seeds for thinking of 
patents as “standard rights” rather than “particularistic privileges.”352 
Second, in the first half of the eighteenth century, the Crown’s law officers 
developed the practice of requiring patentees to provide specifications that 
disclosed the details of their invention.353 Whatever the original motivations 
for this requirement,354 Lord Mansfield noted that it enabled other people to 
practice the invention after the patent expired, and thereby gave the public a 
benefit in exchange for the exclusive rights that the patentee was getting.355 
Soon, lawyers were describing the disclosure of the invention as “[t]he 
consideration[] which the patentee gives for his monopoly.”356 In the words 
of Professor Adam Mossoff, that way of thinking suggests that a patentee “has 
entered into a . . . contract [with society]” and “is morally entitled to the 
benefits of this contract, i.e., legal protection of his patent right.”357 
 
350 See Bracha, supra note 324, at 200-02; see also MACLEOD, supra note 320, at 40-48 
(describing the process). 
351 Bracha, supra note 324, at 202. 
352 Id. at 202-03. 
353 See Davies, supra note 325, at 90 (noting that most patents issued after 1734 included a clause 
requiring the patentee to provide specifications); Walterscheid, Antecedents (pt. 3), supra note 346, 
at 778-81 (citing scholarship that attributes this requirement to the law officers). 
354 Compare MACLEOD, supra note 320, at 51-55 (concluding that the specification “certainly” was 
not introduced “for the purpose of disseminating inventions by disclosure,” and discussing other possible 
motivations), with SEAN BOTTOMLEY, THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM DURING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION, 1700–1852: FROM PRIVILEGE TO PROPERTY 46-50, 89-91 (2014) (suggesting that the 
specification was “initially introduced at the behest of petitioners” but “by the middle of the eighteenth 
century” came to be seen “as the consideration on which the patent was awarded”). 
355 See E. Wyndham Hulme, On the History of Patent Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries, 18 LAW Q. REV. 280, 285 (1902) (providing excerpts from Mansfield’s instructions to the 
jury in the 1778 case of Liardet v. Johnson); see also BRACHA, supra note 340, at 24 (noting that 
Mansfield’s account “became the new doctrinal orthodoxy” by the 1780s). 
356 Turner v. Winter (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1274, 1276 (K.B.) (argument of counsel). Admittedly, even 
before the specification requirement, patentees could have been said to provide other “consideration” for 
their exclusive rights, so this way of talking could have emerged earlier. Cf. Hulme, supra note 326, at 314, 
318 (arguing that “the [patentee’s] undertaking to work the grant”—and hence to introduce a new 
industry to England—“constituted the essential consideration of the early Monopoly system”). 
357 Mossoff, Intellectual History, supra note 327, at 1301 (emphasis omitted); see also 
BOTTOMLEY, supra note 354, at 79 (“[A] distinct rationale for the patent was constructed by the 
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B. Conceptions of Patents in the United States 
1. The Status of Federal Patent Rights in the Early Republic 
After independence, the United States did not reinvent patent law, but it 
also did not exactly duplicate English practices. I will set colonial and early 
state practices aside and focus on the federal level. 
American patents had a different legal basis than English patents. The 
Federal Constitution gave the President executive power but not unspecified 
“prerogative” powers.358 Unlike the Crown, then, the President could not 
validly issue patents on his own authority.359 Instead, the Constitution 
allowed Congress to establish a federal patent system by statute. In the words 
of Article I, “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”360 
The first federal Patent Act, enacted by Congress in 1790, either 
established or reflected another important difference between American and 
English concepts. In England, although the Statute of Monopolies had 
restricted the Crown’s authority to confer exclusive rights, the statute’s 
exception for “Inventors” had been understood broadly; the statute did not 
prevent the Crown from granting exclusive rights to people who simply 
introduced new trades or manufacturing techniques into England from 
abroad.361 In the United States, by contrast, true creation (not mere 
importation) was required for a federal patent. As Edward Walterscheid has 
recounted in detail, one version of the bill that became the Patent Act of 1790 
would have treated the first importer of a device as its inventor within the 
United States, but members of Congress rejected this provision during the 
legislative process.362 Indeed, Walterscheid adduces evidence that Rep. James 
 
1770s, one where the patent was conceived as representing a contract between the inventor and the 
public.”); N. Scott Pierce, Double Jeopardy: Patents of Invention as Contracts, Invention Disclosure as 
Consideration, and Where Oil States Went Wrong, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
645, 710 (2020) (asserting that “[p]atents have been considered contracts since the eighteenth 
century” and calling this shift “the basis for modern jurisprudence in patent law”). 
358 See Mortenson, supra note 47, at 1173; cf. Ilan Wurman, In Search of Prerogative, 70 DUKE 
L.J. 93, 107-37 (2020) (reviewing evidence and agreeing with Mortenson on this point). 
359 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 362-63 (1888) (“[W]e have here no 
prerogative right of the crown; and letters patent, whether for inventions or for grants of land, issue 
not from the President but from the United States. The President has no prerogative in the matter.”). 
360 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
361 See supra note 344 and accompanying text; see also Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, 
Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 379 (2008) (“Though a variety 
of legal and technological changes made patents of importation infrequent after the late nineteenth 
century, they were not completely abandoned [in England] until 1977.”). 
362 EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE 319-26 (2002); see also H.R. 41, 1st Cong. § 6 (Feb. 16, 1790), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
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Madison doubted Congress’s constitutional power to authorize what modern 
scholars call “patents of importation.”363 Be that as it may, the Patent Act of 
1790 required applicants to claim that they “have invented or discovered [a] 
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or [an] improvement 
therein not before known or used,”364 and the Patent Act of 1793 used similar 
language.365 Consistent with both the legislative history and an additional 
statute enacted in 1800,366 early judges said that “if . . . [a person] was not the 
original inventor, in reference to other parts of the world as well as America, 
he is not entitled to a patent.”367 
 
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1626, 1631 (Charlene 
Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) (setting forth the provision that was stricken). 
363 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 362, at 321-25 (canvassing the legislative history and 
private correspondence, and concluding that constitutional concerns were a major reason for the 
omission of the language that would have authorized patents of importation); cf. id. at 323-27 (noting 
that those concerns may not have been well founded). 
364 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10; see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 362, 
at 325 (noting that the phrase “in the United States” had appeared at the end of this provision in 
one version of the bill, but the phrase was deleted in recognition of the elimination of the section 
that would have treated importers like inventors). 
365 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318-19 (requiring applicants to allege that they 
“have invented [a] new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or [a] new 
and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or 
used before the application”). 
366 The Patent Act of 1793 had allowed only “citizens of the United States” to apply for patents. 
Id. at 318; cf. Patent Act of 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. at 109 (inviting applications from “any person”). In 1800, 
Congress broadened the category of potential applicants to include noncitizens who had been living 
in the United States for at least two years by the time of their application—but people who sought 
a patent under this statute had to attest that to the best of their knowledge, the “invention, art or 
discovery” that they were attempting to patent “hath not . . . been known or used either in this or 
any foreign country.” Act of April 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 1, 2 Stat. 37, 38. 
367 Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555, 556 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 11,710) (jury instruction of 
Bushrod Washington); see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 362, at 330-35 (citing Reutgen; Dawson 
v. Follen, 7 F. Cas. 216, 216 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 3670) (jury instruction of Bushrod Washington); 
and Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 853 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4559), rev’d on other grounds, 16 U.S. 
(3 Wheat.) 454 (1818)). In support of the same conclusion, Justice Story also pointed to section 6 of 
the Patent Act of 1793, which allowed defendants to defeat infringement claims (and, indeed, to get 
the court to declare a patent “void”) on the ground that the patented thing “was not originally 
discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or had been described in some public work anterior 
to the supposed discovery of the patentee.” 1 Stat. at 322. Under these provisions, Story observed, 
“it has been uniformly held, that it must be shown that the invention is new, not only in the United 
States, but to the world.” Mellus v. Silsbee, 16 F. Cas. 1332, 1333 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 9404); see 
also Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographic Limitation on Prior Art in a Small 
World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 698 n.67 (2003) (calling attention to Story’s opinion). 
The Patent Act of 1836 relaxed this principle somewhat. Each applicant for a patent still had to 
swear or affirm “that he does verily believe that he is the original and first inventor or discoverer of 
the art, machine, composition, or improvement, for which he solicits a patent, and that he does not 
know or believe that the same was ever before known or used.” Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 
Stat. 117, 119. But if, unbeknownst to the applicant, the invention was known to people in a foreign 
country, a U.S. patent could nonetheless be issued to the applicant unless the invention either had 
been patented in the other country or had been described in a printed publication there. See id. § 7, 
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As Professor Mossoff has noted, an increased emphasis on applicants’ 
creativity potentially dovetailed with a different way of thinking about patent 
rights—not as governmental largesse, nor even as part of a deal between the 
public and an inventor, but as something that the inventor truly deserved even 
before a patent was issued.368 In the context of copyright law, several state 
legislatures had already declared that “there [is] no Property more peculiarly 
a Man’s own than that which is produced by the Labour of his Mind,” and 
they had suggested that security for “the Fruits of [a person’s] Study and 
Industry” is “one of the natural Rights of all Men.”369 In January 1791, 
moreover, the National Constituent Assembly of France explicitly endorsed 
a similar idea with respect to patents. In the preamble of a patent statute that 
was modeled on English and American law,370 the Assembly declared that 
“every new idea, the manifestation or development of which could become 
useful to society, belongs originally to him who conceived it; and . . . it would 
attack the rights of man in their essence not to regard an industrial discovery 
as the property of its creator.”371 Three decades later, Rep. Daniel Webster 
 
5 Stat. at 119-20; see also id. § 15, 5 Stat. at 123 (making a parallel provision about defenses in 
infringement suits). In the 1840s, the Attorney General explained these provisions as a way to 
prevent “the existence of a secret invention or discovery abroad” from defeating the “rightful 
property” of an American inventor who “has been so fortunate as to invent or discover the same 
thing” and who was entitled to “the fruits of his ingenuity.” Patents for Invention, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 
19, 21 (1848); see also id. at 21-22 (defending the rights of “an original bona fide inventor in this country, 
who verily believed himself the original and first inventor, or discover[er], at the time of his 
application,” and observing that under the statute, “[t]he fact that an invention not patented, and 
not described in any printed publication, has been before known or used in any foreign country, is 
rendered immaterial, except so far as it may have come to the knowledge of the applicant”). 
368 See Mossoff, Intellectual History, supra note 327, at 1302-15 (arguing that even in England, 
the conception of novelty in eighteenth-century patent law was linked to John Locke’s idea of a 
natural right to property in the fruits of one’s own labor). 
369 Act of Mar. 17, 1783, ch. 26, 1783 Mass. Acts (Jan. Sess.) 236, 236; Act of Nov. 7, 1783, 1783 
N.H. Laws (Oct. Sess.) 305, 305; An Act for the Purpose of Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right 
and Benefit of Publishing Their Literary Productions, for Twenty-One Years, 1783 R.I. Laws (Dec. 
Sess.) 6, 6; see also Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? 
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 982 & n.134 (2007) 
[hereinafter Mossoff, Jefferson] (calling attention to these statutes). Admittedly, what people said 
about copyrights did not necessarily extend to patents. Compare Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent 
or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 85 (1995) 
(noting that in eighteenth-century England, the common law was thought to recognize property 
rights in literary works but not in inventions), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 at 288 (James 
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (explaining the constitutional provision that empowers 
Congress to secure exclusive rights for authors and inventors by noting that “[t]he copy right of 
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common law” and observing 
that “[t]he right to useful inventions[] seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors”). 
370 See Fredrik Neumeyer, Contribution to the History of Modern Patent Legislation in the United States 
and in France, 4 SCANDINAVIAN ECON. HIST. REV. 126, 147-48 (1956) (noting that the relevant report 
to the Assembly emphasized both English patent law and American acceptance of English concepts). 
371 Act of Jan. 7, 1791, in 41 PROCES-VERBAL DE L’ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE (Paris 1791) (“[T]oute 
idée nouvelle dont la manifestation ou le développement peut devenir utile à la société, appartient 
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spoke as if most of his colleagues in the U.S. House of Representatives 
accepted this idea. In an 1824 debate about a bill involving patents, Rep. 
Webster assumed his colleagues would agree “that the right of the inventor is 
a high property; it is the fruit of his mind—it belongs to him more than any 
other property—	. . . and he ought to be protected in the enjoyment of it.”372 
Webster knew his audience: the colleague whom he was debating (future 
President James Buchanan) “concur[red] . . . heartily . . . in [Webster’s] 
sentiments . . . respecting the property which an inventor has in that which 
is the product of his own genius.”373 
Of course, even if an inventor has some moral entitlement to prevent 
others from freely using his idea, it would have been difficult to enforce that 
entitlement in the state of nature. For Lockeans, though, that practical point 
would not disprove the existence of the entitlement. Indeed, the fact that 
smooth enforcement requires state power does not necessarily distinguish 
intellectual property from other forms of property. 
Still, there are important differences between property in ideas and 
property in physical things. In an 1813 letter that has since become famous, 
Thomas Jefferson invoked those differences to try to debunk the notion “that 
inventors have a natural and exclusive right to their inventions.”374 Even if 
there could be a natural right to property “in an acre of land, for instance,” 
Jefferson took theorists to agree that any such right rested on occupation of 
the land and lasted only so long as the occupation continued.375 According to 
Jefferson, ideas were “incapable of . . . exclusive appropriation” in the relevant 
sense, and so “inventions . . . cannot in nature be a subject of property.”376 In 
 
primitivement à celui qui l’a conçue, et . . . ce seroit attaquer les droits de l’homme dans leur essence, que 
de ne pas regarder une découverte industrielle comme la propriété de son auteur . . . .”). Admittedly, the 
Assembly also authorized patents of importation. See id. art. III (“Quiconque apportera le premier en 
France, une découverte étrangère, jouira des mêmes avantages que s’il en étoit l’inventeur.”). 
372 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824). 
373 Id. at 936; see also Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection 
of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 718 & n.155 (2007) (quoting this exchange). 
374 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES 379, 382 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2009) (observing 
that this notion had been advanced “by some (and in England especially)”); cf. BOTTOMLEY, supra 
note 354, at 86-87 (noting the reference to natural rights in the preamble of the French patent 
statute, and tracing the spread of this legislation to some other countries in the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century, but concluding that “[i]n England, notions of natural rights were much less 
important in contemporary debate about patents”); H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND 
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750–1852, at 18 (1984) (agreeing 
that in the early nineteenth century, “the natural-rights-in-invention thesis was more extensively 
employed by Continental countries” than in England). 
375 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 374, at 382-83; cf. id. at 382 
(setting aside the question “whether the origin of any kind of property is derived from nature at all”). 
376 Id. at 383. But see 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405 (describing copyright 
as a “species of property which, being grounded on labour and invention, is more properly reducible 
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his words, “the moment [an idea] is divulged, it forces itself into the 
possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it”—
and yet “no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of 
it.”377 Jefferson concluded that “if nature has made any one thing less 
susceptible, than all others, of exclusive property, it is the action of the 
thinking power called an Idea.”378 To be sure, society could choose to 
encourage invention by giving people “an exclusive right to the profits arising 
from [their ideas]”—but “this may, or may not be done, according to the will 
and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from any body.”379 
Two centuries later, it is hard to know how many members of the founding 
generation agreed with Jefferson and how many shared the views that he was 
criticizing. In Professor Mossoff ’s words, “The historical record is mixed.”380 
Professor Oren Bracha suggests that at least in some quarters, “a strong 
ideological support for patent rights had consolidated” by the 1790s, but neither 
law nor practice reflected “a clear shift to a right-based system.”381 More 
broadly, although a “new conceptual framework” that saw “the patent as an 
inventor’s property right in his mental creation” had emerged, “[i]t was not 
immediately clear . . . how this new concept of patent rights changed the nature 
of the inventor’s claim on the state, compared with the privilege system.”382 
Some features of founding-era patent law are hard to reconcile with the 
notion that inventors have a natural right to control the use of their ideas 
even after those ideas have been disclosed. The Constitution itself authorizes 
Congress to give inventors exclusive rights only “for limited Times”383—a 
restriction that seems inconsistent with the strongest possible versions of a 
natural right to intellectual property.384 On their face, moreover, the Patent 
 
to the head of occupancy than any other; since the right of occupancy itself is supposed by Mr. 
Locke, and many others, to be founded on the personal labour of the occupant” (footnotes omitted)); 
cf. Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 222 (K.B.) (opinion of Aston, J.) (“Barbeyrac, in his 
notes on Pufendorf, clearly shews that the right acquired from taking possession does not cease when 
there is no possession; that perpetual possession is impossible; [and] that the [contrary] hypothesis 
would reduce property to nothing . . . .”). 
377 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 374, at 383. 
378 Id. 
379 Id. 
380 Mossoff, Jefferson, supra note 369, at 1008. 
381 BRACHA, supra note 340, at 191-201. 
382 Id. at 188. 
383 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
384 See, e.g., EXPOSITION OF PART OF THE PATENT LAW 6 (1816) (asserting that by limiting 
the duration of patents, “the public claim more than their right; for the ingenuity and labour of the 
inventor is his, exclusively, by natural law and justice”). The author of this pamphlet, Oliver Evans, 
was an inventor who “completely revolutionized the processes of flour manufacture.” Coleman 
Sellers, Jr., Oliver Evans and His Inventions, 122 J. FRANKLIN INST. 1, 1 (1886). In 1790, he was 
awarded one of the earliest federal patents. See id. at 8. A few years after it expired, Congress enacted 
a private bill authorizing the Secretary of State to grant him a new patent for another fourteen years. 
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Act of 1790 and the Patent Act of 1793 both gave federal officials the discretion 
to grant patents to worthy applicants, without creating any obligation to do so. 
Still, these features of early patent law are consistent with a more modest 
version of natural-rights thinking. While inventors may not have a natural 
right to prevent others from using their ideas after the ideas have become 
public, inventors have no duty to disclose their ideas in the first place. The 
absence of such duty might be cast as one type of natural “right”—the liberty 
to keep one’s ideas to oneself. In the words of a modern commentator, the 
patent system encourages inventors to surrender “the natural right to keep an 
invention secret” in exchange for “the civil right of a patent.”385 That 
characterization dovetails with the view that patents reflect a contract between 
the public and the inventor, under which the inventor receives exclusive rights 
for a limited time in exchange for disclosing an idea that people will be able 
to use freely thereafter. Scholars agree, moreover, that by the early nineteenth 
century, this notion of patent as contract was “a common theoretical 
justification, offered by both British and North American writers.”386 
The Patent Act of 1790 fits this characterization well. Recall that in 
eighteenth-century England, the Crown’s law officers had developed the 
practice of requiring patentees to furnish specifications, and Lord Mansfield 
eventually explained that requirement as part of an exchange between the 
public and the inventor.387 In the United States, section 2 of the Patent Act 
of 1790 both codified the specification requirement and echoed Lord 
Mansfield’s explanation of it.388 
 
See An Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70 (1808); see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent 
and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective (pt. 2), 49 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 58-65 (2001) (chronicling the litigation over Evans’s patent). Evans’s efforts to 
enforce the new patent are what prompted Isaac McPherson’s correspondence with Thomas 
Jefferson. See Letter from Isaac McPherson to Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 3, 1813, in 6 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES, supra note 374, at 353. 
385 Ronald E. Andermann, Comment, Employee Inventors, the Dual Ladder, and the Useful Arts: 
From Thomas Paine to the “Dilbert Boycott”, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 310, 328 (2002). 
386 Christine MacLeod, The Paradoxes of Patenting: Invention and its Diffusion in 18th and 19th-
Century Britain, France, and North America, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 885, 895 (1991). 
387 See supra notes 353–57 and accompanying text. 
388 Section 2 provided: 
[T]he grantee . . . of each patent shall, at the time of granting the same, deliver to the 
Secretary of State a specification in writing, containing a description . . . and explanations 
and models (if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a model) of the thing 
. . . by him . . . invented or discovered . . . ; which specification shall be so particular, and 
said models so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other 
things before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the 
art or manufacture . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may 
have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term . . . . 
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The idea that rights conferred by a patent sounded in contract (and hence 
vested upon issuance of the patent rather than at the time of the invention) 
also fits with the roles that the Patent Act of 1790 gave executive and judicial 
actors. Anyone who claimed to “have invented or discovered any useful art, 
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not 
before known or used” could apply for a patent by petitioning three high-
ranking executive officials—the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and 
the Attorney General.389 If a majority of those officials “deem[ed] the 
invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important,” they had discretion 
to authorize the preparation of a patent, which the executive branch would 
issue in the name of the United States.390 On the other hand, if the three 
officials decided not to grant a patent, the statute did not appear to 
contemplate any judicial review. Thus, the statute put the executive branch in 
charge of whether to issue a patent in the first place. 
Once a patent was issued, though, any challenges to its validity had to 
proceed in court. Within the first year after issuance, a challenger who averred 
that the patent had been “obtained surreptitiously . . . or upon false 
suggestion” could file a motion in the district court for the district where the 
patentee resided, and the judge could order the patentee to “show cause why 
process should not issue against him . . . to repeal such patent[].”391 Ultimately, 
“in case no sufficient cause shall be shown to the contrary, or if it shall appear 
that the patentee was not the first and true inventor or discoverer, judgment 
shall be rendered by such court for the repeal of such patent.”392 Even after 
 
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (emphasis added); see also Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic: 
Representing Inventions, Constructing Rights and Authors, 73 SOC. RSCH. 1129, 1134-38 (2006) (associating the 
Patent Act of 1790 with the idea of “the patent bargain—the contract between inventors and citizens”). 
389 Patent Act of 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. at 109-10. 
390 Id. at 110. 
391 Id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 111; see also Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323 (enacting a similar 
provision with a deadline of three years rather than one). 
392 Patent Act of 1790 § 5, 1 Stat. at 111; see also Patent Act of 1793 § 10, 1 Stat. at 323 (using almost 
the same words); infra notes 406–10 and accompanying text (describing how the Supreme Court 
eventually interpreted these provisions). For insightful discussion, see Beauchamp, supra note 349. 
In an opinion on circuit, Justice Story compared and contrasted proceedings under these 
provisions to “a scire facias at the common law to repeal a patent.” Stearns v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175, 
1178 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 13,337). As Justice Story understood English practice, only the Crown 
could maintain a scire facias proceeding in court, except that “where two patents have issued for the 
same thing[,] . . . the prior patentee may maintain a scire facias to repeal the second patent.” Id. at 
1178-79. By contrast, Justice Story thought that “under our patent act, any person, whether a patentee 
or not, may apply for the repeal.” Id. at 1179. 
Professor Beauchamp suggests that proceedings to repeal a patent are therefore an exception to 
what Ann Woolhandler and I have described as the historical precursors of modern standing 
doctrine, under which private litigants normally needed a private litigable interest. See Beauchamp, 
supra note 349, at 667 & n.105 (citing Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 3). I do not deny the 
existence of such exceptions, but I am not sure that repeal proceedings were one. The plaintiff in a 
repeal proceeding was trying to establish that he did not owe the defendant a duty to refrain from 
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the deadline for this sort of proceeding passed, the defendant in an 
infringement suit could avoid liability by successfully challenging the truth of 
the patentee’s claim of invention or the adequacy and accuracy of the patent’s 
specifications.393 But while these matters were open for judicial consideration, 
American patents did not reserve any power of revocation for the executive 
branch, and until the twentieth century no federal patent statute tried to build 
such a power into the terms of the bargain that patentees were offered. 
As Professor Christopher Beauchamp has noted, this fact does not 
necessarily prove “that the [revocation] process was seen as inherently 
judicial”; perhaps Congress simply wanted to assign the revocation function 
to “geographically distributed federal officials,” and judges were the only such 
officials whom it made sense to use.394 Still, the way that the early federal 
patent statutes allocated decisionmaking is at least suggestive. Congress 
plainly believed that executive-branch officials could be authorized to decide 
whether to issue patents in the first place. But in keeping with the idea that 
patents (like contracts) gave rise to vested rights after issuance, Congress did 
not authorize the same executive-branch officials who issued patents to 
entertain motions to revoke them. 
Of course, those officials had enough to do as it was. The idea that every 
application for a patent would be evaluated personally by the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General would be laughable 
today, and it did not work well in 1790 either.395 In 1793, Congress therefore 
enacted a new Patent Act that simply authorized the Secretary of State to 
cause a patent to be prepared upon receiving an application that met the 
 
using the invention that the defendant had patented. Ordinarily, someone who was trying to 
establish that legal position would have a private litigable interest—the same sort of private interest 
that is at stake on one side of an infringement suit. Consistent with this point, Professor Beauchamp 
notes that a repeal action initiated by a private complainant was “constructed throughout as a private 
action” and was brought “in the name of a private plaintiff, not the government.” Id. at 664-65; see 
also Wood v. Williams, 30 F. Cas. 485, 485-87 (E.D. Pa. 1834) (No. 17,968) (denying a motion to re-
docket such a suit “as an action wherein the United States are plaintiffs”). 
393 Patent Act of 1790 § 6, 1 Stat. at 111-12. In infringement suits, the 1790 Act made the patent 
“prima facie evidence[] that the said patentee . . . was . . . the first and true inventor or . . . discoverer 
. . . of the thing so specified, and that the same is truly specified,” but the Act allowed the defendant 
to introduce evidence to the contrary. See id. at 111. The Patent Act of 1793 omitted the “prima facie 
evidence” language (presumably because the 1793 Act contemplated that the executive branch would 
issue patents without much scrutiny). The 1793 Act added that if the defendant in an infringement 
suit showed that the patentee was not the true inventor or that the patent’s specifications concealed 
or added information “for the purpose of deceiving the public,” then the court should not only render 
judgment for the defendant but also declare the patent “void.” Patent Act of 1793 § 6, 1 Stat. at 322. 
394 Beauchamp, supra note 349, at 666. 
395 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use and Abuse of History: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of 
Thomas Jefferson’s Influence on the Patent Law, 39 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 195, 203-04 (1998) (concluding that 
the main impetus for the Patent Act of 1793 was the “recognition by the members of the Patent Board . . . 
that they simply had insufficient time to properly carry out the tasks assigned to them under the Act”). 
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statute’s formal requirements.396 Although the statute cast this authority as a 
power rather than a duty, Professor Bracha asserts that no one expected the 
Secretary to examine the substantive merits of the application: “it was clear 
to everyone involved that patents would be issued on demand.”397 At any rate, 
that is basically what happened.398 Although only fifty-seven patents had been 
issued under the Patent Act of 1790,399 nearly ten thousand were issued under 
the Patent Act of 1793, including many that were not really valid.400 
The fact that it was easy to get a patent, and that many patents were 
obtained upon false suggestions, affected how federal district judge William 
Van Ness interpreted the procedure for judicial “repeal” of a patent. The 
Patent Act of 1793 essentially duplicated the provision in the Patent Act of 
1790 about that procedure,401 but neither statute specified the nature of the 
proceedings.402 Sitting on circuit in 1816, Justice Story had interpreted the 
statutory language to call for “a proceeding in the nature of a scire facias at 
the common law,” complete with trial by jury.403 In the early 1820s, though, 
Judge Van Ness disagreed.404 Because patents in the United States were being 
“granted as matters of course, if the applicant complies with the forms of the 
law,” and because purported inventors could use bad patents to “harass the 
 
396 Patent Act of 1793 § 1, 1 Stat. at 318-21. As under the Patent Act of 1790, the Attorney General 
would review the patent for matters of form after the patent was prepared, but the Attorney General 
no longer had a role in the initial decisionmaking, and the Secretary of War had no role at all. See id. 
397 BRACHA, supra note 340, at 202. The principal exception appears to have been “interfering 
applications”—but even then, disputes about which application to grant were to be resolved by 
arbitrators rather than by the Secretary of State. See Patent Act of 1793 § 9, 1 Stat. at 322-23. 
398 See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 24-338 (1836), reprinted in 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 854, 856 (1936) (“The 
act of 1793 . . . gives, according to the practical construction it has received, no power to the Secretary 
to refuse a patent for want of either novelty or usefulness. The only inquiry is whether the terms 
and forms prescribed are complied with.”); Robert P. Merges, The Hamiltonian Origins of the U.S. 
Patent System, and Why They Matter Today, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2559, 2568 (2019) (“From 1793 to 1836, 
inventors who sent the proper documents to the State Department received a patent.”); see also 
Patents for Inventions, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 170, 171 (1812) (advising the Secretary of State that when an 
applicant had submitted the paperwork required by the statute, “the Department of State has no 
discretion to decline to issue the patent as applied for,” and “[t]he efficacy of the patent, when issued, 
will be for judicial cognizance”). 
399 P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 244 (1936). 
400 See Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 886 (1998); see also S. Doc. No. 24-338, supra note 398, at 857 (“A 
considerable portion of all the patents granted are worthless and void, as conflicting with, and 
infringing upon one another, or upon[] public rights not subject to patent privileges . . . .”); cf. id. 
at 859-60 (noting large increases in the number of patents granted each decade). 
401 See supra notes 391–92 and accompanying text. 
402 See Beauchamp, supra note 349, at 674. 
403 Stearns v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175, 1179 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 13,337). 
404 See McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. Cas. 96, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1821) (No. 8793). Although Federal Cases 
(compiled by the West Publishing Company in the late nineteenth century) lists the date of this 
opinion as June 29, 1821, that appears to be the date of the patent. The opinion was issued in 1822. 
See Practice Under the Patent Laws of the United States, 1 U.S.L.J. 82, 83-84 (1822). 
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community,” he thought that the statute should be understood to establish an 
“easy and summary” procedure by which courts could examine the validity of 
a patent soon after it was issued.405 
Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court rejected Judge Van Ness’s 
position as insufficiently attentive to the private rights that were at stake after 
a patent had been granted. Writing for the Court in the 1824 case of Ex parte 
Wood, Justice Story explained that ambiguities in the statutory language 
should be resolved in the manner “most congenial to our institutions.”406 
Justice Story added that during the period covered by a patent, “[t]he 
inventor has . . . a property in his inventions[—]a property which is often of 
very great value, and of which the law intended to give him the absolute 
enjoyment and possession.”407 In Justice Story’s view, Congress should not 
lightly be understood to have “institute[d] a new and summary process, which 
should finally adjudge upon [the inventor’s] rights, without a trial by jury, 
without a right of appeal, and without any of those guards with which, in 
equity suits, it has fenced round the general administration of justice.”408 
Thus, even though the summary process described by Judge Van Ness would 
occur in court, Justice Story suggested that it would not adequately protect 
“the security of vested rights and property.”409 Instead, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the statutory language to envision full-fledged proceedings akin 
to other civil actions, and the Court issued a writ of mandamus commanding 
Judge Van Ness to conduct such proceedings in the case at hand.410 
2. The Patent Act of 1836 
Although concerns about the profusion of bad patents did not cause the 
Supreme Court to embrace Judge Van Ness’s summary procedure for post-
issuance revocation, those concerns eventually led Congress to change the 
 
405 McGaw, 16 F. Cas. at 98-99; see also Beauchamp, supra note 349, at 677-78 (discussing both 
this opinion and Judge Van Ness’s background, which included having been “Aaron Burr’s second in 
the duel that killed Alexander Hamilton”). As Professor Beauchamp notes, Judge Van Ness’s opinion 
in Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826) (No. 13,957), expressed similar concerns 
about the “very alarming facility with which patents are procured.” Id. at 1041; see also id. at 1042 
(urging policymakers to introduce “[s]ome mode . . . of examining into the novelty and utility of 
alleged inventions, before patents are issued to the applicants”). Again, Federal Cases apparently 
reports the wrong date for Thompson; that opinion too probably was issued in 1822. See Beauchamp, 
supra note 349, at 676 n.169; Note by the Publishers of the Journal, 1 U.S.L.J. 459, 459 (1823) (referring 
to the opinion in the January 1823 issue). 
406 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603, 606 (1824). 
407 Id. at 608; see also id. at 609 (referring to the inventor’s “exclusive property”). 
408 Id. at 608. 
409 See id. at 612. 
410 Id. at 614-15. 
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mechanism for issuing patents in the first place.411 The Patent Act of 1836 
created a new federal agency called the Patent Office, headed by a 
Commissioner of Patents.412 Any person who claimed to have “discovered or 
invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter” and who wanted “to obtain an exclusive property therein” could apply 
to the Commissioner for a patent.413 After the applicant submitted the 
required specifications (and paid the required fee), the Commissioner would 
“make or cause to be made[] an examination of the alleged new invention or 
discovery”—and if the Commissioner deemed the invention “sufficiently 
useful and important” and found no disqualifying facts, “it shall be his duty 
to issue a patent therefor.”414 
Despite creating this statutory duty, the Patent Act of 1836 was not 
constructed on the premise that inventors had a vested right to obtain a patent 
before one was granted. For the first three years of the Act’s operation, when the 
Commissioner denied applications for a patent, the disappointed applicants 
normally had no right to judicial review; they could “appeal” the Commissioner’s 
decision to a board of examiners that operated under the auspices of the 
executive branch, but the process normally stopped there.415 Not until 1839 did 
Congress allow all disappointed applicants to take the matter to court.416 
 
411 See S. Doc. No. 24-338, supra note 398, at 857-58 (cataloguing “the evils which necessarily 
result from the law as it now exists,” under which “the Department of State has been . . . issuing 
patents on every application, without any examination into the merit or novelty of the invention”). 
412 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117, 117-18. At first, the Patent Office was attached to 
the Department of State, id., but in 1849 Congress transferred it to the newly created Department 
of the Interior. See Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 2, 9 Stat. 395, 395. 
413 Patent Act of 1836 § 6, 5 Stat. at 119. 
414 Id. § 7, 5 Stat. at 119-20. The potentially disqualifying facts were “that the same had been 
invented or discovered by any other person in this country prior to the alleged invention or discovery 
thereof by the applicant, or that it had been patented or described in any printed publication in this 
or any foreign country, or had been in public use or on sale with the applicant’s consent or allowance 
prior to the application.” Id. at 119; see supra note 367. 
415 See Patent Act of 1836 § 7, 5 Stat. at 120 (providing that the board would be “composed of 
three disinterested persons, who shall be appointed for that purpose by the Secretary of State”); P.J. 
Federico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals (pt. 1), 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 838, 838-42 (1940) (describing 
this system of review). As discussed below, the 1836 Act did give disappointed applicants recourse to 
the courts in one situation: if the board of examiners upheld the denial of an application “on the ground 
that the patent applied for would interfere with an unexpired patent previously granted,” the applicant 
could seek relief in a court of equity, which might ultimately determine (“on notice to adverse parties 
and other due proceedings”) that the existing patent was invalid and that the applicant was indeed 
entitled to a patent. See Patent Act of 1836 § 16, 5 Stat. at 123-24 (lumping this situation together with 
cases in which “two interfering patents” had been issued); see also infra subsection III.B.4. 
416 See Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 10, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (authorizing suits in equity by 
disappointed applicants). Apart from freestanding suits in equity, the 1839 Act also created a 
summary mechanism for disappointed applicants to “appeal” the Commissioner’s decision to the 
chief judge of the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia. See Act of Mar. 
3, 1839, § 11, 5 Stat. at 354; see also infra notes 541–43 and accompanying text (noting uncertainty 
about how to characterize later versions of this procedure). 
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From the start, though, once a patent had been issued, only a court could 
authoritatively declare its invalidity. If two existing patents interfered with 
each other, “any person interested in any such patent” could bring suit in a 
court of equity, which “may adjudge and declare either the patents void in the 
whole or in part.”417 Likewise, defendants who were sued for infringing a 
patent could avoid liability by proving various facts relating to the patent’s 
validity (such as that “the patentee was not the original and first inventor or 
discoverer of the thing patented” or that the specification had concealed facts 
“for the purpose of deceiving the public”).418 
Presumably because the executive branch would no longer be granting 
patents on demand, the Patent Act of 1836 dropped the provisions of the earlier 
statutes that had authorized people to sue for the “repeal” of a patent shortly 
after its issuance.419 What is more, neither the 1836 Act nor its successors 
explicitly authorized the federal government itself to sue for the cancellation of 
a patent. In later years, courts divided over the viability of such suits,420 until 
the Supreme Court held that the United States could indeed bring suit in 
equity to cancel a patent that had been obtained by fraud.421 But even when the 
Commissioner of Patents had identified grounds to cancel a patent, the 
executive branch could not cancel the patent on its own.422 As the Supreme 
Court eventually confirmed, “The only authority competent to set a patent 
aside, or to annul it, or to correct it, for any reason whatever, is vested in the 
judicial department of the government, and this can only be effected by proper 
proceedings taken in the courts of the United States.”423 For the Supreme 
Court, that conclusion followed from the nature of the private rights at stake: 
 
417 Patent Act of 1836 § 16, 5 Stat. at 123-24. 
418 See id. § 15, 5 Stat. at 123. 
419 See John F. Duffy, The Inequities of Inequitable Conduct: A Case Study of Judicial Control of 
Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 417, 423 (2013); cf. supra notes 391–92, 401–10 and 
accompanying text (discussing the earlier provisions). 
420 Compare Attorney Gen. ex rel. Hecker v. Rumford Chem. Works, 32 F. 608, 620, 624 
(C.C.D.R.I. 1876) (concluding that the Attorney General cannot sue in his own name to repeal a 
patent, and suggesting that such a suit does not lie in the name of the United States either), and 
United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 32 F. 591, 601 (C.C.D. Mass. 1887) (agreeing that “the 
government, in the absence of any express enactment, has no power to bring a bill in equity to cancel 
a patent”), rev’d, 128 U.S. 315 (1888), with United States v. Gunning, 18 F. 511, 512 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1883) (holding that the United States can sue in equity to vacate a patent that was obtained by fraud). 
421 Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 356-73. 
422 See McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 612 (1898) (noting that 
if an existing patent had been obtained by fraud or deception, the Commissioner of Patents should 
ask the Attorney General to institute a suit to cancel the patent, but the Commissioner could not 
cancel the patent himself, for that “would be to deprive the [patentee] of his property without due 
process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch of the government by the 
executive”); cf. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 229 (1832) (argument of Daniel Webster) 
(“The vacating and canceling the record of a patent is in its nature a judicial act.”). 
423 Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 364; accord McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609. 
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once a patent was issued, “[i]t has become the property of the patentee, and as 
such is entitled to the same legal protection as other property.”424 
In taking this position, the Supreme Court explicitly analogized patents 
for inventions to patents for land—instruments by which the United States 
transferred title to real property from the federal government to a private 
person.425 Although Congress could grant titles by statute,426 much federal 
land was instead doled out by the executive branch pursuant to statutory 
authority, and the issuance of a patent was typically the final step in the 
administrative process.427 Even after the government had issued a land patent 
declaring the transfer of title, the law recognized certain grounds on which 
the government could ask a court to set aside the patent or to declare it 
void.428 But as the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized in the 1860s and 
1870s, the agency that had issued the patent could not itself cancel the patent 
authoritatively: “That is a judicial act, and requires the judgment of a 
 
424 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609; cf. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843) 
(noting that although the Patent Act of 1836 had repealed earlier patent laws, “[t]his repeal . . . can 
have no effect to impair the right of property then existing in a patentee,” and citing Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 493 (1823), which had 
observed that “the termination of a treaty cannot devest rights of property already vested under it”). 
425 See McCormick, 169 U.S. at 608-09 (asserting that “repeated decisions of this court” had 
established that the executive branch cannot revoke or cancel a patent once it has been issued, and 
adding that “in this respect a patent for an invention stands in the same position and is subject to 
the same limitations as a patent for a grant of lands”); Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 364-68 (citing a 
series of Supreme Court opinions about patents for land); see also Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 
94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877) (dictum) (“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. 
The right rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.”). 
But cf. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 238 (1897) (comparing patents for land to 
patents for inventions, and observing that “although each vests in the patentee certain rights, yet 
they are not in all things alike”); infra note 618. 
Current federal law continues to treat patents as property, but Congress has chosen concepts of 
personal rather than real property as the appropriate baseline. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the 
provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”); Act of July 19, 1952, 
ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792, 810 (enacting this provision). 
426 Nelson, supra note 2, at 577. 
427 See, e.g., Roger D. Billings, The Homestead Act, Pacific Railroad Act and Morrill Act, 39 N. KY. L. 
REV. 699, 713-15 (2012) (describing the process under the Homestead Act of 1862); see also Harrison Land 
Act, ch. 55, § 7, 2 Stat. 73, 76 (1800) (describing registers’ duties in connection with the sale of lands in 
the Northwest Territory and authorizing the President to grant patents upon proof of final payment). 
428 See United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 525, 535 (1865) (indicating that this relief was 
available not only for “fraud in the patentee” but also for certain kinds of “mistake,” such as “where 
the [issuing] officer has no authority in law to grant [the patents in question], or where another party 
has a higher equity [than the patentee] and should have received the patent”). To the extent that 
other people claimed rights in land that the government had purported to grant, they too could 
challenge the validity of a patent in court. See Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 640-48 (1882) 
(summarizing nineteenth-century cases about the grounds upon which a court of law would 
disregard a patent, as well as the broader grounds upon which a litigant could seek relief from a 
court of equity); see also Polk’s Lessee v. Wendal, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 87, 98-99 (1815) (discussing 
similar doctrines with respect to land patents issued by a state). 
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court.”429 Once a patent had been issued, after all, the patentee could claim a 
vested private right in the land that he had been granted, and the idea that 
the executive branch could conclusively adjudicate and reject such a claim “is 
utterly inconsistent with the universal principle on which the right of private 
property is founded.”430 This principle can be traced all the way back to 
Marbury v. Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall not only analogized 
Marbury’s commission to a land grant431 but also noted that “[t]he question 
whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried 
by the judicial authority.”432 
3. Did the Idea of Patents as Property Originate in the Jacksonian Era? 
According to Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, the idea that patents for 
inventions “have the same protections that apply to rights in land or other 
traditional property” did not emerge until the Jacksonian era, when “the 
patent gradually became rebranded as a set of ‘property’ rights.”433 More 
broadly, Professor Hovenkamp warns against attributing later ideas to the 
founding generation.434 While his warning is well taken, I think that he is 
only partially correct about patents. 
Professor Hovenkamp is correct, I think, that early state legislatures 
regarded patents in essentially the same way that they then regarded corporate 
charters—as franchises that the state could grant on a case-by-case basis to 
encourage economic development.435 Even after the Constitution was ratified, 
that view persisted at least at the state level; while members of the First 
Congress may have believed that federal patents could be issued only to 
genuine inventors as a reward for new discoveries,436 states were thought to be 
able to grant exclusive rights to “developers” who “promised to build 
something with existing technology” and whose rights were conditioned on 
 
429 Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 535; see also, e.g., Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533 (1878) (“The 
functions of [the executive] department necessarily cease when the title has passed from the government.”). 
430 Moore, 96 U.S. at 534. 
431 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165 (1803); see also Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 85 (1871) 
(agreeing with Marshall’s premise that someone who purchased land from the federal government 
had a vested right once he paid his money and received a certificate entitling him to a patent, even 
if the patent was not actually issued). 
432 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 167. 
433 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 263, 
271 (2016); see also id. at 293 (“Increasingly after the Civil War, the Supreme Court treated patents as 
a species of property, having many of the same constitutional protections as other forms of property.”). 
434 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 217, at 1-5 (arguing, contrary to the rhetoric of modern 
libertarians, that the Constitution was not written against the backdrop of laissez-faire economics). 
435 See Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 266-68. 
436 See id. at 272-73. 
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putting that promise into practice.437 In this respect, Professor Hovenkamp 
suggests, states continued to follow what he calls “pre-classical theories of 
economic development,” of the sort that had animated mercantilism.438 Just as 
states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries granted corporate 
charters selectively, to encourage specific enterprises that would benefit the 
public, so too states granted other exclusive rights to entrepreneurs who 
promised to do something useful.439 And just as states were thought to have a 
symbiotic relationship with the corporations to which they issued charters,440 
so too the “pre-classical” model “envisioned considerable state involvement in 
ensuring that granted patents were actually used in socially beneficial ways.”441 
As Professor Hovenkamp notes, this model of economic development 
eventually gave way to what we now call “classical” economics, which “began to 
take serious hold in the United States in the 1830s” and which rejected the idea 
that governments were better than individual market actors at directing capital 
to productive uses.442 At the same time, Jacksonians condemned the corruption 
that they associated with granting special privileges to favored individuals or 
entities. Professor Hovenkamp observes that at the federal level, the Patent Act 
of 1836 reflected both trends: it “limit[ed] the number of issued patents” by 
requiring substantive examination of patent applications, but it gave the 
responsible administrative officials a duty to grant applications that satisfied 
“politically neutral” criteria and it envisioned little role for “government 
economic policy making.”443 Under the influence of this system, Professor 
Hovenkamp argues, federal patents came to be viewed as “property right[s], 
pure and simple”—meaning that “once they were issued, patents were subject to 
the management of their owners” and came with “few social obligations.”444 In 
Professor Hovenkamp’s account, that is the point of the analogy between patents 
 
437 Id. at 276. 
438 Id. at 265; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 1595 (referring to the “pre-classical, 
mercantilist model”). 
439 See Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 276. 
440 See Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 1595 (noting that under the “pre-classical” model, each 
business corporation “was a unique entity created by the state for a special purpose and enjoying a 
privileged relationship with the sovereign”). 
441 Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 267. 
442 See id. at 273, 275; see also 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES 
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1-256 (London 1776) (systematically repudiating many of the 
premises of mercantilism). 
443 Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 270, 294-95; see also id. at 297 (linking the “ministerial” 
nature of patent issuance to the rise of general incorporation statutes, another Jacksonian reform). 
444 Id. at 271, 273, 307; see also id. at 284 (“[T]he emergent classical conception of the patent 
saw it as a narrowly authorized property right, given only to inventors and thereafter placed more 
or less completely under the patent owner’s control.”). 
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and land; the owner of a patent could choose to practice it or not,445 with “little 
government oversight other than protection of title and boundaries.”446 
Professor Hovenkamp acknowledges that once patents were thought of as 
property rights in this sense, they could be revoked “only through judicial 
process and for cause.”447 He asserts, however, that under the “pre-classical” 
idea that patents were “exclusive privileges granted in exchange for a promise 
to develop economic infrastructure,” they could be “revoked by the same 
legislative body” that issued them.448 Despite the richness and insight of 
Professor Hovenkamp’s overall account, I do not believe that this particular 
assertion was ever true of federal patents, and I doubt that it was 
uncontroversially true even of the kinds of exclusive rights that states granted. 
In discussing the “pre-classical” conception of patents, Professor 
Hovenkamp himself focuses primarily on the exclusive rights that states 
granted, and he notes differences between those grants and federal patents.449 
Still, his article can be read to suggest that federal patents did not “evolv[e] 
into a ‘property right’” until after Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1836.450 
Contrary to that suggestion, the Patent Act of 1793 itself spoke of patentees 
as “obtaining an exclusive property” in their inventions,451 and lawyers and 
judges alike used similar locutions to describe the rights conferred under that 
statute.452 When instructing a jury on circuit, moreover, Supreme Court 
Justice Henry Baldwin asserted that once a patent had been issued under the 
Act, a court that treated the patent as void for a reason not listed in the Act 
would be violating the principles of Fletcher v. Peck.453 That objection would 
 
445 See id. at 287; see also id. at 271 (“The decision to make productive use of the innovation 
represented in a patent became purely private, emulating the law of real property.”). 
446 Id. at 275. 
447 Id. at 293. 
448 Id. at 292; see also Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 66 (2013) (making a similar suggestion). 
449 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 267 (“[S]tate patents, but not federal patents, were 
issued to ‘promoters’—that is, to those who had not really invented anything new, but rather 
promised to install technology or infrastructure in a new place.”). 
450 Id. at 270. 
451 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 320. 
452 See supra note 407 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 738, 792 (1824) (argument of counsel) (describing “the patent rights granted by the 
national government” as “individual property”); Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1019, 1021 (C.C.D. Pa. 1819) 
(No. 5719) (describing the infringement of a patent as “an unlawful invasion of property to which [the 
patentee] was exclusively entitled”); Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4564) 
(Marshall, C.J.) (“The constitution and [the statute], taken together, give to the inventor, from the 
moment of invention, an inchoate property therein, which is completed by suing out a patent.”), 
reviewed on pro forma certificate of division, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815); cf. Mossoff, Jefferson, supra 
note 369, at 992-97 (citing many cases treating patents as property, including some from this era). 
453 See Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074, 1080 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585) (“No case could 
arise in which the language of the supreme court, in Fletcher v. Peck, would be more forcibly applicable; 
the character of ex post facto legislation, so severely reprobated in their opinion, would not depend on 
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apply all the more readily to a statute that purported to revoke a patent—
something that, as far as I know, Congress never did. 
With respect to the exclusive rights that states granted for the purpose of 
encouraging economic development, Professor Hovenkamp is correct that 
these grants were analogous to the franchises conferred by corporate charters. 
As the Dartmouth College case attests, though, once a state legislature granted 
such franchises to private individuals or entities, the legislature could not 
freely rescind the grant. Unless a reservation of that power was built into the 
grant itself, the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution protected 
corporate charters against legislative repeal, and the same was true of other 
kinds of franchises.454 
Professor Hovenkamp does cite one early example of a state legislature 
that purported to repeal a patent by statute,455 but the lessons of that example 
are equivocal. The protagonist of the story is John Fitch, who has as good a 
claim as anyone to have invented the steamboat.456 In 1786 and 1787, at a time 
when the federal government had no power to issue patents, the state 
legislatures of New Jersey, Delaware, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia 
all enacted statutes granting Fitch exclusive rights to make and use 
steamboats within the state for a fourteen-year term.457 In 1798, however, the 
New York legislature purported to repeal its grant and to convey similar rights 
to Robert Livingston.458 The 1798 statute indicated that the legislature was 
acting upon the suggestion “that the said John Fitch is either dead or hath 
withdrawn himself from this State without having made any attempt in the 
 
the tribunal which exercised it.”); see also id. (asserting that in a suit for patent infringement, “the trial 
is on a question of property, of private right, unconnected with the public interest, and without any 
reference to the public, unless a case is made out of a design to deceive them”). 
454 See supra notes 84–104 and 212–27 and accompanying text. 
455 Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 280-81, 292; see also Hrdy, supra note 448, at 66 n.83 (citing 
the same example). 
456 See THOMPSON WESTCOTT, THE LIFE OF JOHN FITCH, THE INVENTOR OF THE 
STEAMBOAT 119-47 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1857) (describing the genesis of Fitch’s idea 
in 1785 and his early efforts to obtain support); cf. JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, STEAMBOATS COME 
TRUE: AMERICAN INVENTORS IN ACTION 367-68 (1992) (acknowledging that “Fitch built in 1790 
a remarkably effective boat,” but concluding that “he never completely understood what he was 
doing” and “was incapable of repeating his success”). 
457 See WESTCOTT, supra note 456, at 150-51 (New Jersey); id. at 173-75 (Pennsylvania); id. at 
175-76 (Delaware and New York); id. at 197 (Virginia). For the texts of the statutes, see Act of Mar. 
18, 1786, ch. 136, 1785 N.J. Acts 266; Act of Mar. 19, 1787, ch. 57, 1787 N.Y. Laws 472; Act of Mar. 28, 
1787, ch. 1286, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 161, at 441; 
Act of Nov. 7, 1787, ch. 77, 1787 Va. Acts 42; see also Act of Feb. 3, 1787, 1786–1787 Del. Laws 25 (noting 
the statute but not reprinting it). Virginia’s act included a condition that Fitch failed to satisfy, so it 
lapsed after three years. WESTCOTT, supra note 456, at 197, 297. 
458 Act of Mar. 27, 1798, ch. 55, 1798 N.Y. Laws 215. 
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space of more than ten years for executing the plan for which he so obtained 
an exclusive privilege, whereby the same is justly forfeited.”459 
Although this episode is well known, its controversiality is not. To guard 
against “laws inconsistent with the spirit of this constitution, or with the public 
good,” New York’s state constitution provided for a Council of Revision 
(composed of the governor, the chancellor, and the judges of the supreme 
court) to review all bills that passed both houses of the state legislature.460 In 
1798, when the legislature passed the bill repealing Fitch’s rights, the Council 
of Revision objected to the bill, for exactly the reason that the doctrine of 
vested rights would predict: the bill “supposes that the . . . privileges which 
were granted to John Fitch . . . had become forfeited,” but “it doth not appear 
that the facts from which such forfeiture is to arise, have been found in some 
due course of law.”461 Admittedly, the legislature overrode this objection and 
enacted the bill anyway. But in the 1810s, the prominent lawyer and legislator 
William A. Duer sided with the Council of Revision462 and pointed out that 
the validity of the 1798 repeal “ha[s] never been adjudicated.”463 
The contests between Fitch and James Rumsey, who claimed to have 
invented a steamboat before Fitch,464 are also instructive. In 1788 and 1789, 
Rumsey’s allies filed petitions on his behalf in each of the five state 
legislatures that had granted exclusive rights to Fitch.465 In Virginia, where 
Rumsey had previously been granted exclusive rights to an unspecified type 
of boat that he later claimed to involve steam,466 they asked the legislature 
 
459 Id. at 216. These suggestions were not true. See WESTCOTT, supra note 456, at 184-93, 248-56, 277-
91 (describing Fitch’s work on the steamboat); id. at 369-70 (noting that Fitch died in the summer of 1798). 
460 N.Y. CONST. of 1777 art. III. 
461 JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK; AT THEIR TWENTY-FIRST 
SESSION 269 (Albany, Loring Andrews & Co. 1798). 
462 See WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A REPLY TO MR. COLDEN’S VINDICATION OF THE 
STEAM-BOAT MONOPOLY 21-22 (Albany, E. & E. Hosford 1819) (referring to “the vested rights of 
Fitch or his representatives” and indicating that questions about the validity of the original grant 
“were of judicial cognizance”). 
463 WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A LETTER, ADDRESSED TO CADWALLADER D. COLDEN, 
ESQUIRE 79 (Albany, E. & E. Hosford 1817). 
464 WESTCOTT, supra note 456, at 204; see also id. at 207-47 (evaluating the evidence offered 
by both men). 
465 Id. at 262-65. 
466 See An Act Giving James Rumsey the Exclusive Right of Constructing and Navigating 
Certain Boats for a Limited Time, ch. 75, 1784 Va. Laws (Oct. Sess.) 21; cf. WESTCOTT, supra note 
456, at 220 (reporting Fitch’s argument that at this time, Rumsey was envisioning a boat propelled 
by poles rather than steam). The Pennsylvania legislature had enacted a similar statute in 1785, but 
with the proviso that “this act shall be void and of no effect” unless Rumsey brought his plans to 
fruition within the next twelve months. Act of Mar. 25, 1785, ch. 1144, reprinted in 11 THE STATUTES 
AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 161, at 517, 518. 
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simply to repeal Fitch’s grant.467 In the other four states, they asked the 
legislature to grant Rumsey exclusive rights to his plan for a steamboat (along 
with various other inventions)—a proposal that would have narrowed the 
rights previously granted to Fitch.468 Ultimately, all five states refused to 
repeal or limit Fitch’s grant.469 At least in Pennsylvania, and perhaps in other 
states,470 the doctrine of vested rights was a central part of the discussion. 
In September 1788, as soon as Fitch learned of his rival’s petition to the 
Pennsylvania legislature, he protested that Rumsey was seeking “the very 
right which, by special act of Assembly, passed the 28th of March, 1787, is 
vested in [Fitch].”471 By virtue of that earlier statute, he continued, “[Fitch’s] 
property in the exclusive right to all steamboats in the State of Pennsylvania 
is as firmly established in him as the right of any man in the State to his house 
or his farm.”472 The committee to which the legislature referred Rumsey’s 
petition did not go quite so far; its report left open the possibility that “the 
Legislature may have a right to repeal laws which convey grants that are 
 
467 See JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; 
BEGUN AND HOLDEN IN THE CITY OF RICHMOND, IN THE COUNTY OF HENRICO, ON 
MONDAY, [OCTOBER 20, 1788], at 48 (Richmond, Thomas W. White 1828). 
468 See VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF THE DELAWARE 
STATE, AT A SESSION COMMENCED AT DOVER, ON [JANUARY 12, 1789], at 7-8 (Wilmington, 
Frederick Craig & Co. 1789) [hereinafter DELAWARE PROCEEDINGS]; VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-JERSEY AT A SESSION 
BEGUN AT TRENTON ON THE 28TH DAY OF OCTOBER 1788, AND CONTINUED BY 
ADJOURNMENTS 61 (Trenton, Isaac Collins 1788); JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE 
OF NEW-YORK, AT THEIR TWELFTH SESSION, BEGUN AND HOLDEN AT THE CITY OF ALBANY, 
THE ELEVENTH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1788, at 14 (Albany, Samuel & John Loudon 1788); 4 
DEBATES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA, ACCURATELY TAKEN IN SHORT 
HAND, BY THOMAS LLOYD 4 (Philadelphia 1788). 
469 See WESTCOTT, supra note 456, at 262-66 (providing details). 
470 See Letter from John Fitch to the Honourable Legislature of the State of New Jersey (Nov. 
3, 1788), trentonhistory.org/Documents/Manuscript/MS132.html [https://perma.cc/X6QV-D4PY] 
(arguing that in light of Fitch’s reliance, “the property conveyed by [the earlier] Law” should be no 
less secure than people’s “Houses and . . . farms,” and adding that “any limitation or restriction to 
the Law not warranted by the Law itself, would be a violation of the constitution, which directs all 
controversies about property to be decided in courts of Justice”). But cf. DELAWARE PROCEEDINGS, 
supra note 468, at 41 (suggesting that Delaware legislators rejected Rumsey’s petition for the 
threshold reason that under the new Federal Constitution, an alleged inventor’s request for exclusive 
rights should be directed to Congress). 
471 Petition of John Fitch to the Honorable the Representatives for the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania (Sept. 6, 1788), in 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS FOR THE YEAR 
1849, at 557 (Washington 1850). 
472 Id. Fitch’s reference to “all steamboats” was not an exaggeration. Rather than being limited 
to his specific design, the grant from the Pennsylvania legislature covered steamboats in general. See 
Act of Mar. 28, 1787, ch. 1286, § 2, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
supra note 161, at 441 (granting Fitch, for fourteen years, “the sole and exclusive right and privilege 
of constructing, making, using, employing and navigating . . . every species or kind of boats or water 
craft which may be urged or impelled through the water by the force of fire or steam, in all . . . 
waters whatsoever within . . . this state”). 
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highly injurious to the general welfare.”473 Still, the committee set a high bar 
for such repeals: “the resuming such legislative grants ought never to be done, 
unless upon the most pressing necessity.”474 The committee recommended 
that the legislature grant Rumsey exclusive rights to his other claimed 
inventions, but not to any design for a steamboat.475 
In February 1789, when the legislature’s next session began, Rumsey’s 
allies tried again.476 Their new petition and Fitch’s response were again 
referred to a committee,477 which took the occasion to think more generally 
about the power of “granting exclusive rights to the benefits arising from new 
discoveries or inventions”; ultimately, the committee recommended vesting 
this power in “a body better possessed, than the Legislature can be, of the 
means of enquiring and examining into their originality and merits.”478 The 
legislature, however, postponed consideration of this idea and set times for 
representatives of Fitch and Rumsey to argue their positions before the full 
assembly.479 In a sign that important legal and constitutional issues were 
involved, the legislature also requested the justices of the state’s supreme 
court to attend the arguments.480 The Justices did attend,481 and the 
legislature asked them to supply written opinions on the following question: 
“Can this House, consistently with the principles of law, justice, and the 
constitution of this state, enact a law upon the principles of the report before 
this House, in the case contested between John Fitch and James Rumsey?”482 
Justice George Bryan said no: Fitch’s existing grant “ought not to be 
disturbed by any new proceeding whatever.”483 Bryan’s opinion focused 
mostly on the bad consequences that would result from “violating the public 
faith” by rescinding legislative grants.484 Still, he cast his conclusion in the 
terms that the legislature’s question had suggested: a proposal that would 
 
473 Committee Report, in 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS FOR THE YEAR 
1849, supra note 471, at 558. 
474 Id. 
475 Id. 
476 See MINUTES OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, IN THEIR SECOND SESSION 52-53 (Philadelphia 1789) (recording the new petition). 
477 See id. at 62. 
478 Id. at 135. 
479 Id. at 140; see also id. at 145, 150-51 (setting a different time to hear from Rumsey’s 
representative). 
480 Id. at 142. 
481 See id. at 145, 154. 
482 Id. at 163. 
483 Id. at 168. 
484 See id. at 169 (arguing that such revocations would cause both “public mischief ” and 
“private injustice”); see also id. at 168-69 (“[I]t is more for the interest of the community to abide by 
its own legislative grants, than to resume them even in cases wherein they have been improperly 
made, unless indeed there be a very great necessity for so doing . . . .”). 
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limit Fitch’s grant “cannot be adopted, consistently with the principles of law, 
justice, and the constitution of this state.”485 
Chief Justice Thomas M’Kean’s opinion took a different tack. M’Kean 
noted that in England, letters patent granted by the king were “voidable by 
scire facias” if “the King has been deceived in his grant by untrue suggestions 
or otherwise.”486 Because “a House of Assembly here may be deceived, as well 
as the King in Great-Britain,” M’Kean opined that the legislature could repeal 
a statutory grant that had been “obtained upon untrue suggestions or 
misrepresentations.”487 Thus, M’Kean apparently thought that if Rumsey 
were the true inventor of the steamboat, then the legislature could properly 
repeal its grant to Fitch and grant exclusive privileges to Rumsey instead. But 
M’Kean added that “if any controversy should arise thereupon, the same 
should be put in such a train, that it may be tried without prejudice in a court 
of common law.”488 While this statement is ambiguous, M’Kean may have 
thought that the validity of a repeal would depend on whether Fitch had 
obtained his grant by false suggestions, and that this issue would ultimately 
be for the courts to decide. 
The third Justice, Jacob Rush, ducked the constitutional question in a 
related way. Although the statute granting exclusive rights to Fitch had been 
worded broadly,489 Rush maintained that it should not be interpreted to give 
Fitch rights to anything other than what he himself had invented—and if his 
representations of having invented something were false, then “the grant 
itself would be merely void.”490 According to Rush, the proposal that the 
legislature was considering (to grant Rumsey rights in things that Rumsey 
claimed to have invented) would “leave John Fitch in the entire and exclusive 
possession of such specific discovery as he has actually made,” so it would not 
detract from his existing grant at all.491 
The legislature postponed further consideration of the matter until its next 
session.492 When the legislature returned to the subject in September 1789, a 
member introduced a bill that would have granted Rumsey exclusive rights to 
all of his claimed inventions, including what the bill called “Rumsey’s steam 
boat.”493 Again, Fitch submitted a strongly worded remonstrance, complaining 
 
485 Id. at 170. 
486 Id. at 179. 
487 Id. 
488 Id. 
489 See supra note 472. 
490 MINUTES OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, IN THEIR SECOND SESSION, supra note 476, at 179-80. 
491 Id. at 180 (emphasis omitted). 
492 Id. at 191. 
493 See MINUTES OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THEIR THIRD SESSION 238, 275 (Philadelphia 1789) (emphasis omitted). 
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that this bill would “invad[e] the just and legal rights granted to him by a solemn 
Law of the state.”494 Fitch understood past episodes in Pennsylvania history 
(including those involving the Bank of North America and the Philadelphia 
academy495) to establish that a statute granting a charter created vested rights 
that the legislature could not revoke, and he argued that the same was true of his 
grant.496 Anticipating the Marshall Court, he also argued that the proposed bill 
would violate the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution.497 
Ultimately, the full legislature sided with Fitch. Before enacting Rumsey’s 
bill, the legislature deleted the language about steamboats, so that the statute 
did not cut back on what the legislature had previously granted to Fitch.498 
Fitch was not the only person who thought that state grants of this sort 
created vested rights. After the Constitution took effect and Congress enacted 
the federal Patent Act, some people believed that states could not continue to 
grant exclusive rights for inventions; on one view, either the Constitution itself 
had transferred this power to the federal government or the Patent Act should 
be understood to occupy the field.499 Still, the patents that states had granted 
 
For a template of the bill, see AN ACT FOR VESTING IN JAMES RUMSEY, ESQUIRE, THE 
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT AND PRIVILEGE OF MAKING, USING, AND VENDING, DIVERS ENGINES, 
MACHINES AND DEVICES, BY HIM INVENTED, OR IMPROVED, FOR A TERM OF YEARS THEREIN 
MENTIONED (Philadelphia 1789) (Evans 22051). 
494 JOHN FITCH, PETITION AND REMONSTRANCE 1 (1789) (Evans 45475). 
495 See supra notes 152–83 and accompanying text. 
496 FITCH, supra note 494, at 1. 
497 See id. (deeming it clear that “the grant by law to your petitioner of certain absolute, 
exclusive rights is . . . a contract of the strongest nature,—a contract between the state on the one 
part, and the citizen on the other”). 
498 See MINUTES OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THEIR THIRD SESSION, supra note 493, at 275-76 (recording the vote in 
favor of striking this language). The statute as enacted appears in 13 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 161, at 361-65. 
499 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 166-70 (1824) (argument of counsel); 
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 362, at 437-38 (reading section 7 of the Patent Act of 1793 to suggest 
that members of Congress believed in the exclusivity of the federal patent power); Hovenkamp, 
supra note 433, at 277 (“The predominant early interpretation was that the Patent Clause gave 
Congress the right to reward ‘inventors’ with exclusive rights, while permitting the individual states 
to create such rights for other reasons, including grants to noninventor developers.”); supra note 470 
(noting that after the ratification of the Constitution, the Delaware legislature referred James 
Rumsey’s request for exclusive rights to Congress); see also Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v. 
Butler, 53 Ind. 454, 457 (1876) (“The power thus vested in Congress is not expressly an exclusive 
power, but practically it has been so regarded and acted upon, since the adoption of the 
constitution.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Brechbill v. Randall, 1 N.E. 362 (Ind. 1885); cf. 3 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1149 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (expressing uncertainty about whether states could grant 
exclusive rights to inventors). But see Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 581 (N.Y. 1812) (opinion 
of Kent, C.J.) (concluding that the states have concurrent power even with respect to inventors); 
Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 487, 
495-96 (2013) (supporting Kent’s position). 
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before ratification remained in force, because (in the words of one lawyer) 
“[t]he constitution could not take away a right vested before its adoption.”500 
Members of Congress apparently did not like the idea that the recipients 
of federal patents might have exclusive rights under state law as well, so the 
Patent Act of 1793 specified that the owners of such state-granted rights had 
to relinquish them in order to receive a federal patent.501 Significantly, 
however, Congress did not purport simply to cancel the pre-existing state 
grants; instead, Congress cast their surrender as a choice that the patentees 
made in order to receive something better. Again, modern scholars have 
attributed this formulation to the fact that “[t]he private rights in a patent 
franchise were considered vested property rights,” which Congress could not 
unilaterally abrogate.502 
4. The Patent Office’s Role in Resolving Interferences Between New 
Applications and Existing Patents 
The idea that patents give rise to vested rights, and that only judicial 
power can authoritatively determine that an issued patent is invalid, is 
consistent with Congress’s statutes and the Supreme Court’s decisions 
throughout the nineteenth century. Still, doctrines about “interferences” 
require separate discussion.503 
Under the Patent Act of 1793, the executive branch routinely granted most 
applications for patents that seemed proper on their face, but the Act 
established a special procedure to deal with “interfering applications.”504 If 
two pending applications both sought exclusive rights for the same invention, 
a panel of arbitrators would be convened to decide which application the 
executive branch should grant.505 This type of nonjudicial adjudication was 
consistent with the doctrines described in Part I because vested rights were 
 
500 Livingston, 9 Johns. at 540 (argument of counsel). 
501 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 7, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (“[W]here any state, before its adoption 
of the [Constitution] . . . , shall have granted an exclusive right to any invention, the party, claiming 
that right, shall not be capable of obtaining an exclusive right under this act, but on relinquishing 
his right under such particular state, and of such relinquishment his obtaining an exclusive right 
under this act shall be sufficient evidence.”). 
502 W. Howard Mann, The Marshall Court: Nationalization of Private Rights and Personal Liberty 
from the Authority of the Commerce Clause, 38 IND. L.J. 117, 161 n.123 (1963); see also Hrdy, supra note 
448, at 73 (agreeing that “Congress did not feel empowered to simply void the inventors’ vested 
state rights without voluntary action by state patentees”). 
503 See Greg Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Cancellation, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 377, 386-89 (2017) (observing that even before Congress allowed the Patent Office to 
conduct adjudications aimed at cancelling existing patents, “the Patent Office could significantly 
affect the validity of issued patents through its interferences decisions,” and treating that fact as a 
precursor of administrative cancellation). 
504 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 9, 1 Stat. 318, 322-23. 
505 Id. 
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not yet at stake (assuming that patent rights vested only when a patent was 
granted rather than at the time of invention). 
The Patent Act of 1836 expanded the scope of interference inquiries. 
When someone applied for a patent but the Commissioner of Patents 
believed that the application interfered either with another pending 
application or with an “unexpired patent” that had already been granted, the 
Commissioner would notify the other applicant or the patentee and hold a 
hearing on “the question of priority of right or invention.”506 In cases of 
interference between a new application and an existing patent, though, the 
Commissioner had no power to cancel the existing patent.507 Instead, the 
point of the hearing was to decide what to do with the new application. If the 
Commissioner determined that the new applicant was the first inventor, and 
if the other statutory requirements were satisfied, the Commissioner would 
issue a new patent, with the result that two interfering patents would both 
exist. At that point, the Act allowed “any person interested in any such 
patent” to bring a suit in equity to declare one of the patents “void” in whole 
or in part.508 Likewise, whenever the owner of a patent sued someone for 
infringement, the defendant could try to avoid liability on the ground “that 
the patentee was not the original and first inventor or discoverer of the thing 
patented.”509 But one way or another, which patentee was the true inventor 
would be determined by the courts, not simply by the Commissioner. 
Early on, moreover, there seems to have been little idea that the courts 
would defer to the findings that the Commissioner made in an interference 
proceeding. According to Chief Judge William Cranch of the Circuit Court 
for the District of Columbia, if the Commissioner determined that an existing 
patentee was not the true inventor, “the decision of the commissioner is not 
only not conclusive as to [the patentee], but does not in any manner affect his 
legal or equitable rights.”510 In Chief Judge Cranch’s words, “as to the 
patentee, a decision against him would be a brutum fulmen”—a meaningless 
noise, not a judgment with any sort of legal effect.511 
Chief Judge Cranch used that fact to explain his interpretation of one 
aspect of the then-existing statutes. If the Commissioner denied a patent 
application, the Patent Act of 1836 allowed the disappointed applicant to 
 
506 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 8, 5 Stat. 117, 120-21. 
507 See, e.g., Allen v. United States ex rel. Lowry, 26 App. D.C. 8, 14 (1905) (“Of course the 
patent could not be recalled or revoked should the interference result in an award of priority to the 
applicant.”), aff ’d, 203 U.S. 476 (1906). 
508 Patent Act of 1836 § 16, 5 Stat. at 123-24. 
509 Id. § 15, 5 Stat. at 123. 
510 Pomeroy v. Connison, 19 F. Cas. 957, 959 (C.C.D.C. 1842) (No. 11,259). 
511 Id. at 958; see also Brutum Fulmen, MERRIAM WEBSTER, merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
brutum%20fulmen [https://perma.cc/86D6-NATY] (defining “brutum fulmen” as a “meaningless 
thunderbolt: an empty threat: an ineffectual legal judgment”). 
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appeal. Initially, the appeal went to a board of examiners within the executive 
branch;512 after 1839, it instead went to Chief Judge Cranch himself,513 whom 
Congress instructed “to revise such decisions in a summary way, on the 
evidence produced before the Commissioner.”514 If the applicant lost at that 
stage too, he could file a freestanding suit in equity.515 Conversely, if the 
applicant won in front of the Commissioner or on appeal, and if the 
Commissioner therefore granted his application for a new patent despite its 
interference with an existing patent, the existing patentee could file his own 
suit in equity to challenge the new patent’s validity.516 But the existing 
patentee did not have the option of appealing the Commissioner’s decision 
to Chief Judge Cranch.517 As Chief Judge Cranch interpreted the relevant 
statutes, Congress had made such appeals available only to disappointed 
applicants, not existing patentees, because the one needed an appeal 
mechanism more than the other: an administrative decision against an 
applicant “would be conclusive, unless an appeal were given by the statute,” 
but an administrative decision against an existing patentee “has no effect 
upon a patent already granted.”518 
For unrelated reasons, Congress modified the statute in 1852 to authorize 
an appeal to any member of the circuit court for the District of Columbia, not 
just the chief judge.519 At first, members of the court followed Chief Judge 
Cranch’s view that existing patentees could not invoke the appeal mechanism 
in interference proceedings.520 Eventually, though, Judge William Matthews 
 
512 Patent Act of 1836 §§ 7–8, 5 Stat. at 120. 
513 See Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 11, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (authorizing appeals “to the chief justice 
of the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia”); Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 
31, § 24, 2 Stat. 156, 166 (providing for this district court to be held by the chief judge of the circuit 
court that Congress had established for the District of Columbia). 
514 Act of Mar. 3, 1839, § 11, 5 Stat. at 354-55 (providing, however, that “no . . . decision of the 
judge in any such case, shall preclude any person interested in favor or against the validity of any 
patent which has been . . . granted, from the right to contest the same in any judicial court, in any 
action in which its validity may come in question”). 
515 See Patent Act of 1836 § 16, 5 Stat. at 123-24 (authorizing suit in equity “whenever a patent 
on application shall have been refused on an adverse decision of a board of examiners, on the ground 
that the patent applied for would interfere with an unexpired patent previously granted”); Act of 
Mar. 3, 1839, § 10, 5 Stat. at 354 (extending this provision “to all cases where patents are refused for 
any reason whatever, either by the Commissioner of Patents or by the chief justice of the District of 
Columbia, upon appeals from the decision of said Commissioner”). 
516 See Patent Act of 1836 § 16, 5 Stat. at 123-24 (“[W]henever there shall be two interfering 
patents, . . . any person interested in any such patent . . . may have remedy by bill in equity . . . .”). 
517 See Pomeroy v. Connison, 19 F. Cas. 957, 957-59 (C.C.D.C. 1842) (No. 11,259) (concluding 
that “I have no jurisdiction” over a purported appeal by an existing patentee in this situation). 
518 Id. at 958. 
519 See Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 107, § 1, 10 Stat. 75, 75; see also Federico, supra note 415, at 849-
50 (explaining the genesis of this provision). 
520 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Barnum, 12 F. Cas. 491, 492 (C.C.D.C. 1854) (No. 6685) (treating Chief 
Judge Cranch’s interpretation of the statute as “settled”). 
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Merrick reconsidered this question of statutory interpretation and decided that 
Congress had made appeals available to existing patentees as well as 
applicants.521 Still, he did not suggest that the Commissioner’s findings against 
an existing patentee would have legal effect in later judicial proceedings. 
Instead, he simply noted that the Commissioner’s issuance of a second patent 
would cause practical problems for the existing patentee, and the statutory 
appeal mechanism could address those problems faster than a suit in equity.522 
By the latter part of the nineteenth century if not before, courts were 
giving some effect to the Patent Office’s decisions in interference 
proceedings, even when those decisions went against an existing patentee. 
Ordinarily, courts applied a presumption in favor of the validity of an existing 
patent.523 When one patentee was suing the owner of an interfering patent, 
though, courts could not logically presume that both patents were valid. If 
the Patent Office had not conducted an interference proceeding, courts 
presumed (absent other evidence) that the first applicant was the earlier 
inventor.524 But courts took a different approach if the Patent Office had 
issued the second patent on the basis of an interference proceeding. The 
Patent Office’s decision that the second patentee was the true inventor still 
did not have preclusive effect against the first patentee’s claim of vested 
rights; even in litigation between the same two parties, courts would consider 
 
521 See Babcock v. Degener, 2 F. Cas. 293, 294-97 (C.C.D.C. 1859) (No. 698) (disagreeing with Chief 
Judge Cranch’s position in Pomeroy and concluding that under section 8 of the Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 
at 120-21, “a patentee has equal right of appeal from a decision of the commissioner in favor of an applicant 
. . . as an applicant for a patent has under the same section from an adverse decision in favor of a prior 
patentee”); accord Spear v. Belson, 22 F. Cas. 903, 903 (C.C.D.C. 1859) (No. 13,223) (Dunlop, C.J.). 
522 See Babcock, 2 F. Cas. at 295 (observing that “the emanation of a second patent must throw 
a cloud upon the title of the prior patentee and seriously impair the market value of his patent”). 
523 Even in the absence of any interference, questions about a patent’s validity could come up 
in ordinary suits for infringement. See Rev. Stat. § 4920, 18 Stat. 960 (1874) (listing defenses in 
infringement actions). For cases articulating a presumption of validity in that context, see, e.g., 
Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U.S. 94, 96 (1882) (“The patent is prima facie evidence of both novelty 
and utility, and neither of these presumptions has been rebutted by the evidence.”); Parks v. Booth, 
102 U.S. 96, 99 (1880) (“[T]he patent, if introduced in evidence by the complaining party, affords 
him prima facie evidence that the patentee was the original and first inventor. That presumption, in 
the absence of any satisfactory proof to the contrary, is sufficient to entitle him to recover if he 
proves the alleged infringement.”); Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124 (1874) (indicating 
that when the defendant in an infringement action tried to avoid liability on the ground that the 
plaintiff was not the first inventor of the patented item, “[t]he burden of proof rests upon [the 
defendant], and every reasonable doubt should be resolved against him”); see also John F. Duffy, 
Reasoned Decisionmaking vs. Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2351, 2370-72 
(2019) (noting that in the early nineteenth century, the presumption in favor of the validity of an 
issued patent was weak if it existed at all, but it was stronger by the late nineteenth century). 
524 See Brooks v. Sacks, 81 F. 403, 405 (1st Cir. 1897); cf. WILLIAM P. KOOKOGEY, PATENT 
LAW IN BRIEF 53 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1884) (“If there have been no interference 
proceedings at the patent office, the presumption of invention is in favor of the first patentee . . . .”). 
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the question of priority for themselves.525 But the party who had lost the 
interference proceeding would have the burden of proof. In the words of one 
judge, “the new patent granted after a hearing . . . makes out a prima facie 
case for the [new patentee], shifting the presumption that would otherwise 
exist” in favor of the earlier patent.526 
In 1894, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Morgan v. Daniels527 arguably 
ratcheted up the legal effect of interference proceedings. In Morgan itself, the 
Patent Office had held an interference proceeding to choose between two 
pending applications (rather than to decide whether to grant an application that 
would interfere with an existing patent). When the losing applicant sued in 
equity to challenge the denial of his application, the Supreme Court held that he 
had a stiff burden of proof.528 The Court noted that even when the Patent Office 
had not held an interference proceeding, the patents that it granted enjoyed a 
presumption of validity.529 With respect to interference proceedings, moreover, 
the Court characterized the Patent Office as a “special tribunal” that Congress 
had authorized to make determinations about the priority of inventions.530 
According to the Court, a suit “to set aside the conclusions reached by the 
administrative department, and to give to the plaintiff the rights there awarded 
to the defendant,” was “in the nature of a suit to set aside a judgment,” and the 
plaintiff should not win such relief on the basis of “a mere preponderance of 
evidence.”531 Ultimately, the Court laid down the following rule: 
[W]here the question decided in the patent office is one between contesting 
parties as to priority of invention, the decision there made must be accepted 
as controlling upon that question of fact in any subsequent suit between the 
 
525 See, e.g., Westinghouse v. Duncan, 2 App. D.C. 131, 135 (1894) (“It is not within the power 
of the Commissioner of Patents, nor of this court on appeal from the Commissioner, to avoid or 
vacate the patent, or any claim covered by it. The decision, whatever it might be, would be only of 
prima facie effect . . . .”). 
526 Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Crane, 24 F. Cas. 657, 658 (C.C.D. Mass. 1874) (No. 14,388); 
see also, e.g., Wire Book Sewing Mach. Co. v. Stevenson, 11 F. 155, 155 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1882) (“While 
[the Patent Office’s] decision is not conclusive here, it is nevertheless entitled to sufficient weight to 
cast the burden of proof on the plaintiff.” (citation omitted)); 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW 
OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 249-50 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890) (noting that 
despite the Patent Office’s decision in an interference proceeding, “the adverse parties still stand 
upon equal ground” in court, but the Patent Office’s decision “is . . . noticed by the courts as an 
indication that priority is justly claimed by the prevailing party till the contrary appears”). 
527 153 U.S. 120 (1894). 
528 See id. at 122-25, 129. 
529 See id. at 123 (discussing the standard of proof that the Court had applied in Coffin v. Ogden, 
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124 (1874), and Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1886), and asserting 
that “[t]he plaintiff in this case . . . should . . . be held to as strict proof”); supra note 523. 
530 Morgan, 153 U.S. at 124. 
531 Id. 
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same parties, unless the contrary is established by testimony which in 
character and amount carries thorough conviction.532 
As formulated, this rule potentially told courts to defer to the results of all 
interference proceedings—not just those between two pending applications, 
but also those between a new application and an existing patent. By the early 
twentieth century, at least some lower courts were doing exactly that.533 
Suppose that after issuing a patent to one person, the Patent Office received 
an interfering application and held a hearing to determine whether the new 
applicant was the prior inventor.534 From 1893 on, whichever party lost in the 
Patent Office’s tribunals could appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District 
of Columbia.535 But if the existing patentee lost on appeal, the Patent Office 
would issue a patent to the new applicant (assuming that the Patent Office 
regarded the invention as patentable). Either of the two patentees could then 
sue the other in equity, seeking a judicial determination that the interfering 
 
532 Id. at 125; cf. infra note 540. 
533 See, e.g., Automatic Weighing Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 F. 288, 289-91, 304 
(1st Cir. 1909) (invoking Morgan with respect to an interference proceeding that had been resolved 
against an existing patentee); Reilly, supra note 503, at 388. 
534 See Rev. Stat. § 4904, 18 Stat. 957 (1874) (describing this procedure); supra note 506 and 
accompanying text (referring to the precursor of this provision in the Patent Act of 1836). 
535 See Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 9, 27 Stat. 434, 436. Before 1870, Congress had provided 
for a summary appeal to a single judge. See supra notes 513, 519–21 and accompanying text; see also 
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, § 3, 12 Stat. 762, 763 (transferring the powers previously exercised by the 
judges of the circuit court of the District of Columbia to the justices of the newly created Supreme 
Court of the District of Columbia). In 1870, Congress allowed other decisions of the Commissioner 
of Patents to be appealed to “the supreme court of the District of Columbia, sitting in banc,” but 
Congress stopped authorizing appeals in interference cases. See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 48, 16 
Stat. 198, 205; P.J. Federico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals (pt. 2), 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 920, 920-
21 (1940). When Congress created the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in 1893, though, 
Congress gave it jurisdiction over such appeals again. See id. at 931. 
After 1927, if the Patent Office resolved an interference proceeding against an applicant (as 
opposed to an existing patentee), the disappointed applicant had to choose between appealing or 
instead bringing a suit in equity to challenge the denial of his application; disappointed applicants 
no longer could do both in succession. See Act of Mar. 2, 1927, ch. 273, § 11, 44 Stat. 1335, 1336-37 
(amending Rev. Stat. § 4915 to permit suits in equity by disappointed applicants only if no appeal 
“is pending or has been decided”). Indeed, even if the disappointed applicant chose to appeal, an 
adverse party to the interference proceeding could obtain the dismissal of the appeal by “elect[ing] 
to have all further proceedings conducted as provided in section 4915 of the Revised Statutes”—that 
is, by insisting that the applicant bring a new suit in equity rather than pursuing an appeal. Id. § 8, 
44 Stat. at 1336 (amending Rev. Stat. § 4911, regarding appeals). But section 4915 was just about 
suits by disappointed applicants, and so the 1927 amendment did not operate against existing 
patentees. If the Patent Office resolved an interference proceeding against an existing patentee, the 
patentee had a right to appeal under Rev. Stat. § 4911, and his adversary could not force him to bring 
suit in equity instead. See, e.g., Preston v. White, 92 F.2d 813, 815-16 (C.C.P.A. 1937) (explaining this 
interpretation and concluding that “the patentees have a right to proceed under section 4911”); cf. 
infra note 563 and accompanying text (noting changes made in 1952). 
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patent was void in whole or in part.536 The trial of that suit would be “de 
novo” in the sense that the parties would build a new record; they were not 
limited to the evidence that had been presented to the Patent Office.537 Under 
Morgan, though, the party who had lost the interference proceeding would 
face a challenging standard of proof: unless he could establish his priority 
with evidence carrying “thorough conviction,” the court would follow the 
result of the interference proceeding.538 Thus, the determination of priority 
made in the interference proceeding could end up getting great weight in a 
subsequent lawsuit, even when the court was relying on it to rule against an 
existing patentee’s claim of vested rights. 
As applied against existing patents, this aspect of early twentieth-century 
practice may not be consistent with the general framework described in Part I. 
But that is not entirely clear. From the year before Morgan was decided on, if the 
Patent Office ruled against an existing patentee in an interference proceeding, 
the patentee had a right to appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of 
Columbia.539 The ultimate result of the interference proceeding—that is, the 
result to which later tribunals deferred—was the result reached by this court,540 
which met the structural requirements of Article III and was capable of exercising 
“judicial” power.541 (To be sure, the Supreme Court thought that Congress could 
 
536 See Rev. Stat. § 4918, 18 Stat. 959 (1874) (authorizing such suits “[w]henever there are 
interfering patents”); see also supra notes 508, 516 and accompanying text (referring to the precursor 
of this provision in the Patent Act of 1836). 
537 See Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 290 F. 565, 570 (D. Del. 1923) 
(observing that in suits under Rev. Stat. § 4918, as in suits under § 4915, “all questions in issue are tried de 
novo upon all competent evidence, new or old”), aff ’d, 8 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1925), aff ’d, 273 U.S. 670 (1927). 
538 Id. at 571-72; see also Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Carborundum Co., 155 F.2d 746, 749 (3d 
Cir. 1946) (noting that “a mere preponderance of the evidence” is not enough to satisfy Morgan). 
539 See supra note 535. 
540 With respect to the interference proceeding in Morgan itself, the Supreme Court had spoken 
of deference to “the decision of the Patent Office.” Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 125 (1894). But 
the Patent Office had rendered that decision in 1889, before Congress created the Court of Appeals 
of the District of Columbia and authorized it to entertain appeals in interference proceedings. See id. 
at 121 (statement of the case). Going forward, courts understood Morgan to require deference on 
questions of fact to the ultimate result of the interference proceeding—which, in cases where the party 
who had lost in the Patent Office had pursued an appeal, meant the result reached by the Court of 
Appeals. See, e.g., Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co. v. Miller Saw Trimmer Co., 2 F.2d 744, 745-47 
(W.D. Pa. 1923), aff ’d, 6 F.2d 417, 417-18 (3d Cir. 1925) (discussing an interference proceeding in which 
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia had reversed the Patent Office, and invoking Morgan 
to require deference to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals rather than the conclusion 
reached by the Patent Office); infra note 554 and accompanying text. 
541 See Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 1, 27 Stat. 434, 434-35 (providing that the court’s judges “shall 
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold office 
during good behavior”); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 544-45 (1933) (holding that both 
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, as then constituted, “are 
courts of the United States, vested generally with the same jurisdiction as that possessed by the inferior 
federal courts located elsewhere in respect of the cases enumerated in § 2 of Art. III”); cf. Fed. Radio 
Comm’n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 468 (1930) (not denying that the then-existing courts for the 
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give the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia not only judicial 
jurisdiction but also “jurisdiction . . . over quasi judicial or administrative 
matters,” and decisions in patent-interference appeals arguably fell into that 
category.542 In the 1890s, though, the Supreme Court had characterized the role 
that the Court of Appeals played in those cases as “judicial.”543) 
Admittedly, even if the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia was 
acting as a true court in patent-interference appeals, it did not preside over 
the introduction of evidence; it was supposed to “revise the decision appealed 
from in a summary way, on the evidence produced before the 
Commissioner.”544 Still, the court could and did reach its own conclusions 
about what the evidence showed. In case after case, the court reviewed the 
record and formed its own opinion about whether the Commissioner had 
ruled for the correct party.545 
That approach reflects an aspect of the relevant statutes that modern 
readers may miss. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the word 
 
District of Columbia could exercise “judicial” power, but indicating—contrary to O’Donoghue—that 
they were not Article III courts); Nelson, supra note 2, at 575-76 (noting early uncertainty about 
Congress’s ability to create non-Article III courts for the District of Columbia). 
542 See O’Donoghue, 281 U.S. at 545 (invoking Congress’s special authority over the District of 
Columbia, and citing two patent cases and a trademark case as having upheld Congress’s ability to give 
D.C. courts powers and duties “of an exceptional and advisory character”); see also Postum Cereal Co. v. 
Calif. Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 698-99 (1927) (concluding that the decision of the Court of Appeals of 
the District of Columbia in a trademark-interference appeal “is not a judicial judgment” but “is merely 
an instruction to the Commissioner of Patents by a court which is made part of the machinery of the 
Patent Office for administrative purposes”); Rousso v. First Nat’l Bank, 37 F.2d 281, 283 (6th Cir. 1930) 
(“In passing upon an issue raised upon appeal in interference proceedings, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia acts as a branch or arm of the Patent Office, and not in a judicial capacity.”). 
543 United States ex rel. Bernardin v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 589 (1899) (asserting that back when 
Congress had authorized individual judges of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia to hear 
appeals from the Commissioner, those judges were “called on to act as a special judicial tribunal,” 
and concluding that Congress could instead give this role to “existing courts of competent 
jurisdiction,” because “the nature of the thing to be done [is] judicial”); cf. Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 
App. D.C. 404, 405 (1894) (denying a motion to seal the records of an appeal, and explaining that 
even if the Patent Office’s rules allowed proceedings in the Patent Office to be kept secret, “the 
Patent Office is a branch of one of the executive departments of the government, and . . . this is a 
public court of record, governed by very different principles and considerations, in respect to its 
records and proceedings, from those that apply to an executive department”). 
544 Rev. Stat. § 4914, 18 Stat. 958 (1874). 
545 See, e.g., Fagan v. Whitmore, 18 F.2d 182, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (“[F]rom a review of the 
evidence we are of the opinion that Whitmore failed to show due diligence in developing his 
machine . . . . We therefore agree with the decisions of the Examiner of Interference and the 
Examiners in Chief, and reverse the decision of the Commissioner of Patents.”); Tyler v. Kelch, 19 
App. D.C. 180, 184-91 (1902) (noting that the Commissioner had awarded priority to Kelch, and 
examining the record to answer the following question: “Was [the Commissioner] right in that 
conclusion?”); Beals v. Finkenbiner, 12 App. D.C. 23, 25 (1897) (“As is quite common in this class of 
cases, there is a mass of conflicting evidence in the record, which requires careful consideration and 
comparison in order to arrive at the merits of the controversy	.	.	.	.”); id. at 25-32 (reviewing that 
evidence in detail and ultimately reversing the acting Commissioner’s decision). 
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“appeal” frequently had a technical meaning. At that time, the “two principal 
methods known to English jurisprudence, and to the jurisprudence of the 
Federal courts, by which cases may be removed from an inferior to an appellate 
court for review” were “the writ of error and the appeal.”546 When Congress 
authorized review by writ of error, the reviewing court could consider questions 
of law but could not second-guess the lower court’s conclusions on any 
“controverted question of fact.”547 (Much the same was true of the common-law 
writ of certiorari, which might be used “to bring up after judgment the 
proceedings of an inferior court or tribunal, whose procedure is not according 
to the course of the common law”; when used for this purpose, certiorari was 
said to be “in the nature of a writ of error.”548) By contrast, when Congress 
authorized an “appeal” without imposing any special restrictions, the case was 
brought up “for re-examination on all the merits, whether of law or fact, and 
for consideration on these, as though no decree had ever been rendered.”549 
Ever since 1839, when Congress first authorized an “appeal” from decisions 
of the Commissioner of Patents to Article III judges, Congress did impose 
some special restrictions, including the proviso that the judges were “to revise 
such decisions . . . on the evidence produced before the Commissioner.”550 
Between 1870 and 1893, moreover, Congress excluded interference cases from 
the appeal mechanism.551 But in the 1880s, the Supreme Court described the 
then-existing procedure as “a technical appeal” (that is, an appeal in the 
 
546 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 621 (1875). 
547 Id. 
548 Harris v. Barber, 129 U.S. 366, 368-69 (1889); see also FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF 
NEW TRIALS, AND OTHER REHEARINGS; INCLUDING WRITS OF ERROR, APPEALS, ETC. 691 
(Philadelphia, Kay & Brother, 2d ed. 1872) (“The office of a certiorari is to review questions of law, 
not of fact; and, in examining into evidence, the appellate court does not determine the preponderance 
of probabilities, but simply whether the evidence will justify the finding as a legitimate inference from 
the facts proved . . . .”); HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LEGAL REMEDIES OF 
MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION, HABEAS CORPUS, CERTIORARI AND QUO WARRANTO 209 
(Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 1880) (“[W]here the error is as to the facts the writ does not lie.”). 
549 Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 621; see also, e.g., Smith v. Chase, 22 F. Cas. 478, 479-80 
(C.C.D.C. 1828) (No. 13,022) (“By the civil law an appeal brings up the whole cause, fact as well as 
law, to the appellate court; . . . the cause commences de novo in the appellate court, where the 
plaintiff . . . is allowed to make new allegations, and produce new evidence . . . .”); Wiscart v. 
D’Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (opinion of Ellsworth, C.J.) (“An appeal is a process of civil 
law origin, and . . . subject[s] the fact as well as the law, to a review and re-trial . . . .”). 
550 Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 11, 5 Stat. 353, 354-55; see also Rev. Stat. § 4914, 18 Stat. 958 
(1874) (setting forth a successor of this provision). 
551 See supra note 535. 
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technical sense),552 and that presumably remained true in 1893 when Congress 
re-authorized the “appeal” in interference cases.553 
Thus, in the early twentieth century, when courts held that Morgan v. 
Daniels required them to defer to the results of interference proceedings that 
had gone against existing patentees, the courts were not simply deferring to the 
Patent Office’s conclusions. Unless the patentee had waived the right to appeal, 
the results of such interference proceedings were determined by the Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia (a true federal court that was capable of 
exercising “judicial” power) on the basis of its own evaluation of the evidence 
that had been submitted to the agency. Indeed, one of the leading examples of 
a judicial opinion that used the results of an interference proceeding against an 
existing patentee is a case in which the Commissioner of Patents had ruled in 
favor of the patentee, only to be reversed by the Court of Appeals of the District 
of Columbia.554 When later courts deferred to the results of this proceeding, 
the conclusion to which they were deferring was that of the court, not the 
Commissioner of Patents or any other executive tribunal. 
Although the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia normally 
applied the rule that “we must form our own conclusion independently of 
[the Patent Office’s tribunals],”555 the court did give substantial deference to 
those tribunals in one situation. By statute, multiple layers of review were 
available within the Patent Office itself, and each layer could entail 
independent judgment.556 From the 1890s to the early 1920s, if “the expert 
 
552 Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 61 (1884); cf. Phillips v. Preston, 46 
U.S. (5 How.) 278, 289 (1847) (contrasting “a writ of error to bring the law and not the facts here 
for reexamination” with “a technical appeal, where the facts are to be reviewed and reconsidered”). 
553 See Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 9, 27 Stat. 434, 436 (addressing the existing provisions for 
appeals and adding that “in addition, any party aggrieved by a decision of the Commissioner of Patents 
in any interference case may appeal therefrom to [the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia]”); 
see also Dower v. Richards, 151 U.S. 658, 663 (1894) (“In the legislation of Congress, from the foundation 
of the government, a writ of error, which brings up matter of law only, has always been distinguished 
from an appeal, which, unless expressly restricted, brings up both law and fact.”); The Francis Wright, 
105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882) (“Undoubtedly, if Congress should give an appeal in admiralty causes, and say 
no more, the facts, as well as the law, would be subjected to review and retrial . . . .”). 
554 See Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 290 F. 565, 572 (D. Del. 1923) 
(summarizing the course of the interference proceeding), aff ’d, 8 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1925), aff ’d, 273 U.S. 
670 (1927); see also Reilly, supra note 503, at 388 & n.59 (citing Victor Talking Machine as evidence that 
courts deferred to the results of interference proceedings even “when the interference involved an 
issued patent”); cf. Gregory Dolin, Yes, the PTAB Is Unconstitutional, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 
457, 469 (2018) (“Nothing in Victor Talking serves to undermine the conclusion that in the 19th century 
the courts viewed issued patents as indistinguishable from other forms of property and required that 
any doubts about their validity be resolved in properly constituted Article III tribunals.”). 
555 Hillard v. Brooks, 23 App. D.C. 526, 531 (1904). 
556 See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Gathmann, 299 F. 702, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (“The tribunals of the 
Patent Office, after independent examination of the evidence, each reached the conclusion that 
Gathmann was the first to conceive and reduce to practice the particular invention here 
involved . . . .”). Before 1927, there were three relevant tribunals within the Patent Office: after an 
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tribunals of the Patent Office” had considered a question of fact carefully and 
had all reached the same conclusion, the Court of Appeals typically accepted 
that conclusion in the absence of “a clear . . . showing of error.”557 Still, this 
deference usually did not operate against existing patentees, because the 
Patent Office itself usually applied a strong presumption in favor of the 
validity of existing patents; to prevail against an existing patentee in an 
interference proceeding, a later applicant had to establish the priority of his 
invention beyond a reasonable doubt.558 Insofar as it was unusual for the 
Patent Office to resolve interference proceedings against an existing patentee, 
the deference doctrines applied by the Court of Appeals of the District of 
Columbia normally would not have raised concerns about the need for fully 
judicial adjudication of vested rights. 
In 1929, Congress transferred jurisdiction over Patent Office appeals from 
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to the newly renamed Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), but the system otherwise remained 
stable.559 By contrast, the Patent Act of 1952 made important changes. Under 
 
initial examiner rendered a decision, any party could “appeal . . . to the board of examiners-in-chief,” 
and a party dissatisfied with the board’s decision could “appeal to the Commissioner in person.” See 
Rev. Stat. §§ 4909–10, 18 Stat. 958 (1874). In 1927, Congress consolidated the second and third levels, 
creating a new Board of Appeals within the Patent Office that included both the Commissioner and 
the examiners-in-chief. See Act of Mar. 2, 1927, ch. 273, §§ 3, 5–6, 44 Stat. 1335, 1335-36. 
557 McBerty v. Cook, 16 App. D.C. 133, 136 (1900); cf. Lindmark v. Hodgkinson, 31 App. D.C. 612, 
614 (1908) (referring to the idea that “where three tribunals of the Patent Office have concurred	. . . , 
this court will follow them unless a manifest error has been committed,” and suggesting that this is 
especially true on a complex question “about which the experts of the Patent Office are less liable to err 
than ourselves”). In 1922, the court cut back on this practice. See Bungay v. Grey, 281 F. 423, 425 (D.C. 
Cir. 1922) (“[W]hile concurrent decisions of the Patent Office tribunals should be regarded as 
persuasive and given due consideration and respect, nevertheless if material error has been made to 
appear, it is our duty, as in any case, to enter judgment accordingly. We . . . overrule prior opinions 
inconsistent with this view.”). But in 1929, after Congress redirected patent appeals from the Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the practice 
reappeared. See Stern v. Schroeder, 36 F.2d 515, 517 (C.C.P.A. 1929) (indicating that at least on “highly 
technical” questions, “when the tribunals of the Patent Office concur in findings of fact, such findings 
will not be disturbed by this court, unless the decision appealed from is manifestly wrong”). 
558 See Hunter v. Jenkin, 1891 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 157, 160 (“When one of the contestants has a 
patent for the invention in dispute, and the other is an applicant for a patent, the latter, in order to 
prevail, must present a case, both as to conception and as to reasonable diligence, which does not 
admit of a reasonable doubt.”); see also, e.g., Dillon v. Kimball, 1892 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 9, 9 (“As Kimball 
and Wirt had a patent before Dillon’s application was filed, Dillon must . . . prove his case beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”); cf. supra note 523 (noting the presumption of validity applied by courts). 
559 See Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 2(a), 45 Stat. 1475, 1476. Soon after Congress enacted 
this statute, the Supreme Court held that the CCPA was not an Article III court. See Ex parte 
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458-60 (1929); see also United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 
1985 (2021) (citing Bakelite and saying that the CCPA was “an entity within the Executive Branch 
until 1958”). That holding may have been wrong. See Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. 85-755, § 1, 72 
Stat. 848, 848 (1958) (declaring that the CCPA is indeed “a court established under article III”); see 
also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 550 (1962) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) (observing that 
Bakelite’s contrary conclusion had rested on a “non sequitur”). But whether the CCPA was an Article 
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the 1952 statute, when the Commissioner declared an interference between 
two applications or between an application and an unexpired patent, “[t]he 
question of priority of invention shall be determined by a board of patent 
interferences (consisting of three examiners of interferences),” which would 
announce a decision on behalf of the Patent Office.560 If that decision was 
“adverse to a patentee,” it would automatically “constitute cancellation of the 
claims involved from the patent” once any opportunity for appeal or other 
review had passed.561 Thus, the Patent Act of 1952 was the first statute to give 
the Patent Office direct authority to cancel an existing patent. 
Before any such cancellation took effect, though, the patentee would have 
the opportunity for judicial proceedings. More generally, any party to an 
interference proceeding who was dissatisfied with the board’s determination 
of priority could choose either to appeal to the CCPA (under 35 U.S.C. § 141) 
or to seek relief in a freestanding civil action (under 35 U.S.C. § 146).562 In 
practice, the statute gave freestanding civil actions precedence over appeals 
to the CCPA; if a party filed an appeal, any adverse party could get the appeal 
dismissed by making an election “to have all further proceedings conducted 
as provided in section 146,” and the would-be appellant would then have 
thirty days to file a freestanding civil action under section 146.563 As applied 
against existing patentees, whether this system was compatible with the 
traditional doctrine of vested rights therefore depended on the nature of the 
proceeding that section 146 authorized. 
Section 146 specified that the court could consider the administrative 
record (if introduced on motion of either party), but “without prejudice to 
the right of the parties to take further testimony.”564 As a result, proceedings 
under section 146 were at least partially “de novo” in the sense that the parties 
could introduce new evidence.565 Still, the statute did not specify which party 
 
III court or had some other possible justification, Congress seems to have thought that the CCPA 
wielded judicial power. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 928 (enacting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1256, which allowed the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction directly over the CCPA); 
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523-27 (1966) (discussing the constitutional issues raised by 
§ 1256); cf. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2172-80 (2018) (discussing the constitutionality of 
28 U.S.C. § 1259, which allows the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction directly over 
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces). 
560 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 801-02 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 135). 
561 Id. at 802. 
562 See id. at 802-03 (enacting 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 146). 
563 See id. at 802 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 141). In contrast to the version of the statute that had 
been in effect from 1927 until 1952, that was true even if the would-be appellant was an existing 
patentee rather than simply a disappointed applicant. Cf. supra note 535. 
564 Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat. at 803 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 146). 
565 See, e.g., AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1296-
97 (Fed. Cir. 2014). At least for a time, there was a circuit split about the nature of the new evidence 
that could be introduced. See Case v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 730 F.2d 745, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Some courts 
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had the burden of proof or what level of proof was necessary. For years, many 
courts filled this gap by invoking Morgan v. Daniels: they held that whichever 
party had lost in the Patent Office (later renamed the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO)) bore the burden of proving its priority with evidence carrying 
“thorough conviction.”566 If applied against an existing patentee, that 
approach might give an executive-branch adjudication greater effect than the 
traditional doctrine of vested rights would have permitted. More recently, 
however, the Federal Circuit concluded that “a § 146 action is a new civil 
proceeding subject to de novo determination” (at least when new evidence is 
introduced), and the burden of proof rested on the junior applicant rather 
than on the party who lost in the PTO.567 On that understanding, the PTO’s 
role in interference proceedings remained compatible with the constitutional 
framework described in Part I. 
C. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC 
In a sense, interference proceedings under the Patent Act of 1952 laid the 
groundwork for the patent-cancellation provisions in the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (AIA)—the 2011 statute that the Supreme Court 
considered in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC.568 
The Oil States case has already triggered voluminous commentary, and I will 
 
noted that interference proceedings in the Patent Office normally did not include live testimony, 
and they suggested that this limitation might explain the “further testimony” contemplated by 
section 146; these courts suggested that although parties in civil actions under section 146 could call 
witnesses whose depositions had been submitted to the Patent Office, the parties should not be 
allowed to introduce other new evidence unless they had an adequate reason for not having presented 
it to the Patent Office. See, e.g., Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 579 F.2d 1038, 1043-46 (7th 
Cir. 1978). More recently, however, the Supreme Court has rejected an analogous limitation in civil 
actions brought under section 145, see Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 437-46 (2012), and the Federal 
Circuit has held that “the Supreme Court’s decision . . . applies with equal force to both § 145 and 
§ 146 actions.” Troy v. Samson Mfg. Corp., 758 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
566 Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 125 (1894); see Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Montedison, S.p.A., 
664 F.2d 356, 361-62 (3d Cir. 1981); Velsicol, 579 F.2d at 1042; Boyce v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 818, 821-22 (9th 
Cir. 1971); Kirschke v. Lamar, 426 F.2d 870, 873 n.3 (8th Cir. 1970); Tidewater Pat. Dev. Co. v. Gillette 
Co., 273 F.2d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Szuecs, 240 F.2d 886, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
567 Streck, Inc. v. Rsch. & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 659 F.3d 1186, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal 
Circuit did not necessarily call for de novo review “when no new evidence has been introduced” in the 
district court. See Troy, 758 F.3d at 1328 (suggesting that if the parties simply submitted a case to the 
district court on the administrative record, Morgan’s deferential standard would apply). Still, live 
testimony counted as new evidence for this purpose (and therefore triggered a need for “de novo factual 
findings”) even if its substance mirrored testimony that had been presented to the PTO via affidavits 
or deposition transcripts. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
568 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018); see Jeffrey P. Kushan, The Fruits of the Convoluted Road to Patent Reform: 
The New Invalidity Proceedings of the Patent and Trademark Office, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 390 
(2012) (“[T]he[] lineage [of the new procedures] is the PTO’s patent-interference practice.”). 
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not rehash more than necessary.569 As background, though, we must start with 
the two statutes that are commonly seen as precursors of the AIA. 
1. The Traditional Framework and Patent “Reexamination” After 1980 
In 1980, Congress established a procedure by which the PTO could 
“reexamin[e]” the patentability of one or more claims in patents that it had 
already issued.570 Specifically, “[a]ny person at any time” could alert the PTO 
to “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications” that the person 
“believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a particular 
patent,” and the person could ask the PTO to reexamine the claim on the 
basis of the cited prior art.571 If the Commissioner determined that the 
request raised “a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim 
of the patent,”572 the Commissioner would invite a response from the patent 
owner, and the PTO would conduct a reexamination according to the same 
procedures used for initial examinations.573 If the examiner ultimately ruled 
against the patent owner, the patent owner could appeal to the PTO’s Board 
of Appeals—and if the patent owner lost there, 35 U.S.C. § 306 specified that 
“[t]he patent owner . . . may seek court review under the provisions of 
sections 141 to 145 of this title.”574 But after this opportunity for judicial 
review, the Commissioner would “issue and publish a certificate canceling any 
claim of the patent finally determined to be unpatentable” (and “confirming 
any claim of the patent determined to be patentable”).575 
As with interference proceedings, whether this procedure comported with 
the traditional doctrine of vested rights depended on the legal effect of the 
PTO’s determinations, which in turn depended on the nature of the judicial 
review permitted under sections 141 to 145. Those provisions operated when 
the PTO had denied an application for a patent, and they gave the 
disappointed applicant a choice: appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (an Article III court that had replaced the CCPA) under 
 
569 For analyses that proceed in traditional terms, see Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 
Tackles Patent Reform: Inter Partes Review Under the AIA Undermines the Structural Protections Offered 
by Article III Courts, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 188 (2018); Gary Lawson, Appointments and Illegal 
Adjudication: The America Invents Act Through a Constitutional Lens, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 26 
(2018); Adam J. MacLeod, Public Rights After Oil States Energy, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1281 
(2020); Mossoff, supra note 11; Justin Burnham, Note, Patents in the Political Branches, 16 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 559 (2018). 
570 See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015. 
571 Id. at 3015 (enacting 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–02). 
572 Id. (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 303). The Commissioner could also make such a determination 
“[o]n his own initiative,” without a request for reexamination. Id. at 3015-16. 
573 Id. at 3016 (enacting 35 U.S.C. §§ 304–05). 
574 Id. 
575 Id. at 3016-17 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 307). 
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procedures described in sections 141 to 144, or file a civil action against the 
Commissioner in federal district court under section 145. By piggybacking 
upon these provisions, the 1980 statute gave the same choice to patent owners 
who lost a reexamination proceeding. 
As interpreted by the modern Supreme Court, sections 141 to 144 do not 
authorize an “appeal” in the old-fashioned sense.576 Instead of making its own 
factual findings, the Federal Circuit must accept the PTO’s findings unless 
they are “unsupported by substantial evidence” (or, perhaps, “arbitrary, 
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion”)—standards that are familiar from 
judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),577 but that traditionally might have been regarded as inadequate when 
an agency had ruled against a claim of vested rights.578 
From the standpoint of the traditional framework, though, the other option 
offered by the 1980 statute was better. Rather than appealing under sections 141 
to 144, patent owners who lost a reexamination proceeding could bring a 
freestanding civil action in a federal district court under section 145. At least as 
the Supreme Court now interprets section 145, such actions can be largely de 
novo.579 The parties can introduce all relevant evidence whether or not they 
presented it to the PTO—and if a party does introduce new evidence on a 
disputed question of fact, “the district court must make de novo factual findings 
that take account of both the new evidence and the administrative record before 
 
576 Cf. supra notes 549–53 and accompanying text. 
577 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (holding that 
“§ 706 applies when the Federal Circuit reviews findings of fact made by the Patent and Trademark 
Office” in an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 141). But see Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the 
Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 172-78 (2000) (criticizing Zurko and observing that 
“until the mid-1990s, no one had ever suggested that APA Section 10(e) applied to PTO review”). 
578 See Evan D. Bernick, Is Judicial Deference to Agency Fact-Finding Unlawful?, 16 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 27, 30 (2018) (arguing broadly that “judicial deference to agency fact-finding is 
unconstitutional in cases involving deprivations of . . . core private rights to life, liberty, and property,” 
and referring to “an independent model of judicial review of governmental action that was applied from 
the Founding Era until the late nineteenth century” (some emphasis omitted)); cf. Nelson, supra note 
2, at 618 (noting that even today, “allowing federal administrative agencies to adjudicate ordinary 
criminal cases on the same basis that agencies currently handle disputes about broadcast licenses or 
pilots’ certificates would violate longstanding understandings of our constitutional arrangements”). 
579 See Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 433-34 (2012). Before the Supreme Court issued this 
opinion, some courts had imposed special restrictions on the evidence that could be introduced in 
§ 145 actions and had also deferred to the PTO’s findings of fact. See, e.g., DeSeversky v. Brenner, 
424 F.2d 857, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (saying that although the plaintiff “may introduce evidence not 
previously presented to the Patent Office,” the plaintiff “is precluded from presenting new issues, at 
least in the absence of some reason of justice put forward for failing to present the issue to the Patent 
Office”); Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.–Petrobras v. Comm’r of Pats. & Trademarks, Civ. A. No. 85-3743, 
1987 WL 14141, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1987) (“Under 35 U.S.C. § 145, this Court may set aside factual 
findings of the Board only if they are clearly erroneous, based on the record before the Board and 
any new evidence presented in trial.”). 
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the PTO.”580 While a party’s failure to present certain evidence to the PTO 
might affect the weight that the district court itself chooses to give that 
evidence,581 the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the idea “that [the] 
district court should defer to the PTO’s factual findings”; in the Supreme 
Court’s words, “the district court must make its own findings de novo and does 
not act as the ‘reviewing court’ envisioned by the APA.”582 Because 35 U.S.C. 
§ 306 allowed patent owners to bring this same sort of civil action before the 
PTO’s adverse decision in a reexamination proceeding would take effect, the 
1980 statute did not necessarily violate the traditional doctrine of vested rights. 
In 1999, Congress gave the name “ex parte reexamination” to the 
administrative procedure that the 1980 statute had created.583 Congress also 
created a new administrative procedure called “inter partes reexamination” 
that entailed a more adversarial presentation to the PTO and that again could 
result in the cancellation of one or more claims in an existing patent.584 Before 
the cancellation took effect, the owner of the patent could “appeal under the 
provisions of sections 141 through 144,” but Congress did not allow the owner 
to bring an original civil action under section 145.585 At the same time, 
Congress arguably eliminated that option in “ex parte” reexaminations as 
well.586 Still, Congress did not apply these changes to any patents that had 
already been granted; the provisions in the relevant subtitle of the 1999 
statute operated only with respect to patents for which an original application 
was filed on or after the statute’s date of enactment.587 
 
580 Hyatt, 566 U.S. at 444, 446. 
581 See id. at 445 (“[T]he district court may, in its discretion, ‘consider the proceedings before 
and findings of the Patent Office in deciding what weight to afford an applicant’s newly-admitted 
evidence.’” (quoting Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010))). 
582 Id. at 438; see also Michael S. Greve, Exceptional, After All and After Oil States: Judicial Review and 
the Patent System, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 26-35 (2020) (discussing the relationship among the 
Administrative Procedure Act, appeals under sections 141 to 144, and original civil actions under section 145). 
583 See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999 (IPCORA), 
Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I, § 4602, 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-567. 
584 Id. § 4604, 113 Stat. at 1501A-567 to 1501A-570. 
585 Id., 113 Stat. at 1501A-569 (enacting a new 35 U.S.C. § 315). 
586 Although Congress did not modify 35 U.S.C. § 306, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 141 to say 
that “[a] patent owner in any reexamination proceeding” who was dissatisfied with the PTO’s final 
decision “may appeal the decision only to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” 
Id. § 4605(c), 113 Stat. at 1501A-571 (emphasis added); see also In re Teles AG Informationstechnologien, 
747 F.3d 1357, 1361-66 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing Congress’s sloppiness in failing to amend § 306, but 
concluding that “the 1999 amendments eliminated the right of patent owners to secure review under 
§ 145”). In 2011, the AIA finally amended § 306 to drop the reference to § 145. See Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. 112-29, § 6(h)(2)(A), 125 Stat. 284, 312. 
587 IPCORA § 4608(a), 113 Stat. at 1501A-572. 
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2. The America Invents Act of 2011 
In 2011, the AIA made major changes to the patent system. Most 
significantly, the AIA changed the basis on which patents would be granted 
going forward.588 But apart from altering the test for granting patents in the 
future, the AIA also established two new procedures for asking the PTO to 
cancel patents after issuing them. 
One of those procedures, called “post-grant review,” expanded 
considerably upon the reasons that would have supported administrative 
reexamination of a patent under prior law. Within the first nine months after 
a patent is issued, “a person who is not the owner” can now petition the PTO 
to cancel some or all of the patent’s claims on the basis of any arguments 
about invalidity that could be raised as defenses in an infringement suit.589 In 
response to such a petition, the PTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB) might conduct an adversarial proceeding that can result in 
cancellation of one or more of the patent’s claims.590 (Before the PTO issues 
 
588 Previous federal patent laws had used “a first-to-invent rule”: generally speaking, “the 
United States . . . award[ed] patent rights to the first inventor to create an invention even if he or 
she filed a patent application later than another inventor.” Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus 
Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 79 n.24 (2013). The AIA shifted to what it labeled a “first 
inventor to file” rule: as between two people who have independently invented the same thing, the 
first to apply for a patent normally wins. See AIA § 3, 125 Stat. at 285-93; Ford, supra, at 79 n.24. In 
keeping with this shift, Congress also reformulated the traditional “interference” proceedings; it is 
no longer necessary to determine the priority of invention, but the PTO can conduct what are now 
called “derivation” proceedings to test the independence of someone’s alleged invention. See AIA 
§ 3(i)–(j), 125 Stat. at 289-91 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 135 and substituting “derivation” for 
“interference” in § 146). Of course, these particular changes did not apply to any existing patents. 
Roughly speaking, the new system applied only with respect to applications filed at least eighteen 
months after the AIA was enacted. See id. § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293. 
589 See AIA § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 306 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 321). 
590 See id. at 306-10 (enacting 35 U.S.C. §§ 324, 326, 328). The PTAB is the successor to the 
PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See id. § 7(a)(1), 125 Stat. at 313 (amending 35 U.S.C. 
§ 6). It consists of the Director and Deputy Director of the PTO, the Commissioner for Patents, the 
Commissioner for Trademarks, and many “administrative patent judges” who are “appointed by the 
Secretary [of Commerce] in consultation with the Director [of the PTO].” Id. For purposes of both 
post-grant review and inter partes review (the other new cancellation procedure created by the AIA), 
the PTAB sits in panels of at least three members, who are designated by the Director.  Id. 
Recently, in a case involving inter partes review, the Supreme Court held that if the structure 
contemplated by the AIA were given full effect, and if a panel of administrative patent judges could 
render final decisions that were not subject to review by any superior officers in the executive branch, 
then the administrative patent judges would not be “inferior” officers whose appointment can be 
vested in the Secretary of Commerce; instead, they would have to be appointed by the President by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; United States v. Arthrex, 
Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1979-83, 1985-86 (2021). To solve this perceived problem, a plurality concluded 
that “[d]ecisions by [administrative patent judges] must be subject to review by the Director,” id. at 
1986 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.), and the plurality further concluded that current law permits 
that result. See id. at 1987 (holding that 35 U.S.C. § 6(c), as enacted by the AIA, “cannot 
constitutionally be enforced to the extent that its requirements prevent the Director from reviewing 
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a certificate canceling a claim, a dissatisfied party may appeal to the Federal 
Circuit, but the court will defer to the PTAB’s factual determinations if they 
are supported by substantial evidence.591) By and large, though, the AIA’s 
provisions authorizing post-grant review operate only with respect to patents 
issued after the AIA was enacted.592 
The other new review procedure established by the AIA, “inter partes 
review,” was not limited in this way; once it took effect (one year after 
enactment of the AIA), it applied to “any patent issued before, on, or after 
that effective date.”593 But “inter partes review” simply replaced the 
mechanism for “inter partes reexamination” that had existed since 1999, and 
the main differences between the two mechanisms were procedural rather 
than substantive.594 While Congress wanted the PTAB’s procedures for “inter 
partes review” to be more court-like than the prior procedures for inter partes 
reexamination, Congress did not expand the grounds upon which the PTO 
could cancel patents through the use of these procedures. By the terms of the 
AIA, petitioners seeking inter partes review can ask the PTO to cancel a claim 
in an existing patent only on the ground that the claim is obvious or lacked 
novelty, and “only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed 
publications”595—the same things that would have allowed the PTO to cancel 
a claim under the earlier procedure of inter partes reexamination.596 
Still, the 1999 statute had made inter partes reexamination available only for 
patents issuing from applications filed on or after November 29, 1999 (the date 
 
final decisions rendered by [administrative patent judges]”); id. (“The Director accordingly may 
review final PTAB decisions and, upon review, may issue decisions himself on behalf of the Board.”). 
Although Arthrex involved “the Director’s ability to supervise [administrative patent judges] in 
adjudicating petitions for inter partes review,” id., I assume that the plurality would apply the same 
analysis to post-grant review. 
591 See AIA § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 310-11 (enacting 35 U.S.C. §§ 328–29); id. § 7(c)(1), 125 Stat. at 
314 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 141(c)); see also Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1977-78 (“The Federal Circuit reviews 
the PTAB’s application of patentability standards de novo and its underlying factual determinations 
for substantial evidence.”). 
592 See AIA § 6(f)(2)(A), 125 Stat. at 311. But cf. id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329-31 (instructing the 
Director of the PTO to issue regulations “establishing and implementing a transitional post-grant 
review proceeding for review of the validity of covered business method patents,” which claim “a 
method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the 
practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service”). 
593 Id. § 6(c)(2), 125 Stat. at 304. 
594 See H.R. Rep. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46-47 (2011) (“The [AIA] converts inter partes reexamination 
from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding, and renames the proceeding ‘inter partes 
review.’”); see also id. at 47 (listing some other changes). 
595 AIA § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 299 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)). 
596 See IPCORA, Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I, sec. 4604, § 311(a), 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-567 (1999) 
(authorizing requests for inter partes reexamination “on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions 
of section 301”); 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (permitting the citation of “prior art consisting of patents or printed 
publications”); see also Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“In [inter partes reviews], 
patents are reviewed on the same substantive grounds . . . as ex parte and inter partes reexaminations.”). 
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the statute was enacted).597 The application for the patent involved in the Oil 
States case had been filed a few months earlier,598 so that patent would not have 
been subject to inter partes reexamination. From 2012 on, however, the AIA 
nonetheless purported to expose the patent to inter partes review. After the 
patent’s owner (Oil States Energy Services, LLC) sued Greene’s Energy Group, 
LLC, for infringement, the defendant in that suit did indeed ask the PTO to 
initiate an inter partes review of two of the patent’s claims, and the PTAB 
concluded that the two claims were unpatentable.599 Oil States appealed to the 
Federal Circuit, arguing both that the claims were patentable and that the AIA’s 
provisions about inter partes review were unconstitutional. The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the PTAB’s decision, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari.600 
For some reason, “Oil States [did] not challenge the retroactive 
application of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in place 
when its patent issued.”601 Instead, Oil States suggested that no matter what 
conditions the law might try to impose at the time the federal government 
granted a patent, subsequent adjudication of the patent’s validity required an 
exercise of “judicial” power, at least when the adjudication involved 
adversarial proceedings between private parties.602 But a majority of the 
Supreme Court rejected this position. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion 
observed that “the decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public 
rights—specifically, the grant of a public franchise.”603 Under federal law, 
moreover, patents “are granted subject to the qualification that the PTO has 
‘the authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent claim’ in an inter 
partes review.”604 According to Justice Thomas, “This Court has recognized 
that franchises can be qualified in this manner.”605 And because Oil States had 
not made any arguments about the fact that the AIA had not been in place 
when the patent in question was granted, the Supreme Court refused to 
consider that fact.606 Without deciding what Congress could do in the absence 
 
597 See supra note 587 and accompanying text. 
598 See U.S. Patent No. 6,179,053 B1, patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/pdfs/US6179053.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B839-8YMF] (indicating that the application was filed on August 12, 1999). 
599 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (2018). 
600 See id. (summarizing the procedural posture). 
601 Id. at 1379. 
602 See Brief for Petitioner at 22-23, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712); cf. id. at 50 
(conceding that the 1980 statute authorizing the PTO to cancel patents after ex parte reexamination 
did not violate Article III, but suggesting that Congress could not validly authorize the agency to 
conduct “an adversarial proceeding with all the trappings of litigation”). 
603 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373. 
604 Id. at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016)). 
605 Id. at 1375 (citing Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U.S. 470 (1882), and other cases). But cf. 
id. at 1379 (“[O]ur decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property 
for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”). 
606 See id. at 1379. 
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of a relevant reservation, the majority held that “Congress has permissibly 
reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct [inter partes review].”607 
3. Some Possible Limits on the Reservation Theory 
The dissenters in Oil States suggested that the majority was wrong to 
equate patents with “ordinary public franchises.”608 According to the 
dissenters, early American courts had distinguished patents (which courts 
interpreted in the same manner as “other instruments creating private 
property rights, like land deeds”) from grants of “anticompetitive 
monopolies” like “the . . . exclusive right to operate a toll bridge” (which 
courts “view[ed] . . . with disfavor” and construed narrowly).609 As a 
historical matter, moreover, “most everyone considered an issued patent a 
personal right—no less than a home or farm—that the federal government 
could revoke only with the concurrence of independent judges.”610 
As we have seen, that is true. But perhaps it is true only because the 
federal government traditionally granted patents without purporting to 
reserve any authority for nonjudicial cancellation. In this respect, American 
patents differed from English patents. From the seventeenth century on, 
virtually all English patents included a clause allowing the Crown to void the 
grant upon findings made by the Crown or its Privy Council.611 By contrast, 
patents issued in the United States did not contain such clauses,612 and 
Congress did not purport to reserve any administrative cancellation authority 
until the second half of the twentieth century.613 The key issue in Oil States 
was what to make of this fact: did the federal government’s longstanding 
practice of granting patents without such reservations simply reflect a policy 
choice that Congress could change for future patents, or did the Constitution 
itself prevent Congress from building nonjudicial cancellation procedures 
into federal patent law (and causing all subsequently issued patents to be 
granted subject to those procedures)? 
 
607 Id. at 1373. 
608 Id. at 1385 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
609 Id.; see also Mossoff, Jefferson, supra note 369, at 999-1000 (providing additional citations in 
support of this contrast). 
610 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
611 See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text; Davies, supra note 325, at 102-04 
(summarizing the rise and continued use of the clause); Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, supra note 
335, at 3-5 (chronicling the clause from the eighteenth century to 1908); see also Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1377 (emphasizing this aspect of English history). 
612 See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 349, at 685. 
613 See supra text accompanying notes 560–67 (discussing the qualified authority conferred by 
the Patent Act of 1952 in interference cases); supra subsection III.C.1 (discussing later provisions 
about patent “reexamination”). 
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That sort of question is not limited to patents, or even to franchises more 
generally. Reservations are potentially an issue whenever the government 
enters into any contract or grants any type of property. Thus, even if the 
dissenters in Oil States were correct to analogize invention patents to land 
grants, they still needed to think about reservations. 
As Professors Gary Lawson and John Harrison have both observed, if the 
federal government owns a tract of land, Congress probably can authorize the 
government to convey title to a private person while retaining a reversionary 
interest that allows the government to reclaim title at any time and for any 
reason.614 Even under the traditional framework, moreover, Congress could put 
the executive branch in charge of whether to exercise this option. Of course, if 
the grantee claimed to own a fee simple absolute and denied that the 
government had retained a reversionary interest, the grantee probably would 
be able to raise this argument in court (unless the grantee waived that 
opportunity); Congress could not give the executive branch conclusive 
authority to reject a private person’s claim of vested rights. But if the 
government had indeed retained the option of reclaiming title at will, the 
government’s decision to exercise this option would not require judicial 
involvement. In Professor Harrison’s words, “exercising the government’s own 
proprietary rights” was a “characteristic executive function,” and the correlative 
private interests on the other side would have been considered privileges rather 
than vested private rights.615 One might say that an interest is not “vested” (for 
purposes of the traditional framework) if the government can revoke it at will. 
Matters were less clear when the government had retained a more qualified 
reversionary interest that came into play only in certain circumstances. The 
typical land grant made by the government in the nineteenth century was like 
that; it could be unwound upon proof of certain facts, such as fraud on the part 
of the grantee or certain kinds of mistakes on the part of the government.616 
As noted above, the Supreme Court repeatedly indicated that grantees whose 
titles were challenged on these grounds were entitled to judicial adjudication 
of the relevant facts.617 In the various opinions that established this point, 
though, the Court did not address whether the government could reserve 
power to determine the facts administratively if the government included this 
 
614 See Harrison, supra note 12, at 194-95, 203; Lawson, supra note 569, at 43. 
615 See Harrison, supra note 12, at 148-49. 
616 See supra note 428 (citing United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 525, 535 (1865)). 
617 See, e.g., Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1878) (indicating that once executive 
officials have issued a land patent and the grantee has accepted it, “all right to control the title or to 
decide on the right to the title . . . has passed from the Executive Department,” and “[i]f fraud, 
mistake, error, or wrong has been done, the courts of justice present the only remedy”); see also supra 
notes 428–32 and accompanying text. 
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condition in the initial grant. So far as I know, the Court has not answered 
that question to this day.618 
In the nineteenth century, questions of this sort did come up with respect 
to franchises. In 1876, for instance, the Minnesota legislature passed a statute 
granting a ferry franchise but specifying that “[i]f the [franchisee] . . . fail[s] 
to fulfil any of the conditions of this act, then the legislature may at any time 
alter, amend or repeal the same.”619 Five years later, the legislature repealed 
the grant.620 The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the constitutionality 
of the repeal, but only after the judiciary found that the franchisee had indeed 
failed to fulfill the conditions. The court explained that “[w]here the right 
reserved to recall the grant depends on the happening of a contingent event, 
the existence of the fact at the time of the recall must, of course, be a matter 
for judicial investigation.”621 In the court’s words, a final determination of the 
 
618 In a 1963 case about a lease for drilling rights on public land, the Supreme Court did hold 
that the statutes giving the Secretary of the Interior “general managerial powers over the public 
lands” authorized the Secretary “to cancel this lease administratively for invalidity at its inception”—
a conclusion that the Court probably would not have reached if the Court had seen constitutional 
problems. See Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 476-78 (1963). Still, the Court based this conclusion 
on the proprietary rights that the United States had retained with respect to both the land and the 
minerals that were the subject of the lease. See id. at 477-78 (“Unlike a land patent, which divests the 
Government of title, Congress under the Mineral Leasing Act has not only reserved to the United 
States the fee interest in the leased land, but has also subjected the lease to exacting restrictions and 
continuing supervision by the Secretary.”); id. at 478 (“[A] mineral lease does not give the lessee 
anything approaching the full ownership of a fee patentee, nor does it convey an unencumbered 
estate in the minerals.”); see also id. at 478 n.7 (contrasting the limited leasehold in question with the 
full-fledged property rights enjoyed by “a mining claimant whose location is perfected”); cf. Noble 
v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893) (treating a right of way over public lands 
as property and concluding that the Secretary of the Interior could not unilaterally revoke it). 
Although the Supreme Court cited Boesche in Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1376 n.3 (2018), Boesche 
may not really apply to patents for inventions. Indeed, patents for inventions might not implicate 
the government’s proprietary rights at all. Although unpatented things are said to be in the public 
domain, that phrase simply means that each member of the public is at liberty to make and use those 
things. In contrast to other forms of public ownership, this general liberty might not give the 
government proprietary rights of the sort that we expect the executive branch to manage. See United 
States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 238 (1897) (observing that although patents for inventions 
resemble patents for land in some respects, “the patent for an invention is not a conveyance of 
something which the Government owns”); accord Marsh v. Nichols, Shephard & Co., 128 U.S. 605, 
611 (1888); Att’y Gen. ex rel. Hecker v. Rumford Chem. Works, 32 F. 608, 622 (C.C.D.R.I. 1876). 
Even if patent rights did originate with the public in the same proprietary sense as rights in public 
lands, moreover, the Constitution speaks of “securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their . . . Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). That language might 
prevent the government from retaining any ownership interest when it does grant a patent, and 
hence might rule out the sort of co-ownership that was at issue in Boesche. See Harrison, supra note 
12, at 195 (flagging this issue and noting that it arose obliquely at oral argument in Oil States). 
619 Act of Mar. 6, 1876, ch. 132, § 7, 1876 Minn. Spec. Laws 215, 216. 
620 Act of Feb. 24, 1881, ch. 364, § 1, 1881 Minn. Spec. Laws 918, 918. 
621 Myrick v. La Moure, 23 N.W. 549, 549 (Minn. 1885). 
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legislature’s “right[] . . . to enforce the forfeiture” was “necessarily and 
inherently a judicial question, which only the judiciary can decide.”622 
At roughly the same time, though, the U.S. Supreme Court arguably 
pointed in the opposite direction. In 1869, Congress had passed a joint 
resolution consenting to the erection of a bridge over the Ohio River by the 
Newport and Cincinnati Bridge Company.623 The resolution had specified 
some minimum requirements for the bridge, but it had added: 
Congress reserves the right to withdraw the assent hereby given in case the 
free navigation of said river shall at any time be substantially and materially 
obstructed by any bridge to be erected under the authority of this resolution, 
or to direct the necessary modifications and alterations of said bridge.624 
Two years later, Congress enacted a statute imposing more stringent 
requirements to protect navigation.625 Aware that the company had already 
begun construction according to the old plan, Congress authorized the 
company to sue the United States to determine whether the government was 
liable to the company because of the required changes.626 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court held that the United States was not liable. In the course of 
its opinion, the Court indicated that although the reservation clause in the 
joint resolution had allowed Congress to withdraw consent only in case of a 
substantial obstruction to navigation, the existence of such an obstruction did 
not have to be “judicially ascertained.”627 To be sure, “Congress can exercise 
legislative power only,” and so “all its reservations of power, connected with 
grants that are made, must necessarily be legislative in character.”628 But the 
Court thought that identifying the due requirements for protecting 
navigation along an artery of interstate commerce was indeed legislative—
and as the Court interpreted the reservation clause, “[t]he withdrawal of 
assent . . . has been left to depend on the judgment of Congress in the exercise 
of its legislative discretion.”629 The Court concluded that the reservation 
clause “expressly” made the bridge company’s franchise “defeasible at will,” 
and the bridge company could not complain about Congress’s “legitimate 
exercise of the power that was reserved.”630 
 
622 Id. at 550. 
623 J. Res. 21, 40th Cong., Sess. 3, 15 Stat. 347 (1869). 
624 Id. at 348. 
625 Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 121, § 5, 16 Stat. 571, 572-73. 
626 Id. at 573. 
627 Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U.S. 470, 480 (1882). 
628 Id. 
629 Id. at 480-82. 
630 Id. at 481-82. But see id. at 504 (Field, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether or not the contingency 
had occurred, was not a fact to be arbitrarily determined by the legislature. It was to be ascertained 
judicially upon proofs and after hearing the parties, like any other disputed fact upon the 
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Some corporate charters raised similar questions. If a legislature granted 
a charter but reserved the power to repeal it at will, the legislature could 
exercise this power without judicial involvement. Sometimes, though, the 
legislature reserved the power to repeal a charter only for certain reasons or 
in certain circumstances. Faced with statutes purporting to exercise this 
power, courts divided over whether they were bound to accept the legislature’s 
apparent conclusion that the required reasons had existed.631 In one case from 
1846, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Iowa interpreted the reservation 
clause in a bank’s charter to make the legislature the final arbiter of whether 
the conditions for repeal were satisfied, and the court treated the legislature’s 
decision as conclusive.632 But courts in some other states later portrayed this 
case as an outlier.633 According to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, courts 
could make their own determination of “whether the casus foederis, upon 
which the authority to repeal is based, has occurred,” and the legislature’s 
decision on this question was at most “primâ facie valid.”634 
 
establishment of which rights of property depend.”). In a later case, the Supreme Court explicitly 
distinguished between the reserved power to repeal a franchise “at the pleasure of the legislature” 
and “the power to cancel for violation of the terms of the grant.” Pub. Serv. Comm’n of P.R. v. 
Havemeyer, 296 U.S. 506, 517 (1936). The Court explained: 
In the absence of constitutional, legislative, or contractual restriction, the exertion of 
the first mentioned power requires nothing more than an appropriate declaration of 
the repeal. But, without consent of the holder, valid cancellation for condition broken 
cannot be accomplished without giving to the holder an opportunity to have the 
asserted default judicially determined. 
Id. (citation omitted). Even when a franchise was being canceled for breach of a condition, though, 
the Court observed that the “initial step” did not have to occur in the judiciary. See id. at 515 
(“Essential requirements are satisfied if the withdrawal of the privilege, declared by legislative or 
executive authority, may be followed by appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction in which the 
rights of the holders may be determined.”); cf. id. at 511, 516-18, 520 (appearing to accept a procedure 
that empowered the Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico to determine that a condition had 
been violated and to cancel a franchise on that basis, with review in the insular courts being limited 
to the record compiled in the Public Service Commission). 
631 See WM. L. CLARK & WM. L. MARSHALL, MARSHALL ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 139 
(1902) (identifying a three-way split); Horace Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under a 
Reserved Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation (pt. 1), 53 AM. L. REG. 1, 17 n.23 (1905) (same). 
632 See Miners’ Bank of Dubuque v. United States ex rel. Grant, Morris 482, 485-86 (Iowa Terr. 
1846), writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 213 (1847). According to the 
court, the power that had been reserved “amounted to an absolute power of repeal, coupled with a 
legislative pledge that such power should never be exerted [except] in the cases therein provided”—
and the latter pledge did not have to be judicially enforceable. Id. at 485. 
633 See Flint & Fentonville Plank-Road Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, 105-06 (1872) (saying 
that the Iowa case “stands alone”); Commonwealth ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Pittsburg & Connellsville 
R.R. Co., 58 Pa. (8 P.F. Smith) 26, 46-47 (1868) (referring to the Iowa case as the “one exception” 
to “[t]he current of American authorities”). 
634 Pittsburg & Connellsville, 58 Pa. (8 P.F. Smith) at 47-48; see also Iron City Bank v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 37 Pa. 340, 348 (1861) (observing that where a state reserved the power to alter or revoke bank 
charters subject to the proviso that no injustice shall be done to the corporators, “I incline to think that 
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For some judges, this debate might simply have been about the proper 
interpretation of the charter: should the legislature be understood not only to 
have reserved the power to revoke the charter in the specified circumstances, 
but also to have reserved unreviewable power to decide whether those 
circumstances obtained? In a case decided on circuit in 1865, Justice Robert 
Grier resisted reading a charter to reserve the latter power, but he appeared to 
believe that such reservations were possible.635 On the other hand, the 
distinguished judge Thomas Cooley of Michigan suggested that constitutional 
principles might prevent the legislature from reserving this adjudicative 
authority for itself.636 Treatises too were in conflict on this point.637 
The fact that a charter took effect only if accepted by the grantee, and that 
the grantee thereby consented to its terms, did not mean that legislatures had 
 
it is for the courts and not for the legislature to decide whether the repeal or modification of a bank 
charter works injustice to the corporators”); Erie & N.E. R.R. v. Casey, 26 Pa. 287, 316 (1856) (“I incline 
to the opinion that when the constitutional power of the legislature to pass a law depends on matter of 
fact, the party to be affected by it ought to have an opportunity afterwards of showing how the fact is.”). 
635 See City of Baltimore v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R.R. Co., 2 F. Cas. 570, 570 (C.C.W.D. 
Pa. 1865) (“[I]f this contract is that the legislature may repeal the act whenever, in its opinion, the 
corporation has misused or abused its privileges, then the contract constitutes the legislature the 
arbiter and judge of the existence of that fact.”). 
636 See Flint & Fentonville, 25 Mich. at 112 (indicating that “the determination whether a 
corporation has violated its charter is judicial in its nature,” even when the legislature has reserved 
the power to repeal the charter on those grounds). In Flint & Fentonville, the Michigan legislature 
had incorporated a company in 1848. The legislature had reserved the power to repeal this act, but 
the act had specified that the legislature would not exercise this power within the next thirty years 
“unless it shall be made to appear to the legislature that there has been a violation by the company 
of some of the provisions of this act.” Act of Apr. 3, 1848, No. 271, § 4, 1848 Mich. Acts 404, 405. 
Despite the phrase “to the legislature,” Justice Cooley held that “[t]he violation of the charter cannot 
be legally made to appear, except on trial in a tribunal whose course of proceeding is devised for the 
determination of questions of this nature.” Flint & Fentonville, 25 Mich. at 112. In his words, “It is 
not to be presumed that the legislature designed to take upon itself judicial powers; and as the act 
does not necessarily require that construction, it should not be given it.” Id.; cf. Report Upon the 
Petitions Relative to Annulling the Charter of the Conestoga Navigation Company (Apr. 8, 1833), 
in 2 JOURNAL OF THE FORTY THIRD HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF PENNSYLVANIA 757, 761 (Harrisburg, Henry Welsh 1833) (concluding that even when the 
legislature reserves the power to repeal a corporation’s charter if the corporation abuses or misuses 
its privileges or if the charter proves injurious to the Commonwealth, “still there ought to be a 
competent tribunal to try the facts of abuse or misuse of the privileges, or the causes which may 
have rendered them injurious,” and adding that “[i]t is . . . important to the public interests, that 
the Legislature should not be involved in judicial investigations”). 
637 Compare JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 803-04 (Boston, Little & Brown, 4th ed. 1852) (citing the Iowa 
court’s position and appearing to accept it), with HENRY O. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS HAVING CAPITAL STOCK § 458 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1884) 
(“[I]n accordance with the fundamental principles of our system of government, . . . it would seem 
proper that a judicial tribunal should determine whether or not that condition of fact exists which 
the legislature has declared shall forfeit the franchises of a corporation.”). 
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completely unfettered discretion to include whatever terms they liked.638 For 
instance, in the second half of the nineteenth century, there was widespread 
agreement that although legislatures could reserve the power to revoke or alter 
a corporation’s charter, they could not reserve the power to take a private 
corporation’s property or to destroy other vested rights without 
compensation.639 Thus, the Supreme Court observed that by virtue of a 
reservation clause, Congress could “make such alterations and amendments of 
the charter [of the Union Pacific Railroad Company] as come within the just 
scope of legislative power”—but “[a]ll agree that [this power] cannot be used 
to take away property already acquired under the operation of the charter, or 
to deprive the corporation of the fruits actually reduced to possession of 
contracts lawfully made.”640 In a circuit-court opinion a few years later, Justice 
Stephen Field likewise noted that when a state created corporations, 
[i]t cannot impose the condition that they shall not resort to the courts of law 
for the redress of injuries or the protection of [their] property; that they shall 
make no complaint if their goods are plundered and their premises invaded; 
that they shall ask no indemnity if their lands be seized for public use, or be 
taken without due process of law, or that they shall submit without objection 
to unequal and oppressive burdens arbitrarily imposed upon them; that, in 
other words, over them and their property the state may exercise unlimited 
and irresponsible power.641 
While the state could reserve the power to revoke corporate charters at the state 
legislature’s discretion, so that charter rights did not vest in the first place, the 
state could not necessarily reserve unusual power over rights that did vest. 
 
638 Cf. Miller v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 21 Barb. 513, 519 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856) (“It would be 
preposterous to say that the legislature has the power to make any and every requisition upon the 
defendants as a condition of their retaining their corporate existence.”), disapproved of by Albany N. 
R.R. Co. v. Brownell, 24 N.Y. 345, 351 (1862). 
639 See Siegel, supra note 184, at 34-35. 
640 Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 720 (1879); see also, e.g., Miller v. State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 
478, 498 (1873) (“Power to legislate, founded upon such a reservation in a charter to a private 
corporation, . . . cannot be exercised to take away or destroy rights acquired by virtue of such a 
charter, and which by a legitimate use of the powers granted have become vested in the 
corporation . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 239, 253 (1859) (“Perhaps . . . 
the rule . . . is this; that where, under power in a charter, rights have been acquired and become 
vested, no amendment or alteration of the charter can take away the property or rights which have 
become vested under a legitimate exercise of the powers granted.”). 
641 R.R. Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 754 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), writ of error dismissed, 116 U.S. 138 (1885); cf. 
Stern, supra note 631, at 25-28 (praising Justice Field’s analysis, but suggesting that “the majority of cases 
reported in the books . . . are not to be reconciled satisfactorily with the principles there enunciated”). 
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Ever since the 1870s, judges have discussed issues of this sort under the 
rubric of “unconstitutional conditions.”642 But the fact that this label has been 
around for a long time does not mean that people agree about which 
conditions are unconstitutional under which circumstances. The Supreme 
Court’s statements on this topic are “wonderfully inconsistent,”643 and 
scholars have suggested a host of different approaches.644 
Under current doctrine, there is no doubt that Congress can authorize 
decisionmakers who are not Article III judges to resolve certain disputes with 
the consent of the parties to those disputes, even when authoritative 
resolution would otherwise require judicial power. For instance, in Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Supreme Court held that as part of 
its power to execute a federal regulatory statute, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) can be given authority to adjudicate certain 
disputes about private rights with the consent of the parties to those disputes, 
subject only to modern appellate-style judicial review—so that if both sides 
choose to proceed in the CFTC, the party who loses cannot insist upon de 
novo relitigation in an Article III court.645 Likewise, in Wellness International 
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, the Supreme Court held that Congress can give the 
parties to bankruptcy cases the option of submitting claims for resolution by 
bankruptcy judges who lack the protections of Article III, even with respect 
to claims that Congress could not constitutionally authorize non-Article III 
adjudicators to resolve without the parties’ consent.646 
Yet while the parties’ freely given consent to alternative forms of dispute 
resolution can obviate the need for “judicial” power,647 federal law restricts 
 
642 See Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1877) (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also 
Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1863-66 (2008) 
(describing Doyle and later cases). 
643 Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability 
Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 374 (1995). That has been true for a long time. See, e.g., Maurice 
H. Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 879, 886 (1929) (“Although . . . dicta in 
three cases . . . seem to foreshadow it, the decision in [Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad 
Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926),] . . . conflicts with such a well-established current of adjudication 
that it is difficult to see how both can survive in . . . our constitutional law” (footnote omitted)). 
644 Leading treatments include Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: 
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Robert 
L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); and 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). For the 
observation that courts should not try to articulate “a unitary unconstitutional conditions doctrine” 
and that proper analysis will vary according to the particular constitutional provision in question, 
see Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular 
Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 595, 621 (1990). 
645 478 U.S. 833, 848-57 (1986). 
646 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942-47 (2015). 
647 Cf. Nelson, supra note 21, at 2511 (“[P]erhaps the power that is uniquely ‘judicial’—the 
power that only true courts can exercise—is the power to adjudicate and authoritatively resolve 
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what the government can do to extract such consent. Consider how Congress 
has regulated federal agencies’ use of arbitration agreements to resolve 
disputes with private parties arising out of federal programs. To the extent 
that agency officials have authority to settle such disputes, Congress is happy 
to let them agree to binding arbitration.648 But while freestanding arbitration 
agreements that serve the interests of both parties are fine, Congress has 
specified that “[a]n agency may not require any person to consent to 
arbitration as a condition of entering into a contract or obtaining a benefit.”649 
Of course, this prohibition extends well beyond disputes involving claims 
of vested rights—suggesting that Congress imposed it more for policy reasons 
than because of constitutional scruples. Whatever the rationale behind this 
particular prohibition, moreover, scattered federal statutes do condition 
government licenses or other benefits on the beneficiary’s promise to arbitrate 
certain disputes about the beneficiary’s contractual rights, property rights, or 
monetary liability650—disputes that, in the absence of consent, the traditional 
framework would have prevented Congress from authorizing nonjudicial 
decisionmakers to resolve with binding effect. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Corp., 
the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to one statute that 
arguably fit this mold (though the litigants did not emphasize the 
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine and the Court left many questions 
open).651 Other cases similarly suggest that Congress or state legislatures can 
 
disputes about certain kinds of private rights even without the consent of the purported right-
holder.”). For a critique of the relevance of consent, see F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to Adjudication 
Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND. L. REV. 715 (2018). 
648 See 5 U.S.C. § 575. William Barr—then the head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)—
testified at a congressional hearing that one version of the bill that became this statute raised 
constitutional concerns under the Appointments Clause and the theory of the unitary executive. See 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. 
of the Comm. on Governmental Affs., 101st Cong. 93-99 (1989). Since then, however, OLC has issued 
a formal opinion rejecting those concerns. See Constitutional Limitations on Federal Government 
Participation in Binding Arbitration, 19 Op. O.L.C. 208 (1995). But cf. Exec. Order No. 12,778 
§ 1(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. 359, 361 (1992) (instructing lawyers who conduct litigation for the federal 
government not to agree to “binding arbitration”—that is, arbitration capable of producing awards 
that the agency lacks discretion to reject). 
649 5 U.S.C. § 575(a)(3); see also S. REP. NO. 101-543, at 13 (1990) (“This prohibition is 
intended to help ensure that the use of arbitration is truly voluntary on all sides.”). 
650 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (mandating arbitration of certain disputes regarding an employer’s 
liability for withdrawing from a multiemployer plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act); 49 U.S.C. § 14708 (requiring motor carriers that transport household goods, as a 
condition of obtaining necessary licenses from the federal government, to offer shippers the option 
of binding arbitration to settle disputed claims of up to $10,000 for damage or loss). 
651 473 U.S. 568 (1985). Federal law prohibits the sale of pesticides that have not been 
registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and companies seeking registration 
normally must submit scientific data to the EPA. In 1978, Congress expanded the opportunities for 
would-be registrants to use data previously submitted by another company, but only if they offered 
to compensate the earlier registrant. The statute provided that if the parties did not agree on the 
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offer favorable treatment to regulated entities as part of a package, conditioned 
on the entities’ consent to administrative adjudication of claims against them.652 
Yet references to cases cannot really resolve the question, because the 
Supreme Court’s precedents about the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine 
are in conflict. Even with respect to privileges that the state could withhold 
altogether and that the state also has the power to grant subject to conditions, 
some cases broadly say that the state “may not impose conditions which require 
the relinquishment of constitutional rights.”653 In cases about the privilege of 
government employment, moreover, the modern Supreme Court has 
specifically held that the Constitution insulates the procedural requirements 
of the Due Process Clause against state modification. More precisely, if state 
law gives government employees an interest in continued employment of the 
sort that counts as “property” for purposes of modern procedural-due-process 
doctrines, and if those employees are therefore entitled to a hearing before 
being fired for cause, the state cannot avoid that conclusion simply by building 
less generous procedures into the laws that define the terms of government 
 
amount of compensation, the dispute would be resolved by arbitration, with limited judicial review. 
In Thomas, the Supreme Court rejected an original registrant’s challenge to this provision. See 
Nelson, supra note 2, at 607 (describing the majority’s analysis, but noting that unless the original 
registrant had a continuing property interest in data submitted to the government, the traditional 
framework would not have entitled the registrant to judicial adjudication); see also Thomas, 473 U.S. 
at 585 (acknowledging that federal law had preserved trade-secret protections for data submitted 
between 1972 and 1978, but observing that arbitral awards would not foreclose takings claims seeking 
additional compensation from the government for any property interests that the 1978 statute 
abrogated). In dicta, the Court suggested that the statute also adequately protected follow-on 
applicants who chose to use an earlier registrant’s data, because they “explicitly consent[ed] to have 
[their] rights determined by arbitration.” Id. at 592. Still, the Court did not decide exactly what was 
at stake for these follow-on applicants. See id. at 591 (leaving open whether arbitral awards were 
enforceable debts or whether the consequence of failing to pay an award was simply that the 
government would not register the follow-on applicant’s pesticide). 
652 Consider the early “elective” workers’ compensation statutes, which governed only those 
employers who opted into the system. In Wisconsin, the Workmen’s Compensation Act empowered 
the state’s Industrial Commission to adjudicate workers’ compensation claims against participating 
employers, and the Act made the Industrial Commission’s findings conclusive if there was any 
evidence to support them. When an employer protested that this limitation on judicial review 
subjected the employer to the deprivation of property without due process of law, the Supreme 
Court responded that “the elective or voluntary character of the Wisconsin Compensation Act” 
supplied a “complete answer.” Booth Fisheries Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 208, 210 (1926). After 
all, employers who wanted fully judicial adjudication of claims by injured employees could simply 
forgo the benefits of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and not participate in the system. “In view 
of such an opportunity for choice,” the Court concluded, “the employer who elects to accept the law 
may not complain that, in the plan for assessing the employer’s compensation for injury sustained, 
there is no particular form of judicial review.” Id. at 210-11. 
653 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). Although there 
is contrary authority too, modern cases continue to cite Frost. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 608 (2013) (“[W]e have repeatedly rejected the argument that if 
the government need not confer a benefit at all, it can withhold the benefit because someone refuses 
to give up his constitutional rights.”). 
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employment.654 States presumably cannot get around this principle simply by 
requiring prospective employees to consent to less robust procedures as a 
condition of government employment. And if the government cannot always 
grant privileges on condition that the grantees waive the procedural safeguards 
that the Constitution is understood to give that type of legal interest,655 then 
perhaps the government also cannot grant franchises or other vested rights on 
condition that the grantees accept nonjudicial adjudication of matters for 
which the Constitution ordinarily requires judicial power. 
Modern scholarship does suggest some reasons to be concerned about 
conditions on grants of franchises. By definition, franchises are available only 
from the government. Because people who are dissatisfied with the 
government’s proposed terms cannot turn to an alternative supplier, the need 
to obtain their consent does not constrain the government’s demands as much 
as it otherwise would. In circumstances of this sort, even scholars who 
ordinarily put great emphasis on consent see more room for a doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.656 
Of course, the whole concept of a franchise historically revolved around a 
bargain between the government and a private person, who received special 
grants in exchange for doing something of value for the public. Because the 
government could not simply command private people to provide ferry 
service or to build and maintain turnpikes, history makes clear that the 
 
654 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985) (rejecting the idea 
that when state law bundles substantive job protections together with special procedures for 
termination, employees “must take the bitter with the sweet” (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 
134, 154 (1974) (plurality opinion))); cf. United States v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 
282 U.S. 311, 328 (1931) (“It long has been settled in this court that the rejection of an 
unconstitutional condition imposed by a state upon the grant of a privilege, even though the state 
possess the unqualified power to withhold the grant altogether, does not annul the grant. The grantee 
may ignore or enjoin the enforcement of the condition without thereby losing the grant.”). 
655 With respect to privileges, those safeguards do not necessarily include access to a true court. 
Under the traditional framework, legislatures often could authorize executive-branch actors to 
adjudicate facts relevant to the enjoyment of mere privileges. That largely remains true today; while 
doctrines of procedural due process guard against arbitrary deprivations of certain interests that 
nineteenth-century lawyers would have classified as privileges, those doctrines can still be satisfied 
by adjudication in administrative agencies rather than courts. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 611-12. 
656 See Epstein, supra note 644, at 22 (arguing on economic grounds that “when [the state] 
provides resources of which it is the sole supplier,” it “should be limited both in the concessions that 
it may exact from private owners and in the conditions it may impose on them”); see also id. at 73 
(“Unconstitutional conditions doctrine should be invoked only when there are structural concerns 
relating to monopoly power, collective action problems, and externalities suggesting that individual 
consent will generally be an insufficient check against systematic government misbehavior.”); cf. 
Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 
22 (1983) (suggesting that due-process review of the government’s procedures for withholding or 
cancelling benefits is most appropriate when the government has either “foreclose[d] substantially 
the private market substitutes on which the claimant might otherwise have relied” or “force[d] the 
claimant, if he is to use a private market substitute, in effect to pay twice for the same good”). 
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government can grant franchises subject to some conditions that the 
Constitution would not let the government impose without consent. More 
generally, governments can obtain by contract some goods and services that 
they could not simply conscript. 
Still, history does not provide equally clear support for the idea that the 
federal government can structure grants in such a way as to create property 
interests that are identical in all substantive respects to traditional forms of 
property, but that are exempt from the procedural safeguards normally protecting 
such property. For instance, Congress generally has not tried to convey federal 
land with procedural restrictions of this sort, and until the twentieth century 
Congress did not impose any such conditions on patents for inventions either. 
History does indicate that when the government grants a franchise, the 
government can reserve the power to revoke it at will, and the executive branch 
can be put in charge of whether to exercise this option. But exercising a power 
of revocation is different than authoritatively resolving disputes about whether 
the government has such a power, or about whether a private person’s alleged 
rights ever vested in the first place. While Congress can put executive-branch 
agencies in charge of managing the government’s own proprietary rights, 
Congress cannot necessarily encumber franchises with procedural conditions 
purporting to let executive-branch agencies adjudicate disputes of the latter sort. 
At any rate, neither history nor case law definitively establishes that Congress 
can use the federal government’s grant-making powers to eliminate the need for 
“judicial” adjudication of private rights that derive from government grants. 
Some such reservations, at least, might either exceed Congress’s enumerated 
powers657 or violate affirmative limitations on those powers.658 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the majority opinion in Oil States was right or wrong, it was 
limited.659 The Supreme Court held that when the federal government issues 
a patent, the government can reserve the power to cancel the patent for 
certain causes through an administrative process, subject only to appellate-
style judicial review. But the majority explicitly refrained from deciding 
 
657 Often, Congress’s power to impose conditions on government grants would come from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. On one view, though, efforts to opt out of 
otherwise applicable separation-of-powers principles might not always be “proper” means of carrying 
the federal government’s powers into execution. Cf. Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” 
Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297 (1993) 
(arguing that to be “proper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause, “executory laws must be 
consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights”). 
658 Cf. supra notes 654–55 and accompanying text (mentioning doctrines about procedural due process). 
659 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 
(2018) (“We emphasize the narrowness of our holding.”). 
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whether Congress can unilaterally modify existing patents by imposing this 
reservation retroactively.660 
Notwithstanding the incautious reference to “franchises” in my earlier 
article,661 history answers that question in the negative. At least when the 
government granted a franchise for consideration and without valid 
reservations, the franchisee could claim a vested private right that sounded in 
property or contract. Even if the government subsequently identified some 
basis for contesting that claim, nineteenth-century lawyers would not have 
thought that the executive branch could unilaterally resolve such disputes 
itself. Throughout the nineteenth century, once a franchise had been granted 
to a private person, authoritative adjudication of disputes about its validity 
or its forfeiture normally required “judicial” power. 
 
 
660 See id. Nor did the Court address the legal effect of a cancellation upon causes of action that 
may already have accrued. Suppose that while a patent is apparently in force, a third party infringes 
it, giving the patentee a claim for damages. Even if the government subsequently exercises its reserved 
power to cancel the patent administratively, the patentee might be able to argue that the cancellation 
cannot eliminate the patentee’s accrued claim for damages. See Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 721 
(1879) (observing that when Congress exercises its reserved power to repeal or alter a corporate 
charter, “it cannot undo what has already been done”); supra notes 639–41 and accompanying text 
(discussing protections for vested rights even under the reservation theory); cf. Monaghan, supra note 
7, at 41 (noting that in Oil States, the majority indicated that “the patent revocation [pursuant to inter 
partes review] ‘does not make any binding determination’ regarding a then-pending patent 
infringement suit between the patent holder and an alleged infringer” (quoting Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1378)). Under the traditional framework, if the patentee’s cause of action for damages qualifies as a 
vested right, then a court hearing the patentee’s infringement suit might ultimately have to decide for 
itself whether the patent was valid at the time that the third party infringed it. 
661 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 567-68 (grouping franchises together with privileges rather than 
core private rights). 
